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“A Perennial Problem”:
Canadian Relations with Hungary, 1945-65
Greg Donaghy1
2014-15 marks the 50th anniversary of the establishment of Canadian-
Hungarian diplomatic relations. On January 14, 1965, under cold blue
skies and a bright sun, János Bartha, a 37-year-old expert on North Ameri-
can affairs, arrived in the cozy, wood paneled offices of the Secretary of
State for External Affairs, Paul Martin Sr. As deputy foreign minister
Marcel Cadieux and a handful of diplomats looked on, Bartha presented
his credentials as Budapest’s first full-time representative in Canada. Four
months later, on May 18, Canada’s ambassador to Czechoslovakia, Mal-
colm Bow, arrived in Budapest to present his credentials as Canada’s first
non-resident representative to Hungary. As he alighted from his embassy
car, battered and dented from an accident en route, with its fender flag
already frayed, grey skies poured rain.
The contrasting settings in Ottawa and Budapest are an apt meta-
phor for this uneven and often distant relationship. For Hungary, Bartha’s
arrival was a victory to savor, the culmination of fifteen years of diplo-
matic campaigning and another step out from beneath the shadows of the
postwar communist take-over and the 1956 Hungarian Revolution. For
Canada, the benefits were much less clear-cut. In the context of the bitter
East-West Cold War confrontation, closer ties with communist Hungary
demanded a steep domestic political price in exchange for a bundle of un-
certain economic, consular, and political gains. Few Canadian policy-
makers thought the price was worth it. Though sometimes tempted by the
lucre of trade, ministers repeatedly rejected Hungarian overtures for closer
relations until the early 1960s, when they judged the balance of interests to
shift in Canada’s favour. They were wrong.
1 I would like to thank Ryan Shackleton, Patrick Belanger, Marcel Jesen-
ský, and Michael Stevenson for their help with this paper. The views expressed
are mine alone, and do not represent the views of my Department or the Govern-
ment of Canada.
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It would be hard to exaggerate Canada’s disdain for Hungary in
the immediate aftermath of the Second World War. An enemy state during
that conflict, by the late 1940s, communist Hungary was well on the wrong
side of the worsening Cold War divisions between the democratic West
and the Soviet Union’s East Bloc empire. Its human rights violations,
especially Cardinal József Mindzenty’s show-trial and imprisonment in
1948, left Canadians “bitter” and “hostile.”1 Indeed, when Canada’s UN
diplomats championed a resolution targeting Hungary in November 1949,
their UN office switchboard lit up with almost a hundred calls of support.2
Editorial backing was equally strong. Canadian UN speechifying on Hun-
garian human rights, gushed the Toronto Daily Star, was “of exceptional
importance and confirmed Canada’s reputation as one of the principal
exponents of the Western powers.”3
Nor was it likely that the miniscule trade between the two
countries would offset these deep political tensions and justify closer
diplomatic relations. Canadian exports to Hungary declined from
$1,063,000 in 1947 to $35,000 in 1954. Imports hardly kept pace with
inflation, creeping up from $103,000 in 1948 to $124,000 in 1955.4
Similarly, there was little demand for consular or immigration services.
Hungarian immigration, mostly postwar refugees drawn from the dis-
placed person camps of Western Europe, peaked in 1951 at just over five
thousand (from an influx that year of 194,391) before dwindling to less
than 700 in 1955.5
Among Canadian diplomats, there was little appetite to take on
Hungary. Canada’s small Department of External Affairs had just gone
through a period of rapid expansion that was simply unsustainable. From
1946 to 1948, the department grew from 26 posts with 67 officers to 44
posts with 216 officers, leaving it without experienced staff or funds to
open any new missions.6 This was especially true of missions behind the
Iron Curtain, which involved extra security costs. Moreover, the prospect
of reciprocal missions spooked the Royal Canadian Mounted Police
(RCMP), which worried that a Hungarian embassy might be used to spy
on or intimidate the expatriate Hungarian-Canadian community. Thus,
when Hungarian diplomats, seeking trade opportunities and diplomatic
legitimacy for their newly-erected communist regime, sought to establish
relations with Canada in 1949 and again in early 1955, they were turned
firmly aside.
By the end of 1955, however, Ottawa’s attitude had softened
significantly. Much of the impetus for change lay abroad. Stalin’s death in
1953, the Korean peace conference of May 1954, and the July 1955 East-
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West summit in Geneva signalled reduced Cold War tensions. Canada’s
leading Soviet expert, Robert Ford, back in External Affairs after two long
stints in Moscow, encouraged Canadian policy-makers to see the Soviet
Union as a conservative and satiated power, ready to accept the status quo
in central Europe. What Moscow wanted, he argued, was a “workable divi-
sion of the world more or less along the present lines.”7 External Affairs
Minister L.B. Pearson agreed. Indeed, he returned from his own trip to
Moscow in the fall of 1955 fearful of Soviet isolation and Moscow’s
dangerous ignorance of the outside world. “Canada should meet Soviet
overtures halfway,” he told cabinet, “and indicate a willingness to settle
problems as they arose.”8 In late 1955, ministers agreed to a stepped-up
program of official exchanges and opened talks with Moscow on a trade
agreement.
Improved relations with Moscow quickened Canada's contacts
with the East Bloc satellites, including Hungary. Pressure for a shift in
Canadian policy came primarily from Ford, who had tracked political and
social unrest in Eastern Europe since the 20th Soviet Party Congress in
February 1956. Ford's hopes were restrained, and he warned that Moscow
would insist on maintaining some form of control over the satellites for the
foreseeable future. Even so, he argued that Khrushchev's rapprochement
with Tito, the denigration of Stalin, and the rehabilitation of nationalist
leaders in Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia were evidence of a
“liberalization” that “may offer some degree of Titoism.” Ford urged the
West to abandon its rhetorical commitment to the liberation of the
satellites, which only alarmed communist authorities and raised impossible
expectations in Eastern Europe. Instead, Canada and its allies should
increase contacts with the satellites, encouraging closer commercial, cul-
tural, and scientific ties. “Our object,” Ford told Pearson, “is to wean them
away to some degree from extreme dependence on the Soviet Union and to
encourage any developments which will ameliorate the lot of the satellite
peoples.”9
There were new domestic pressures to justify closer relations with
Eastern European as well. Through the mid-1950s, politicians and farmers
from Western Canada were growing evermore concerned at aggressive
American efforts to protect the over-extended agricultural sector in the
United States. They were especially alarmed at Public Law 480 and US
agricultural disposal policies which gave away huge amounts of American
wheat as foreign aid, often displacing Canadian wheat from many of its
traditional markets.10 Between 1954-55 and 1956-57, Canada’s share of
the world market for wheat and flour fell sharply from 27.4% to 20.6%,
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while the American share rose from 31.2% to 41.9%.11 Net farm income in
Saskatchewan, whose rural economy was based on wheat, plummeted
from $531 million in 1951 to $179 million in 1957.12 Suddenly, Eastern
Europe represented a potentially important and contested market for
prairie wheat. Thus, when the Hungarian government, which bought
150,000 tons of Canadian wheat in March 1956, proposed exchanging
“most-favoured-nation” (MFN) treatment in April, External Affairs sniffed
a deal.13
Ottawa refused a straight-up exchange of MFN treatment. Mutual
tariff reductions were meaningless when trading with communist
countries, which normally imposed no tariffs but relied on the state’s eco-
nomic apparatus to manage imports and exports by fiat. Instead, cabinet
demanded annual purchases of 150,000 tons of wheat on a cash basis in
exchange for granting Hungary its lowest generalized tariff, or MFN
status. Officials in External Affairs, who suspected that Budapest would
also seek to exchange diplomatic representatives, steeled themselves to
resist. A trade office “of some sort” was possibly legitimate, they admitted.
But, it would involve no privileges or immunities, be severely limited in
size, and be located under the watchful eye of federal security authorities
in Ottawa.14
The Hungarians were tough and canny negotiators. Canadians
Mitchell Sharp and Ed Ritchie liked the delegation and its personable
leader, Tibor Barabas. The East European visitors were able, flexible,
pleasant, and surprisingly independent in their judgements. They were
openly thrilled that a Hungarian-Canadian had been chosen as “Miss
Rough Rider,” notwithstanding her outspoken anti-regime views.15 It
helped too, perhaps, that the Hungarian minister in Washington issued 30
exit visas as the talks began in mid-October “to create a good impression
in Canada.”16 During ten days of discussions, Barabas slowly whittled
down Hungary’s proposed purchase commitment to just 300,000 tons over
three years, convincing Ottawa to extend credit to his cash-strapped
country as well. By the time the deal was approved by cabinet on October
28, he and Pearson had even quietly agreed that Canada and Hungary
would open reciprocal diplomatic missions within 12-18 months.17 “Trade
motives take priority in this,” deputy foreign minister Jules Léger told
Pearson, “though the rapid changes in the political situation in Hungary
also argue in favour of a more forthcoming attitude... than would have
been possible a few months back.”18
The Hungarian uprising and the brutal Soviet intervention of 1
November 1956 spelled delay, but, remarkably, they did not immediately
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upset the bilateral arrangement. As Russian tanks rolled into Budapest,
Canadian officials, skittish about appearing to side with Moscow, and
Barabas, unsure if his mandate still stood, agreed to defer signature.19 But
wheat was a powerful motivator, and by 3 January 1957, the grain trade
and its potent cabinet advocate, Trade and Commerce Minister C.D.
Howe, were pressing External Affairs to conclude the deal. Pinned bet-
ween principle and national self-interest, squirming diplomats temporized.
“I did not see how we could take any action that might seem to be bolster-
ing up an unpopular regime in Hungary,” assistant under-secretary John
Holmes explained to deputy trade minister Fred Bull over lunch. But if
János Kádár, Moscow’s new puppet in Budapest, showed any signs of
broadening his regime’s popular support, Holmes offered, “we would
probably favour the wheat deal as soon as possible.”20
That was not enough for Howe, grown short-tempered and
autocratic as he aged. The trade minister brought the issue to cabinet a few
days later. Even as Immigration Minister Jack Pickersgill rallied Cana-
dians to welcome large numbers of Hungarian refugees to Canada, Howe
insisted that the wheat deal would “feed the people and help the victims”
in Hungary.21 His colleagues were clearly unimpressed, and when Pearson
cited strong US objections to any business “whatever” with the Kádár
regime, they quickly deferred the trade deal.
But, by May, wheat sales were back on the agenda. Amid reports
of Belgian efforts to sign a civil aviation treaty with Budapest and French
bids to sell wheat to Hungary on soft credit terms, fretful trade officials
and diplomats told Pearson that there were “strong commercial” grounds
for reviving the deal.22 The pragmatic minister thought so too. But doubt-
less aware of continued popular hostility toward Kádár’s Hungary, Pearson
was taking few chances as Canadians headed to the polls on June 10. Sure,
he minuted, let’s have “another look at it on, say, June 15th!”23
Pearson and his Liberal colleagues were swept from office on June
10, and replaced by a Progressive Conservative ministry under an untested
and largely unknown leader, Prime Minister John G. Diefenbaker. Few
issues mattered more to the Saskatchewan parliamentarian than wheat
sales and the welfare of prairie farmers, who turned out en masse to back
Tory candidates. Intellectually, Diefenbaker grasped the importance of
reaching out to Moscow and its allies to defuse dangerous Cold War
tensions. These concerns were offset in Diefenbaker by a strong emotional
commitment to political and economic freedom, and a deep sympathy for
the captive nations of Eastern Europe. Just as important, he was acutely
sensitive to the voting preferences of their anti-communist compatriots in
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Canada.24 Diefenbaker and his ministers would soon have their chance to
tackle the “perennial problem of Hungary.”
Through the late 1950s, Kádár’s post-revolutionary regime re-
mained a global pariah, even denied full standing at the UN General
Assembly, where its credentials were questioned and rejected. Isolation
provided Budapest with strong incentives to continue seeking closer
diplomatic relations with Canada (as well as other Western powers). In
addition to enhanced international respectability, better relations would
give Budapest access to the 40,000 Hungarian refugees, who had poured
into Canada following the revolution. On a practical level, these were
already straining the limited consular services provided by the Polish
Embassy in Ottawa, which handled Hungarian interests in Canada, and
were reportedly gnawing at Polish-Hungarian fraternal relations. They
doubtless represented a tempting target for Hungarian intelligence too.
Moreover, Budapest still looked eagerly at the Canadian market and
government credit facilities to bolster its economy. In December 1957 and
January 1958, Hungarian officials in Ottawa and in Europe revived the
notion of a trade deal and diplomatic exchange.25
The reaction in Ottawa was divided. Naturally, the salesmen in the
Department of Trade and Commerce were pleased with the renewed
interest.26 Indeed, by mid-January, a Wheat Board agent had quietly
slipped into Paris for preliminary talks with Hungarian state officials, who
offered to buy “substantial quantities” of prairie wheat in exchange for a
trade deal and diplomatic ties. Associate deputy trade minister Mitchell
Sharp was clearly in support: “In view of the continuing serious difficult-
ties facing our wheat exports, even on credit terms, we in this Department
would strongly favour such a decision.”27 Moreover, he added in justi-
fication, several European countries had recently re-established normal
trade with Hungary. It was time for Canada to act.
External Affairs diplomats in their East Block headquarters were
doubtful. Diefenbaker had made no secret of his scepticism about official
advice on foreign policy, and they were carefully attuned to the prime
minister’s strong anti-communist instincts and his prairie populism. They
worried about the grim news from Hungary. The political situation in
Budapest remained tense, insisted A. J. Pick of European Division, and
there were rumours of a renewed campaign of repression.28 The foreign
ministry was irked too by Budapest’s hostile and unfriendly references in
the press to Canada’s reception of Hungarian refugees, a nasty dispute that
had erupted openly in late December.29 The department was upset as well
that Hungarian refugees in Canada were encountering obstacles in obtain-
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ing exit visas for family members anxious to join them.30 Any rap-
prochement, they cautioned, would “cause unrest” among Hungarian
refugees in Canada.31 The prospect of wheat sales and a trade agreement
effectively died when External Affairs insisted on sending the question to
cabinet in April 1958. There was no chance of cabinet support once de-
posed premier Imre Nagy was summarily executed in June, and the minis-
ters were never asked their views.32
It frustrated Hungarian policy-makers that Canada remained so
unyielding while its Western allies, including the US, eased their sanctions
against Budapest. What, probed Tibor Zádor, the top man in Hungary’s
Washington Embassy in March 1959, was the problem? Politics, veteran
diplomat Henry Davis, whispered in response. With 40,000 Hungarian
refugees on its hands, Ottawa could hardly improve relations so long as
communist apparatchiks prevented dual nationals from visiting freely and
ignored the humanitarian claims of families wishing to reunite in Canada.
Perhaps, Zádor offered, Budapest might review its emigration policies if
Ottawa would favourably consider a limited “package deal,” which would
resolve Hungary’s outstanding debts in Canada and Canadian claims for
nationalized properties in exchange for the release of blocked Hungarian
assets in Canada and permission to open a small consulate-general with
two staff members.33
The small step offered a basis for “testing” Hungary’s desire for
better relations and it was greeted warmly in External Affairs. “This seems
sensible,” approved the powerful under-secretary, Norman Robertson.34
East Block officials weighed the proposal fully in April, endorsing the full
exchange of diplomatic missions provided there was progress on emigra-
tion.35 Support for the “package deal” grew through the summer. External
Affairs could count on Trade and Commerce, which hoped to open the
Hungarian market to Canadian wheat. The mission in Prague, whose
officers had visited Budapest regularly since 1955, also backed the plan.
The consular case was “incontestable” and there were obvious geopolitical
reasons to encourage Hungarian trade with the West. More important, a
mission offered the prospect of direct, if discreet, relations with Hun-
garians themselves. “I am sure a Canadian mission would be welcomed,”
insisted Arthur Andrew, chargé d’affaires in Prague, “not least by those
Hungarians who are most out of sympathy with the regime.”36 Indeed, by
August, progress seemed virtually certain as Budapest issued a rare and
unexpected exit visa to a Hungarian-Canadian dual citizen long trapped in
Hungary.37
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But just as quickly, the door slammed shut, and remained so for
the next three years. Comfortably slumped before their TV screens on
Sunday, 25 October 1959, North American viewers learned that 150
Hungarian students languished in prison, waiting to be executed as they
turned eighteen. TV Host Ed Sullivan urged his viewers to act, “to save
these Hungarian kids.”38 The plea passed unnoticed in Washington, but
sparked a minor panic in Canada. The student council president at the
University of British Colombia quickly championed the cause and forced
the prime minister to issue a supportive statement.39 External Affairs
Minister Howard Green, who represented the riding of Vancouver Quadra,
took notice. Ignoring departmental advice to avoid a futile Cold War “set-
piece” in New York, Green insisted on debating Hungary at the UN
General Assembly that fall.40
Though short-lived, the furor was searing enough for those
involved, and it scotched any prospect of reviving relations with Hungary.
When Trade Minister George Hees resurrected the 1956 trade agreement
in March 1961, Green refused to endorse the scheme, ensuring that cabinet
turned it down “on political grounds, particularly because of the reaction...
which must be anticipated from the Hungarian community.”41 Hees tried
again, in the spring of 1962, but Green simply ignored him, instructing his
officials to “let this ride.”42 Hungary was clearly off this government’s
agenda.
Conditions changed in April 1963, when L.B. “Mike” Pearson’s
Liberals replaced Diefenbaker’s shattered Tories. Pearson’s government
was less inclined to see the world in grim shades of black and white, and it
was quick to welcome evidence of East-West détente after the dangerous
Cuban missile crisis the previous October. The Liberal prime minister
rejected the idea that Canada might pursue the Soviet bloc’s “diplomatic
and economic ostracism.” The only “reasonable” policy, he argued, was
“to maintain as close contact as possible with the Soviet bloc leaders with
a view to seeking and exploiting openings for negotiations on major east-
west issues.”43 The ultimate goal, he added, was “the evolution of the
thinking of Soviet bloc leaders.”
Canadian diplomats in Vienna and Prague, who continued their
periodic visits to Budapest, were likewise encouraged by local evidence of
progress. The marginalization of Stalinist hardliners following the 8th
Congress of the Hungarian Communist Party in November 1962, the
profile attained by non-party candidates in local elections in February
1963, the March amnesty for participants in the revolution, and increased
emigration pointed towards a “general trend toward greater tolerance,”
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making Hungary “one of the most liberal [countries] in the Soviet bloc.”44
With one eye cocked for adverse Hungarian-Canadian reaction, Foreign
Minister Paul Martin signalled the change in Canadian perspective, ap-
proving orders to abandon the fight over Hungarian credentials at the UN
special session in May 1963.45 Thus, when Hungarian trade officials ar-
rived in Ottawa in August 1963 for exploratory discussions, Canadian
officials were primed to listen.
Progress was much slower than anticipated. Early talks foundered
on Hungary’s refusal to accept the principle of a firm purchase commit-
ment (as it had done in 1956) in exchange for MFN treatment and permis-
sion to open a trade office. By the time the Hungarians were ready to
accept a commitment in October, the Canadian perspective had shifted
dramatically.46 Inspired by their recent success settling trade and out-
standing financial issues with weaker Bulgaria, East Block officials raised
their sights and aimed for a similarly broad arrangement with Hungary.
Budapest’s persistent pursuit of trade and diplomatic relations had con-
vinced them that the time was ripe to wrest additional concessions from
Budapest on its defaulted pre-war debts, some stretching back to the First
World War, war damages, and postwar compensation claims. Conse-
quently, in late December, External Affairs insisted seeking Hungarian
assurances that Budapest was ready to discuss these claims to the nego-
tiating agenda.47
Trade and Commerce, which had hoped to lead narrowly focussed
trade talks, where Canada enjoyed an advantage, took a dim view of this
effort and proved uncooperative in the difficult interdepartmental discus-
sions required to hammer out the Canadian offer. Amid reports of conces-
sionary US wheat sales to Hungary, Maurice Schwarzmann, an assistant
deputy minister, resented making solid trade prospects dependent on an
uncertain claims agreement.48 He also questioned Canadian tactics. “The
moment we sign a trade agreement,” the veteran negotiator insisted, “our
bargaining counters will have been spent, and if in the process we have not
achieved a settlement... our chances of doing so may well be gone.”49
But Finance backed External Affairs. “Our bargaining position
with the Eastern European countries seems to be particularly strong at the
present time,” argued Rodney Gray, head of its international relations
division. “Countries like Hungary appear anxious to improve their trade
relations with Canada and to impress us with their credit worthiness... the
time would appear propitious for us to try and settle as many of our
outstanding claims as possible and on as good — or better — terms as
other countries such as the US, the UK, and France have obtained.”50
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Perhaps, External Affairs wondered, Canada should sweeten its offer?
Officials agreed to do so in late January 1964, adding the exchange of
diplomatic representatives as well as emigration and consular issues to the
proposed agenda.51 Eventually, in March 1964, with Budapest hinting
impatiently that it would boycott Expo ’67 if a trade agreement was not
forthcoming, a Canadian package headed to cabinet.52 Assured by con-
fident officials of an attractive outcome, Liberal ministers approved a
broad Canadian negotiating offer without discussion in April 1964.53
But bilateral talks opened on a sour note. Péter Mód, Hungary’s
first deputy minister of foreign affairs, arrived in Ottawa upset by recent
Canadian demands for still more advance assurances of Budapest’s pur-
chase commitment. Until the crucial trade question was settled, he shrewd-
ly told Under-Secretary Marcel Cadieux, the rest of the Hungarian team
was staying home. For almost a week, the two countries were deadlocked.
In exchange for a trade agreement and the right to a trade office, the
Canadians demanded annual wheat sales of $12 million over a three year
period; the Hungarians offered just $5 million and demanded a Montreal
trade office with full consular facilities. The gap seemed unbridgeable.
Perhaps, Cadieux hinted to Mód, more progress might be made by simul-
taneously engaging the full agenda, allowing greater trade-offs.54
For the next two weeks, negotiating sub-committees tackled
consular affairs, trade, diplomatic representation, and claims issues. Max
Wershof, who handled the consular work for External Affairs, easily
secured promises that dual citizens using a Canadian passport could enter
and leave Hungary freely, an important victory for Hungarian-Canadians
though not as much as the ministers had expected. The trade dispute, too,
slowly gave way as each side moderated its demands. Canadian negoti-
ators eventually settled for annual guaranteed sales of wheat and barley
worth $8 million, much less than the $10 million minimum that cabinet
had wanted, but not an insignificant sale. To achieve this settlement,
Canadian diplomats dropped their opposition to a Hungarian trade office
with consular status in Montreal.55
There was more trouble over diplomatic representation and the
claims agreement. Cabinet had approved the exchange of diplomatic
representation on the cheap, favouring dual accreditation on a non-resident
basis. The pressure for missions in the newly independent states of Africa
and Asia was enormous in the mid-1960s, and External Affairs saw few
benefits in a mission in Budapest. Moreover, a Hungarian resident mission
in Ottawa might mean security issues. The Hungarians, who wanted access
to their large expatriate community in Canada and greater diplomatic
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legitimacy, demanded more, firmly insisting on their unfettered right to a
resident mission.56
They rejected Canada’s position on claims too. The Pearson
government had hoped for language that would commit Hungary to review
debts and claims in a speedy and wholesale manner and to pay them in
convertible funds, thus setting solid precedents for subsequent negotiations
with Poland and Czechoslovakia, where the Canadian stake was much
larger. Mód refused to yield even a little, insisting that these were precisely
the kinds of issues that ought to be settled in the negotiations themselves.
At most, Hungary would agree to give Canada terms no less favourable
than it gave to other states. Given Budapest’s interest in obtaining a trade
agreement and exchanging diplomatic representatives, this was probably
as good a deal as Canada would ever get, admitted Cadieux. “Our leverage
is now at a maximum point,” he warned Martin, and “our bargaining
power on both the trade and diplomatic questions may deteriorate as time
goes by.”57 With Mód hinting that American wheat sales were readily
available, Ottawa would have to give in if it wanted to sell its wheat.
Ministers were clearly disappointed in the result. It was, Martin
and Sharp admitted to their cabinet colleagues, “not possible to reach a full
agreement.”58 In an unusually frank statement, Sharp blamed the unsatis-
factory debt and claims settlement on earlier governments (of which he
had not been part) for being “remiss” in not pressing Hungary to settle in
the 1940s. There were likely to be security issues with the new Hungarian
offices to be opened in Ottawa and Montreal, Martin warned gloomily.
Neither Hungarian-Canadians nor the Opposition would like this limited
deal, which they would denounce “as a betrayal of the goal of freeing
Eastern European peoples from Soviet domination.”59 But with a wheat
sale in the offing, ministers consoled themselves with the lofty geo-
political notion that “relations with countries such as Hungary was
essential if there was to be any hope of exercising influence over their
policies.”60 Cabinet approved the deal, which was signed in Ottawa on 11
June 1964.
Though Hungary and Canada traded diplomatic representatives in
early 1965, and Ottawa sent a resident consular official to Budapest in
1966, it is hard to conclude that these exchanges generated any real
interest in better or closer ties. The tough negotiations and Ottawa’s dis-
appointed hopes cast a pall over, and provided little momentum to, a basic
mercantile connection. Indeed, implementation of the 1964 agreement
soon began to undermine relations, which stumbled fitfully during the late
1960s. As Martin feared, one of the obstacles was domestic, as the
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Canadian Hungarian Association and its tireless spokesman, Paul Villányi,
stepped up their close surveillance of bilateral interactions. The group re-
mained upset over ongoing consular problems and barriers to family reuni-
fication, reminding Liberal ministers that they had “prematurely” allowed
Budapest to open missions in Ottawa and Montreal without “a firm quid
pro quo.”61 The 10th anniversary of the Hungarian uprising in late 1966
amplified domestic doubts, especially when Cadieux stirred a fuss among
cabinet members by asking Transport Minister Jack Pickersgill, who had
played a prominent part in welcoming Hungarian refugees in 1957, to limit
his commemorative activities lest he compromise bilateral ties. Pickersgill
refused.62
There were other substantive reasons for Ottawa’s lack of enthusi-
asm for pursuing relations with Hungary. As anticipated, Hungarian
embassy officials were soon spying on Canada and its Hungarian-
Canadian expatriate community, practices confirmed by both the RCMP
and Hungarian defectors in the US. Indeed, to the disappointment (and
irritation) of External Affairs, by mid-1968, over 50 percent of mission
staff, including some senior representatives, were engaged in “illegitimate
functions.”63 And the return to Canada remained depressingly minimal.
Bumper crops in Hungary prompted Budapest to delay, and later suspend,
its purchases of Canadian grain, leaving the agreement’s key trade
component unfulfilled. By the time the deal expired in June 1967, Hungary
had purchased only 100,000 tons of its 250,000 ton commitment.64
Budapest was similarly unresponsive in negotiations over unsettled debts
and claims. Despite three rounds of talks, where they enjoyed little lever-
age, frustrated Canadian diplomats failed to convince the Hungarians to
increase their initial $300,000 offer, while they slashed Canada’s claim
from $70 million to $25 million, and then, to $10.5 million.65
Most important, the renewed Cold War tensions that accompanied
the escalation of the Vietnam War after 1965 reinforced the basic geo-
political reality that divided Canada and Hungary. When the Soviet Union
invaded Czechoslovakia in August 1968 to crush its recent political and
economic reforms, Budapest marched with Moscow. Though sympathetic
to Hungary’s unhappy predicament — External Affairs labelled it the
“least guilty” — there would have to be repercussions to appease domestic
and allied opinion. Ottawa quickly suspended general political and social
contacts, adopting an attitude that was “correct but cool.”66
That ought not to have surprised anyone. Budapest and Ottawa
were always on different sides of the 20th century Cold War dividing the
communist East from the Democratic West, a fundamental division that
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defined their postwar relations. For the regime in Hungary, in 1948 as well
as 1958 and 1964, Canada promised access to the expansive possibilities
of postwar capitalism and a pathway to international respectability. Better
relations with Canada was a prize worth winning. For Ottawa policy-
makers the benefits of closer ties with Budapest were less obvious. Cer-
tainly, the European nation represented a small but not insignificant outlet
for Canadian wheat, an important consideration as world markets grew
more competitive. There were consular and immigration benefits to be
gained too. But the dismal human rights record of Hungary’s communist
authorities meant that the risk of alienating Catholic voters and anti-
communist refugees, especially after the influx of Hungarian refugees in
1956-57, was very high. Strategic rather than bilateral tactical considera-
tions tipped the balance, as successive Canadian governments narrowed
their view of relations with Hungary to a gambit in the East-West contest.
Burdened with the overblown hopes that accompanied this view, it is
hardly surprising that Canadian-Hungarian bilateral relations often dis-
appointed in the decades after 1945.
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Escape into Emigration:
Christian democratic social welfare politician
Béla Kovrig and the Hungarian State Security
1946-1948
Éva Petrás
“A dissident from the intelligentsia”
In his poem A Sentence on Tyranny the Hungarian poet Gyula Illyés wrote:
“where there is tyranny, everyone is a link in the chain.”1 This “link in the
chain” existence, by virtue of their position as intellectuals, is most often
used to characterize members of the intelligentsia. Any discussion of the
relationship between the intelligentsia and the state security apparatus in
communist Hungary should always take this situation into account. Éva
Cs. Gyimesi, a Hungarian-Romanian literary historian who died in 2011
under tragic circumstances, came up with a term while reading the sur-
veillance reports the Romanian Securitate had on her. She said that
because their designation was problematic “dissidents from the intel-
ligentsia” should be assigned to a separate category.2 Gyimesi also sug-
gested that leaving the country is not the beginning of defection, and not
all circumstances result in a dissident’s emigration. A dissident may go
into an internal or inner emigration — when the decision doesn’t neces-
sarily involve the dissident’s actual departure from his or her country.
However, the communist state security agencies, for simplicity’s sake,
preferred to define defection as the act of crossing a border. Certainly,
“internal emigration” often ended in real emigration but it was usually
preceded by a shorter or longer period when the decision to leave had been
taken but, on the surface, the life of the would-be defector continued as if
nothing had happened.
For some people this transitional period lasted for decades — or
never ended — and offered a certain opportunity to a thoughtful intel-
lectual: an opportunity for the freedom of decision, however limited. That
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is why Gyimesi introduced the third category to totalitarian society’s
offenders and victims — the “intellectual dissidents.” For Gyimesi the
individual deliberating on inner or actual emigration cannot be called
simply a victim: he makes his own free decision, since he believes that
when “living under tyranny, a passage between, over, or under the visible
and invisible barriers is always possible through political devices.”3 Such
individuals therefore cannot be seen simply as “victims, insofar as they —
through their own free will — embraced an ideological system, world-
view, belief, or religion,… and they accepted the consequences of their
own views and deeds.”4
Our present study traces the life of Béla Kovrig — a professor of
sociology, Christian democratic politician, and a prominent member of
public life in Hungary — from the First World War to the Second and
after. We follow the course of his life to see whether his role as an “intel-
lectual dissident” can be reconstructed and how long it lasted. Though the
nature of the documentation makes this difficult, we outline his career
using state security records, biographical sources, and his own scholarly
writings.
What can be known for certain is that Béla Kovrig left Hungary in
October 1948, and, after a short stay in Italy, emigrated to the United
States. With his escape he intended to put an end to a two-year-long dead-
end situation: his career as an agent of the state security apparatus.
Leaving Hungary was a turning point in Kovrig’s life that was preceded by
two-and-a-half decades of activity as a bureaucrat, politician and scholar,
and was followed by a decade-and-a-half of existence as an émigré intel-
lectual. His emigration, however, cannot be strictly connected to the point
when he left Hungary. It includes personal and political experiences of the
interim years starting with the end of World War II, which led to his
decision to leave. These experiences also left their mark on the second half
of his life and on his existence as an émigré.
Béla Kovrig’s career and work
Kovrig was born in Budapest on April 8, 1900, into a Transylvanian
family of Armenian-Hungarian stock.5 His career began in 1920 when he
got his diploma from Budapest’s Péter Pázmány Catholic University. He
earned his doctorate in political science and law in 1921 and then went on
a study-tour abroad that took him to the Hochschule für Politik in Berlin
and the Sorbonne and the École des Sciences Politiques in Paris.6 After
returning to Hungary in 1923 he became Prime Minister István Bethlen’s
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private secretary while also working in the Bureau of Nationalities and
Minorities of the Prime Minister’s Office. During the same period he also
served as editor of two journals: Társadalompolitika [Social Policy] and
Munkaügyi Szemle [Labour Review]. From 1927 on, he was employed by
the Ministry of Social Welfare and Labour where he was deeply involved
in affairs relating to social welfare. Following this he became Deputy
Director of the National Institute of Social Security [Országos Társa-
dalombiztosítási Intézet, “OTI”]. As one of the drafters of the 1928 XL
law on old-age and disability insurance,7 he reviewed Hungary’s social
insurance situation as well as trends in European welfare policy, which he
and his colleagues then applied to Hungary’s conditions. Because of the
onset of the Great Depression in 1929, many reform ideas on welfare
could not be realized.
In the second half of the 1930s Kovrig’s career reached new
heights. In 1938 Prime Minister Béla Imrédy appointed him director of the
newly-formed V., the so-called Social Policy Department of the Prime
Minister’s Office. The Social Policy Department was not a sociological or
social policy advisory body, rather it dealt mainly with the government’s
propaganda.8 In addition to the propaganda however, Kovrig never gave
up pushing his ideas on welfare policy, towards the achievement of which
he saw social propaganda as the most effective instrument. It was under
these circumstances that he drew up the bill for old-age insurance for
people working in the economy’s agricultural sector. The bill was then
enacted by Parliament as the 1938 XII Law.9 After Prime Minister Pál
Teleki merged the Social Policy Department with the Ministry of Religion
and Public Education, Kovrig took part in establishing the National Policy
Office and became its director. After Teleki’s suicide in April 1941, the
National Policy Office was closed down and Kovrig left government ser-
vice. He became first the dean, then the rector of the newly-established
Hungarian university in Kolozsvár/Cluj in Northern Transylvania that
Hungary had re-annexed the previous year.
In the history of Hungarian scholarship, the activities of the Ferenc
József University during the years that Northern Transylvania was again
under Hungarian rule (1940-44) were particularly important.10 Until
Kovrig’s appointment as chief administrator there, the only Hungarian
professorship of sociology had been in Budapest. As a result of his work,
modern sociology education found a new location in Transylvania. Kovrig
was also instrumental in introducing to Northern Transylvania organiza-
tions that had been successful in the promotion of public welfare in
Hungary proper. An outstanding example of such an institution was
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KALOT [National Association of Catholic Agrarian Youth Organiza-
tions].11
Kovrig was not only a social policy bureaucrat — he was also a
scholar. As a productive and talented writer he published continuously
from the early 1920s on. His writings included A munka védelme a dunai
államokban [Employment Protection in the Danube States], which utilized
a comparative approach, and Szociálpolitika [Welfare Policy] which was a
theoretical overview. He also produced a plethora of other volumes,
articles and papers.12
Kovrig’s role in Catholic reform politics
Béla Kovrig was a Catholic social scientist. In Hungary in the period bet-
ween the two World Wars, but mainly in the 1930s, Catholic social and
political thought developed in circumstances that made it possible for
certain intellectuals to work out a program that was intended to be politi-
cally neutral. This group of Catholic sociologists, publicists and politicians
followed, above all, the papal social doctrine of Pope Pius XI’s 1931
encyclical Quadragesimo Anno.13 Under the influence of such ideas and
through an analysis of the Hungarian situation, Kovrig arrived at conclusi-
ons that differed from the ideas held by Hungary’s political elite, the
advocates of the “Christian national course” regarding the country’s social
and political set-up, or the Catholic Church’s role in society.14 Distin-
guished other representatives of this reform movement were the soci-
ologist Vid Mihelics, the Jesuit philosophers Elemér Csávossy and László
Varga — the latter being the founder and principal editor of the reform
Catholic journal Korunk Szava [Voice of Our Age] — Count György
Széchenyi, and István Barankovics the future leader of the Democratic
People’s Party (the Christian Democratic party formed after the war). In
this circle of reformers, Kovrig was the pre-eminent scholar.
Because of his station in life, Kovrig was the government’s
bureaucrat, but as a scholar he was also the government’s critic. Originally
he had been a conservative, then a reformed conservative, finally in his
Christian Democratic period he came to believe in reforming the Horthy
regime — which he, unlike many of his contemporaries, considered pos-
sible. As a bureaucrat and politician Kovrig had direct contact with
national welfare policy; as a scholar however he envisaged its further
development. Thus we shouldn’t be surprised that on August 23, 1943 he
played a key role in a meeting called together by Vilmos Apor, Bishop of
Győr, where those gathered decided to form the organization called the
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Catholic Social People’s Movement — which can be considered the
predecessor of the Christian Democratic People’s Party that was estab-
lished on 13 October 1944 — only two days before the removal from
office of Horthy by the Nazis and the assumption of power in Hungary by
the right-radical Arrow Cross movement.15 Earlier, at a secret meeting of
the Party’s founders, Kovrig had been tasked with working out the Party’s
social program, thus he can be considered instrumental in establishing the
Christian Democratic People’s Party, which later changed its name to the
Democratic People’s Party (DPP).16 At the time, Kovrig was working on
the volume Magyar Társadalompolitika [Hungarian Social Policy], a com-
pendium of Hungary’s welfare and social policies between the wars. This
work became the basis for the DPP’s platform after the war.17
Throughout these years Kovrig, in tune with his views, fought
against the relentless advance of the extreme right in Hungary and kept in
contact with anti-Nazi political and public figures. Thus it is not surprising
that during the war he took part in the anti-fascist resistance as well. After
Prince Primate Jusztinián Cardinal Serédi gave Catholics permission to
take part in the anti-fascist movement known as Hungarian Front, which
worked together with the Communists, Kovrig became active in the
Front’s operations — printing and distributing leaflets and hiding people.18
In the winter of 1944–45 he himself was forced into hiding, but already in
January of 1945, after a new government was established behind Red
Army lines, he reported to its Ministry of Religion and Public Education.
He worked there for a while, then in the Reconstruction Ministry. Still
later he returned to teaching, first at the Royal József Nádor Technical and
Economic University, then at the University of Agriculture, and finally
from 1947 on, in Eger at the city’s law-school.
Kovrig’s induction as an agent for the State Security Agencies
Because of Kovrig’s prominent past activities as well as his central role in
founding the Democratic People’s Party, already in 1946 he aroused the
interest of the Budapest Headquarters of the Political Investigation Depart-
ment of the Hungarian State Police. His irreproachable conduct and anti-
fascist stance, at the same time, didn’t give the police an immediate oppor-
tunity to blackmail him. For the time being, Kovrig’s main concern was
the illness of his mother rather than being investigated by the police.
By 1946 changes in Hungarian domestic politics had already
occurred, which despite the existence of a coalition government, indicated
that the country’s Communist Party would use every possible tool to seize
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power. The Communists’ “get the people’s enemies out of the coalition”
campaign, announced in the fall of 1946, was unequivocally aimed at the
Smallholders Party. The denunciations and assaults through the press
began — all intended to rankle relations within the coalition. The Com-
munists also tried to weaken the Smallholders’ influence with the
country’s electorate.19 They systematically accumulated information on the
Party’s leaders, and later also on members of Hungary’s clerical elite who
were considered opponents of the Communists’ ambitions.
In 1945 the Hungarian State Police had formed two Political
Investigation Departments [PROs], one for Budapest and one for the
countryside — both of which were under communist control from the very
beginning. At the outset their declared tasks did not include intelligence
and interception work focusing on the Churches. In September of 1946 the
two departments were merged and became the State Security Department
[Államvédelmi Osztály or ÁVO]. One of the new agency’s overt tasks be-
came the surveillance of the Churches.20 Because the Churches were so
deeply embedded in Hungarian society, the battle against the “clerical
reaction” as the Communists called it, soon became the Communist
Party’s chief preoccupation. The starting point was the claim that the
majority of the Hungarian people’s enemies were “hiding behind the
cloaks of the church; mainly the Roman Catholic Church.”21 Under-
standably under these circumstances the ÁVO’s anti-church activities were
viewed more and more as valuable.
In this atmosphere of political hysteria, on 9 September 1946,
Kovrig was taken to ÁVO headquarters at 60 Andrássy Avenue for
questioning. According to the State Security Agencies’ reports, the ÁVO
had investigated Kovrig for two months prior to this event.22 His inter-
rogators accused him with having harmed the Hungarian people “as a
result of his wartime and anti-democratic activities.”
According to a report prepared a few days after his interrogation,
“in the first phase of his questioning we only asked about the subject at
hand, while the special group leader observed his behavior. But he still
held out. Later when we revealed to him the severity of his situation and
the group leader asked him what would happen to his sick family mem-
bers, that’s when he broke a bit...”23 Kovrig soon realized that the ÁVO
agents wanted something special from him. According to the report, “after
questioning him for about an hour, he offered his services.”24 At that point
they had him sign a statement of co-operation and fill out a data sheet
documenting his induction, on which the method of induction was listed as
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having come “under pressure.” They attached his curriculum vitae to his
induction file.25
From the point of view of the emerging new order, Kovrig’s
curriculum vitae had only one flaw: his anti-Soviet attitudes; and the secret
police — according to their working reports — had precise data on this
matter.26 In his CV Kovrig had made strenuous efforts to play down his
own earlier anti-soviet writings mainly his monograph entitled “Az új
Oroszország (1917–1926)” [The new Russia];27 his chapter on the Russian
revolution in a 1940 volume entitled Korfordulón [At the turning point of
an era];28 and a booklet from 1942 entitled Embersors a szovjetéletben
[Man’s fate in Soviet life]. In these writings it was made perfectly clear
that as a social thinker he was absolutely sure of the differences between
socialism and communism, as well as among Marxism, Leninism, and
Stalinism. Perhaps we are not too far from the truth if we surmise that in
his curriculum vitae he emphasized his role in the anti-fascist opposition
and stressed his original social commitment, in an effort to counter-
balance his anti-Soviet stance.
For the next two years until his defection, Kovrig produced reports
for the ÁVO on events and trends in Hungarian ecclesiastical life and
policy, and on certain Catholic public figures.29 His cover-name was
“Bihari”, though he never used this name in his reports; he always signed
with his own name. His tasks were mainly to strengthen the line against
Cardinal Mindszenty, and do surveillance of Catholic politicians and
clerics around István Barankovics and the Democratic People’s Party.
With the accusation of having “committed war-like and anti-
democratic acts to the detriment of the Hungarian nation” hanging over his
head, a leading intellectual from the Horthy era became an eminent agent.
Kovrig must have known that several dozen public figures (among them
four previous prime ministers) similarly charged had paid for their
“crimes” with their lives.30 This explains why the terror-stricken Kovrig
lived in continual fear, and his surveillance reports were always precise
and accurate. It must have appeared to the secret police that they had
entered into what could be called a “successful collaboration.” Already in
the late fall and early winter of 1946 Kovrig supplied his masters with a
great deal of detailed information on matters relating to the churches,
which must have been appreciated by men who knew little on the subject.
However, with only one or two exceptions, his reports on particular indivi-
duals do not contain negative information.31 On the pages of such reports
one couldn’t really find any more information than someone familiar with
Catholic public life would have known anyway: the personalities in
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Catholic public life were depicted as irreproachable people who led
exemplary lives — they were anti-German, anti-fascist, Catholic–Christian
champions of progressive ideas.
Kovrig’s liason officer, János Tihanyi, praised his work: “I have
been in touch with him regularly for about half a year. His helpfulness and
activity are outstanding. I have learned a lot from him with respect to the
Catholic line. Beyond this, through debate-like conversations I think his
view has become clearer, he is politically a realist, deeply religious, but to
his benefit, he has changed a lot.”32
Regarding Kovrig’s true state of mind, Jenő Kerkai, one of the
Jesuit leaders of the KALOT movement who was under Kovrig’s sur-
veillance, knew the most. According to Kerkai “Kovrig suffered from
paranoia”. When, for example, he visited Kerkai, “he put his coat over the
telephone in the room and pulled out the plug of the radio, to avoid being
bugged.”33
In this period fear permeates Kovrig’s writings. This also charac-
terizes his reports to his liaison officer. Not long after his induction, he
was asked to submit a report entitled: A progresszív katolicizmus és a
munkáspártok viszonyáról [The Relationship between Progressive Catholi-
cism and the Labour Parties] in which he shared his views with his liaison
officer in scholarly detail.34 As other historians have also noted, particular-
ly in cases when a member of the intelligentsia came in contact with the
secret police, besides the fear that what he says may hurt him, there exists
a hidden desire to influence the organization. This can be considered
political tactic:35 a way of finally getting appreciation for their own views,
getting certain things done,36 or getting their narcissistic manifestations
into the “secret company of the wise analysts”37 — or probably a
combination of some or all of these factors.
In any case, given Béla Kovrig’s outstanding intellect, from the
beginning he twisted the message of his reports so that keeping the “ter-
rorized professor” as a state security agent could only seem successful to a
certain degree, and from a certain point of view. At the same time Kovrig
did not simply provide incriminating information on the people under his
surveillance. With his scholarly discussions he not only put the secret
police’s literacy to the test, but he tried to turn the “offered opportunity”
around to his own benefit and that of his political allies — the Christian
democratic politicians and the Democratic People’s Party. In his first
report for the secret police, Kovrig already spoke with a different voice —
as a politician. He submitted a plan on how the intellectual Christian
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democratic movement could be widened into a social movement support-
ing the left and what steps would be necessary towards that.38
Kovrig also used “the opportunity” to characterize Mindszenty
(whom the Pope had appointed Hungary’s Prince Primate in September of
1945) and his politics, as being in opposition to the Democratic People’s
Party. The conflict between Mindszenty and the Democratic People’s
Party, Mindszenty and Barankovics, and Mindszenty and Kovrig was an
older issue, and also sprang from actual theoretical and personal dif-
ferences of opinion — as it comes clear in the report Kovrig wrote for the
state security. With the Hungarian Communist Party’s defeat in the 1945
parliamentary elections, Mindszenty came to be seen by the secret police
as an individual opposed to the Communist Party’s goals.39 It can therefore
be said that Kovrig, on the basis of the “the enemy of my enemy is my
friend” theory, designated Mindszenty as a common enemy.
How the state security agencies used the information they got from
Kovrig differed somewhat from what he assumed. His background-
politicizing through the medium of the secret police wasn’t very success-
ful. It probably wasn’t clear to Kovrig that it actually wasn’t possible to
undertake consensus-building political discussion between the Democratic
People’s Party and the Communist Party. In the struggle for the control of
ecclesiastical policy, Kovrig’s machinations amounted to being merely a
sideshow, though the information provided by him was used by the secret
police. In the meantime he caused Mindszenty to be considered as an
enemy who could be blackmailed,40 while over time he himself, according
to reports made on him, “became more and more nervous.”41 As he wrote
in a letter to his mother after he emigrated: he defected because “he started
to hate politics.”42
Kovrig continued producing surveillance reports until 1948. A
1950 summary of these lists 24 important reports, only some of which can
be found. The earliest report was on the day of his induction, September 9,
1946, and the last one was dated August 7, 1948.43 Kovrig must have seen
the discrediting propaganda and campaign against the Catholic leaders and
politicians he had reported on. The result was a rapid deterioration of his
nervous condition.
Finally at one point in early or mid-1948 he decided to leave the
country and in October of the same year he and his wife were successful in
escaping. Steve Koczak (an advisor to the Budapest Embassy of the United
States) helped them to get out.44 Kovrig left a farewell letter to János
Tihanyi who (under the cover name of “Mirkó”) was still his liaison
officer. In it he apologized for leaving the country. He explained that the
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reason for his escape was that he could no longer teach in Eger, and in
Hungary there was no professorship where he would be able to teach in
Catholic mentality.45 He said he had been invited to the United States in
1947, but state security hadn’t permitted him to go; on the basis of which
he concluded that a legal departure would not be possible.46 The fact that
he left a farewell letter to his liaison officer shows that Kovrig hadn’t yet
escaped from his psychological dependence on the secret police.
There is no indication in the files that the secret police were
prepared for Kovrig’s defection, or that after he left any quick investiga-
tions were made. It is possible that Kovrig’s role as an agent had become
superfluous,47 given that the Hungarian Communist Party led by Mátyás
Rákosi, had already decided to destroy the Catholic Church. Less than a
month after Kovrig left, Cardinal Mindszenty was arrested. Then, after
István Barankovics also left the country, the Democratic People’s Party
disintegrated. Altogether eleven members of the Party’s leadership de-
fected.48 Koczak helped many of them to leave the country.
The circumstances of Kovrig’s escape were only reconstructed in
1950 on the basis of Jenő Kerkai’s statements made when he was also put
under arrest. According to this, Ágoston Takáts helped with the defection’s
technical arrangements. Takáts and Kerkai had both worked with the
Jesuits and that is how they knew Kovrig. In a confession made to the
secret police on February 20, 1949, Takáts stated that in the late summer
of 1948 Kovrig told him he had met Koczak to plan the escape. After that
Takáts himself spoke to Koczak about Kovrig’s planned escape. On a
Friday, Takáts accompanied Kovrig and his wife to Hidegkuti Street in
Budapest. Before that the Kovrigs had placed their luggage in baggage
storage at the city’s Keleti Train Station. Takács gave the baggage storage
voucher to Koczak. Next, Kovrig and his wife got into Koczak’s car. The
car was driven by a US Embassy employee. Koczak took Kovrig and his
wife out of the country hidden in the car’s trunk.49
In this manner Kovrig was successful in leaving the country. For a
while he stayed in Italy, from where he wrote letters to his mother who had
remained in Budapest. He apologized for leaving her alone in her old
age.50 Finally he took up residence in the USA, where he became a
professor of sociology at the Jesuit University in Milwaukee, Wisconsin.
He probably thought that he had left his mother and his country, along
with its secret police behind, but he was wrong about the latter.
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The emigration years
Upon learning of Kovrig’s activities in America after his emigration, in
1950 state security investigator Lieutenant Sándor Vadócz proposed that
he should be re-recruited. Because of Kovrig’s close contacts with pro-
minent émigrés including Károly Peyer, Ferenc Nagy, Béla Varga and
István Barankovics, the security men thought he would be ideal not only
for getting information on the Hungarian emigration, but also on science,
economics and politics in America.51
The first step in trying to re-recruit Kovrig was an evaluation of
his old reports, with particular attention to finding information that would
could be used to blackmail him. The secret policemen who re-read his
reports, however, came to the conclusion that there were few reports
whose contents could be construed as being embarrassing to him in the
eyes of the American or the Hungarian-American public.52 Therefore the
ÁVO turned its interest to Kovrig’s mother in Budapest, and they made a
study of her circumstances. They found that she, now Mrs. Imre Drehr
(after her second husband), lived in poverty and was “under the influence
of the church.” “Before the war she had been amongst the upper 10,000,”
but by the early 1950s she was in the process of selling her possessions in
order to make ends meet. They guessed that, judging by her circumstances,
it was probable that through an intermediary she was in touch with her son
and that he contributed to her support.53 Next they ordered that she be put
under surveillance whenever she left her home. Through such means the
ÁVO learned for example that Kovrig’s mother, on a certain day went to
church, then visited someone in a hospital, then did some shopping. On the
pages of the surveillance reports the daily life of the unsuspecting elderly
woman roll out before us dramatically. In the reports we can follow the
process of the ÁVO fabricating an image of the enemy, since she had been
named “an enemy of the people’s democracy”. Because of her advanced
age, she was not considered an “active enemy” and her person was
handled as an object and thus she was dehumanized as well.
In the meantime a proposal was made to acquire Kovrig’s home
address in Milwaukee, which they wanted to get from his mother in a
conspiratorial fashion. What this meant was that the communist authorities
arranged that her eligibility for an old-age pension be reviewed. Next she
was informed that she was not entitled to receive it. Further, she was
frequently called into the pensions office, where amongst many other
things they asked her what her son’s address was. They also tried to inform
themselves with regards to the university where Kovrig taught.
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Today it is difficult for us to imagine the scope of this “intel-
ligence” operation, how many man-hours were invested, for how long the
surveillance went on and how much money was spent on it. Kovrig’s
mother didn’t give the Communists her son’s address, though they most
likely harassed her for it for years. It is possible that she really didn’t know
it, and knew only the address of her brother-in-law in Munich, through
whom she corresponded with her son. In any case, for years János Tihanyi,
who had been Kovrig’s liaison officer, visited her pretending to be an
employee of the Welfare Ministry. She sometimes got heating fuel for
free, and after a while they even reinstated her pension, so that she would
continue to trust Tihanyi who kept in touch with her. It seemed that when
Kovrig’s mother became seriously ill and was hospitalized in March 1952,
the ÁVO was given an opportunity to obtain Kovrig’s address. Tihanyi
had a letter sent to Kovrig’s address at his place of work, in which a doctor
informed him of his mother’s condition and warned him that if it was
important that “his mother be in good hands for her remaining days,” so he
should go to a meeting at a place in Washington D.C. The letter was
signed with the cover name “Mirkó”, from which Kovrig would have
known immediately that Tihanyi was behind the whole operation. Kovrig
did not answer — at least not directly to Tihanyi, but he wrote a letter to
his mother that contained messages to the security people who would be
reading what he wrote: in spite of the fact that the authorities in Hungary
— thanks to Tihanyi’s intervention — restored her pension, provided her
with fuel, and paid for her hospital treatment, he would not write a letter to
anyone else but to “dear mother.”54
In the end the secret policemen were not able to establish contact
with Kovrig through his mother. Therefore on October 31, 1952, two years
after they began trying to contact Kovrig, a new proposal was made for
accomplishing this aim. The trivial manner in which they solved the
“mystery” of his home address is comical: with the help of a Washington
resident, they got a copy of the Milwaukee city telephone directory and
simply looked up his address and telephone number. Nevertheless, it
wasn’t until quite a bit later, in June 1955, that they finally made another
move to make contact. They posted a letter to him from New York —
inviting him to another meeting.55 But Kovrig did not show up for this
meeting either, nor did he respond to the letter even though they threatened
to cancel his mother’s pension. He had come to the point where he was
independent from the pressures of being a link in the Hungarian “tyranny
chain.” The price of his freedom however, was that his mother remained at
the mercy of Hungary’s state security apparatus.56
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Kovrig’s example shows that escaping from a mentally and
physically destructive collaboration with the communist secret police
invited great risks for the victims, and that defection brought further
burdens to the life of a “dissident from the intelligentsia” from which it
was hardly possible to escape.
Kovrig actively participated in the American-Hungarian émigré
community’s politics. In the letters he sent to his mother, on the other
hand, he talked mainly about his work at the university. He probably knew
that the security people were reading his letters. In 1954 the Hungarian
National Committee, an umbrella organization of the Hungarian expatriate
community, published a new version of the 1944 Magyar Társadalom-
politika [Hungarian Social Policy] re-written in emigration and with a
foreword by István Barankovics.57 To this day, this work stands alone in
Hungarian social science as an important documentary source material for
historians and sociologists on Hungarian social policy in the interwar
period and the immediate aftermath of World War II. The book was re-
published again in Budapest in 2011.58
Béla Kovrig died in Milwaukee, Wisconsin in 1962. His wife was
the only member of his family who was able to attend his funeral.
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Nicholas L. Deak, the Hungarian
“James Bond of the world of money”
Susan Glanz
An article on Nicholas Deak published in the June 12, 1964 issue of Time
magazine is the source of this sobriquet. What was/is the popular view of
the characteristics of James Bond? According to Vanity Fair the goal of
Bond’s creator was “to show audiences how stylish and thrilling life could
be.”1 Yes, there are similarities between James Bond and Nicholas Deak,
e.g. the languages spoken: English, French, and German, and the stylish
life, e.g. expensive ski vacations, but the “perils” faced by Deak were not
created by guns, but by the financial markets and then later by the US
government. It is worth noting that Deak’s resume shows several similari-
ties to that of Ian Fleming’s, the creator of Bond: they were about the same
age, both were born in the early 1900s, had worked for intelligence ser-
vices, had one son born to each of them in their 40s, and both were very
successful in their careers.2
A brief biography of Nicholas Louis Deak
Most of the information on Nicholas Deak’s life and his US military
carrier comes from files kept on him by the Office of Strategic Services or
OSS. The files had been declassified and were sent to me when I requested
them through the Freedom of Information Act. Nicholas Louis Deak was
born [to Louis Deak and Malvin (Billitz)] on October 8, 1905 in Hátszeg
(today’s Hateg, Romania), Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. He earned his
doctorate in economics in 1929 from the University of Neuchâtel,
Switzerland.3 In his completed Personnel Placement Questionnaire filed
with the War Department in 1943 he claimed to have served in the
Romanian Air Force as a pilot in 1933 and 1936. On the same form he lists
his college studies to have been completed in Vienna, Austria and Nancy,
France, before earning his Ph.D. Deak also lists his employment history to
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include running the foreign exchange and bank security department of the
Bucharest branch of the British-Hungarian Bank (1934-1938) (Angol
Magyar Bank Részvénytársaság) and being an employee of the Romanian
Government at the League of Nations in Geneva (1937- October 1939)
assigned to writing economic analysis. Deak gave the reason for leaving
the League as the breakout of the war. Parallel to his assignment at the
League, Deak taught, as an adjunct, two classes in economics, and inter-
national affairs at the Universal Esperanto Association.
He entered the USA on a Romanian quota in 1939, arriving in
New York on October 15, 1939, sailing from Genoa on passenger ship
Rex. Deak married Liselotte Maria Potter on Dec. 21, 1939 (born on Dec
13, 1919). In the 1940 census Deak and his wife appeared twice. Once
living in Larchmont, in the household of John Potter who declared his
birthplace as Austria, and his residence on April 1, 1935 to have been in
Romania and a then current occupation as importer, owning his own
business. Deak is listed as a son-in-law with 2 years of college education
and occupation of foreign exchange (dealer). Deak and his wife were also
listed as renting an apartment on Riverside Drive, in Manhattan, NY where
he gave his occupation as a banker and she as a student. In this filing he
reported 4-years of college education and an income for 1939 of $2,300.
Although all later newspaper reports list Deak entering the USA in 1939,
according to the manifest of the ship President Harding, Deak entered
(visited?) the USA on March 27, 1937. His occupation then was recorded
as lawyer and that he spoke English, Romanian, French and German.
Deak’s first employment in the USA was in the field of education.
He was a part-time teacher (“visiting lecturer”) at the Perkiomen School, a
traditional college preparatory school in Pennsburg, PA between1940-
1942, where his annual pay was $3,000. ($50,578.16 in 2014 dollars —
not bad!) In 1941, Deak was also a faculty member at City College, NY,
where he earned $3.25/hour. We know this from three sources, the
membership lists of the AAUP (American Association of University
Professors),4 the AEA (American Economic Association)5 and his military
personnel form. In September 1941, Deak became VP and financial
advisor in a part-time basis, to Korody and Co., Inc. (44 Beaver Street) for
an annual salary of $6,000 ($96,211.81 in 2014 dollars).
In October 1942 he registered for the draft and was originally
classified as 3A (deferred service; men with dependents, not engaged in
work essential to national defense). In December, as an officer candidate,
he started training at the OSS Paratrooper School at Fort Benning, Ga.
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(Deak was naturalized on April 10, 1943 and his wife became a natu-
ralized citizen on May 11, 1944.)
In September 1943 he was promoted to the rank of First Lieute-
nant and was assigned to the Middle East Theater. The original “assign-
ment” he was given on September 27, 1943, was that from Cairo, he “will
enter Romania, promote and organize partisan groups… and supply neces-
sary weapons for resistance.” This did not happen. Deak’s service was not
without blemish. His Theater Service Record completed on November 25,
1944 states that his “use in the OSS” should be terminated because of his
unsatisfactory rating with working with others. His leadership qualities
were also only rated “satisfactory.” The report also mentions, in one
sentence, that Deak did some intelligence work for Special Operations in
Syria and Palestine, but did not do Special Operations work in the Middle
East. At the end of December 1944, Deak was assigned to the Research
and Analysis Outpost of the Chinese Burma India (CBI) Branch. The
memo of this transfer states “it is our opinion that his present assignment
will probably utilize his abilities and that one major criticism of his
behavior in his previous assignment is unlikely to become apparent in his
assignment with this Branch.” Deak’s name was first mentioned in the
American newspapers in connection to this posting to the Chinese Burma
India Theater. He was assigned to safeguarding American holdings in
Singapore. He was also credited with the discovery of insurance industry
files.6
William J. Casey, who worked for the OSS and then was the head
of the SEC (1971-1973), then was under-secretary of economic affairs
(1973-74), then was the chairman of the Export-Import Bank (1974-76) -
in his introduction of Deak in 1975, to The Newcomen Society sponsored
lecture, recounts the story that Deak “was in charge of an OSS unit… that
accepted the sword of surrender of the Commanding General of the
Japanese forces in Burma.”7 (Sep.13, 1945 (?))
The postwar successor to the OSS (Office of Strategic Services)
was the S.S.U. (Strategic Services Unit, established on October 1, 1945).
In November 1945, the China branch established itself at General Wede-
meyer’s China Theatre headquarters in Shanghai.8 Deak, now ranked as
captain, was assigned to this theater March 1946.
Nicholas Deak returned to the USA in May 1946 and was “sepa-
rated” on August 17, 1946 with rank of captain.9 His son, Robert Leslie,
was born on January 22, 1951. In early December 1984 several of the
Deak’s firms filed for protection from creditors under Chapter 11 of the
US bankruptcy laws.
Susan Glanz42
Nicholas Deak was murdered on 18 November 1985 by a 44 year-
old homeless woman, Lois Lang.10 Conspiracy theories abound on the
internet that the murder was either organized by the CIA, because Lois
Lang was a subject of various brain experiments, or that it was directly
organized by the CIA because Deak did not go along with his CIA
handlers. Although no proof exists that the CIA was directly implicated in
his murder, Deak, even in his life time, was accused of and a proven
participant to several shady CIA actions.
The firm… building an empire
Deak & Co., Inc. was incorporated on September 26, 1946 as an export-
import firm. The firm took over Korody and Co. Inc., Deak’s employer
before his enlistment.
Deak & Company first made news in 1947 when it announced that
the Hungarian Weiss Manfred Steel and Metal Works wanted to enter the
US markets through them.11 The following year seemed to be a successful
year for Deak’s firm; Hungarian freight car sales to Germany were negoti-
ated through the firm12, as were the trade agreements with Argentina for
$300,000 worth of goods.13 The firm acted as middleman in aiding
American firms to attend the Budapest Industrial Fair in 1948.14 In 1949 an
optimistic Deak represented Hungarian interests to sell low quality manga-
nese in the US, and stated that his firm represented Hungarian interests in
the Americas and the Far East.15
The concentration of political and economic power in the hands of
the Communist Party in Hungary, and the falling iron curtain, forced
Deak’s firm to look for additional avenues to make money. In representing
Hungarian interests Deak realized that businesses were hindered by
foreign exchange restrictions, had difficulties in sending remittances
between countries and felt that he had “comparative advantage” with his
knowledge of languages and the financial landscape in Europe. Currency
exchange business seemed to be a logical next step. In 1949 Deak was
interviewed on the market rate of the new Eastern European currencies
which were handled in the US by foreign exchange firms (like his) and
gave the example that the 10Forint which was officially worth $0.87 was
sold for $0.36.16 Deak did not specialize in Eastern European currencies,
his firm bought and sold all currencies; for example, from 1950 the Times
of India reported the price of the rupee in New York every week by
quoting Deak & Co.17
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The currency exchange business was not developed to help the
tourists travelling from one country to another, but to help businesses get
around strict currency controls imposed by virtually every country after
World War II. In each country capital controls were sanctioned to prevent
currency crises, but the growing volume of trade made the official system
untenable and avenues had to be found for financing and paying for trade
and for surplus capital to earn higher interest rates.
The currency exchange businesses facilitated the flow of ‘hot
money’ around the world. ‘Hot money’ are funds that are held in one
currency but are liable to switch to another currency quickly in search of
the highest available returns. It is often used to describe the money in-
vested in currency markets by speculators.18
Economists often talk of two kinds of hot money, “speculative
capital movements” meaning movement due to anticipated changes in
exchange rates; while “flight movements” are movements of funds
because of anticipated war, communist insurrection, new higher taxes,
capital levies, and/or imposition of exchange restrictions, etc.19 The hot
moneys in this period represented capital flight.
Deak’s business must have been doing well, as the company
opened its first office outside NY in Washington DC in 1950 which was
reported by the Washington Post on October 14, 1950 and a new, second
office was opened in NYC, the following year, as reported by the New
York Tribune on June 30, 1951. The January 2, 1954 issue of The New
York Tribune/Herald announced the sale of Perera Co. to Deak & Co.
Inc.20 Over the following years this new firm opened offices at airports all
over the world. Some examples: New York (Idlewild), Miami, Los
Angeles, San Francisco, Hawaii, Toronto, San Juan, PR, Toronto, London,
Macao, and Hong Kong. In an article by Bernard Kalb in 1955, Deak is
touting the safety and the great rates offered by his firm for travelers
needing foreign currencies.21 A natural outgrowth of this business was the
sale of foreign currency denominated travelers’ checks.
As the business expanded the Deak offices made the headlines a
few times because of burglaries in their offices in 1957 and 1958.22 While
the thieves took off with relatively small sums, more significant events in
the company’s history were ignored by the American press.
The foreign exchange units were operated like banks, but were
non-banks.23 They accepted deposits from foreigners, paid interest and
transferred funds between various points in the world. But as the American
definition of a bank required, they did not make loans, and they accepted
money only from foreigners. To attract more funds, to provide “full-
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service” to his customers, Deak entered the banking business. In the USA
he purchased a small national bank, First National Bank of Fleischmanns24
in 1957, and founded the Foreign Commerce Bank in Zurich, Switzerland
in 1958.25 This small American bank, renamed Deak National Bank,
attracted a “lot of depositors from Latin America because of the devalua-
tion of their currencies”26 said the head of the international division in an
interview.  Deak claimed that this Swiss bank was established because the
commissions paid to handle their business was more than it cost to do it
themselves.27
To add to his empire, Deak purchased another European bank, in
1966. This was an old Viennese bank, Bankhaus Mayer-Loos and this
bank’s name was changed to Bankhaus Deak.28 In an interview given to
the New York Times, Deak explained the need for this new bank: were the
changing Swiss bank laws due to central banks and government pressures,
“foreign tax collectors and anti crime forces”… making “Austrian banks…
even more effective in protecting foreign money from prying eyes than
those of Switzerland.”29 In this interview Deak enumerated how Austrian
laws encouraged the flow of funds into the country as they allowed interest
payments on accounts larger than $10,000, which the Swiss did not; did
not force account holders to convert funds into the local currency, again
which is something the Swiss often did; the negative interest rates that the
Swiss charged on large deposits and taxed interest earned on large savings
accounts were also avoided by depositors in Austrian banks.
Another benefit of this new Austrian bank, and Deak’s other
foreign subsidiaries, was that they could participate in underwriting as
shown in 1972 and 1974 tombstone ads,30 as in America the laws separat-
ing investment and commercial banking were still on the books. In 1972
Bankhaus Deak who is one of the underwriters for Lafayette Academy’s
stock offering; in 1974 it was Deak and Co (Ontario) helped bring the
Hungarian National Bank’s euro-currency borrowing to the market.
To attract business Deak advertised in trade publications. For
example, an ad in the American Bar Association’s Journal in June 1963
read “FOREIGN FUNDS, BLOCKED ACCOUNTS, Foreign Money
Transfers, Financing of International Transactions. Deak & Co., Inc., 26
Broadway, New York 4.” This ad appeared monthly in the journal.
Deak did not hide his methods of money transfer. In an interview
published in the March 3, 1966 issue of the Wall Street Journal, Deak was
quite open about the way he transferred funds between countries. Two
examples were cited in the article, one method was to accept payment in
local currency into Deak’s account in the country with blocked funds, then
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finding a foreign partner who needs the local currency and can pay in USD
to Deak. Another method used was buying and selling airline tickets. The
airline tickets were purchased in countries with nonconvertible funds, then
smuggled out of the country and then sold to individuals or cashed in at
airline offices outside the purchase country. Deak is quoted in the article
that “most of the rubles he was selling went to Latin American diplomats,
who smuggled them into Moscow and used them for private purchases.”
But by the end of the 1960s the world was changing, more
and more players entered and competed for funds. As a 1971 Federal
Reserve Bank publication explained:
In the 1960s, European and Japanese exports became more com-
petitive with US exports. The US share of world output decreased
and so did the need for dollars, making converting those dollars to
gold more desirable. The deteriorating US balance of payments,
combined with military spending and foreign aid, resulted in a large
supply of dollars around the world. Meanwhile, the gold supply had
increased only marginally. Eventually, there were more foreign-held
dollars than the United States had gold. The country was vulnerable
to a run on gold and there was a loss of confidence in the US
government’s ability to meet its obligations, thereby threatening
both the dollar’s position as reserve currency and the overall Bretton
Woods system. With inflation on the rise and a gold run looming,
Nixon’s administration coordinated a plan for bold action.31
President Richard Nixon ended international convertibility of the US
dollar to gold on August 15, 1971. The Smithsonian Agreement of
1971 allowed the dollar to be devalued and the boundaries in which
exchange rates could fluctuate increased to 2-3 percent. In 1973
under the so-called Smithsonian Agreement II, the exchange rate
boundaries were eliminated altogether. This change effectively al-
lowed exchange rates of major currencies to float freely. To allow
businesses and individuals to participate in this new world of freely float-
ing currencies, the Chicago Mercantile Exchange opened a futures trading
floor for currencies in 1972.32
Deak reacted to the regulatory changes in two ways, on one-hand
he continued to advocate for hard currency, on the other, he introduced
new financial certificates backed by precious metals. This was ‘offered’ to
individuals who do not want to deal with the “cost of storage, assay,
fabrication, shipping, security and sales taxes.”33
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In 1976 in a speech given to the Empire Club of Canada, Deak
summarized his views, by saying that the answer to the double deficit and
the loss of value of the dollar “smart people… have already put their
money into better currencies, or in gold or silver or some other form of
investment.”34 To emphasize his point on the loss of value of the US$, in
the July 6, 1973 issue of the Los Angeles Times, Deak was quoted as
saying “that his gardener has asked to be paid in Italian lira because ‘the
dollar is bound to sunk lower.’”
Of course, his firm has acted previously, for example, to aid flight
capital, the Deak National Bank and the Bankhaus Deak offered checking
accounts denominated in gold in the late 1960s. (For US citizens the
private ownership of gold certificates was legalized in 1964. They could be
openly owned but were not redeemable in gold. The limitation on gold
ownership in the U.S. was repealed by President Gerald Ford in December
31, 1974.) After Americans were legally allowed to own gold bullion, the
firm advertised its ability to buy and sell both bullion and coins. While
owning gold and silver coins exempted the owner from sales taxes, the
owners of gold deposit certificates do not have to report their holdings to
the IRS.35
Americans could participate in the gold market in several ways, by
buying bullion, gold coins, or jewelry. The July 22, 1979 issue of the New
York Times explained that investors could also participate in the gold
market by using the options or futures markets or by buying gold certifi-
cates. Gold certificates represented gold deposits in the issuers’ banks
(Deak was one of the issuers). Gold bank accounts were regular checking
or savings accounts based on the value of the underlying gold value the
bank purchases or sells for the account holder. Deak National Bank was
one of the banks offering this type of account. On January 21, 1982 Amex
started trading in gold coins “many of its members in the securities busi-
ness have customers who want to buy coins now and then as part of their
investment portfolios.”36
The closing of the gold window in 1971 and the opportunity for
Americans to own gold opened a new money making avenue for Deak. He
was favored speaker at several seminars on gold, for example in February
1974 (advertised in Barron’s), several seminars and investor workshops
advertised in the Wall Street Journal. In 1979 both The New York Times
and the Los Angeles Times ran articles about the booming business of
investment seminars. On discussing the goal of the seminars, Deak, said “I
prefer to be a gold bug rather than a paper worm.”37
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Another avenue for gold ownership was by buying gold coins,
especially Krugerrands initially. The Krugerrand is a South African gold
coin, first minted in 1967 to help market South African gold and produced
by the South African Mint.38 It was legal tender in South Africa. On Janu-
ary 1, 1975 Americans could again legally own bullion and parallel to the
changing US laws, the South Africa’s Chamber of Mines began an adver-
tising campaign to convince Americans of this “unique” hedge against
“currency fluctuations and inflation.”39 Deak was one of the first compa-
nies to advertise the availability of this new “product.” As the public senti-
ment against the apartheid regime increased, protests and rallies were held
all over the country.  In 1985 there were several protests in front of Deak’s
various offices against the sales of Krugerrands.40 On August 8, 1985 Deak
&Co suspended the sale of Krugerrands “due to public pressure.”41 (Presi-
dent Reagan banned the importation of Krugerrands after October 11,
1985.42) Of course, after the introduction of gold coins by other nations,
like the Canadian Maple Leaf, in 1979, and the US Gold Medallions in
1982, Deak added them to his firm’s portfolio.43
While on one-hand the late1960s not only meant competition for
funds for the banks, but because of the double “menace” of inflation and
increasing deficit, on the other, foreign banking institutions came under
scrutiny. The one day hearing on December 9, 1968 held by the House
Committee on Banking and Currency defined its goal as a “number of
court cases, newspaper stories, and other reports of proceedings against
individuals, involving the illicit manipulation of huge sums of money. We
are especially concerned about the number of instances where the use of
foreign bank accounts in countries with strong bank secrecy laws consti-
tute an important phase of the illicit operation.”44
Based on the hearings, Wright Patman, the committee’s chair,
introduced the “Banks Records and Foreign Transactions Act,” popularly
known as the Bank Secrecy Act, which was passed in 1970. The focus of
the act was, on one hand to regulate the record keeping of domestic banks
and financial institutions, and on the other, the use of Americans of secret
foreign bank accounts outside US jurisdiction.45 The Act required that cash
movements of $10,000 or more be reported. This Act, and its amended
versions, together with the Congressional hearing leading to the passage of
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act will be the downfall of Deak & Co.
The first scandal to involve the firm is yet to be reported in the
press, it will be in the mid1970s (the Lockheed scandal), the coverage of
the firm is still positive; e.g. the formation of the new Deak Investment
Corporation, a real estate company, which was founded in 1972, with a
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goal of buying and developing properties in California, New York State
and Hawaii.
With the end of the direct U.S. military involvement in Vietnam in
1973 and the capture of Saigon by the North Vietnamese Army in 1975,
Vietnamese refugees were in the news. Wealthy refugees brought out their
life savings in gold. The refuges were housed in camps in Guam and on
several air force bases in the USA. The Christian Science Monitor reported
that “air force officers… expressed concern that they might run some risks
on the street of American cities. The officers advised the Vietnamese to
convert their gold into dollars…”46 One of the firms participating in this
gold buying program is Deak & Co. In the same article Deak was reported
to have admitted that on the first day in Guam the company purchased
$500,000 worth of gold. Two months later, in July, the New York Times
reported that business was still brisk.47
A sign of respect and success in the banking world that in 1974
Deak is one of the invited guests at the Ford White House for the dinner in
honor of Austrian Chancellor Bruno Kreisky.48 In 1975 Deak was one of
the candidates for the regional Federal Reserve Bank’s Class A directors’
spots.49 He lost the election.
Another development as a result of the changing US bank laws
were the rapid rise in offshore financial centers (OFC). These “are broadly
defined as markets in which financial operators are permitted to raise
funds from nonresidents and invest or lend the money to other nonresi-
dents free from most regulations and taxes. Most commonly, the designa-
tion “offshore” financial market is used to describe the wholesale inter-
national financial market, previously known as the Eurodollar market.”50
For North American banks, doing business in London was expensive and
the Caribbean OFCs offered a cheaper and equally attractive regulatory
environment free of exchange controls, reserve requirements, and interest
rate ceilings, and in the same time zone as New York. In a letter to the
editor to The New York Times, on Apr 11, 1979, Deak argued that New
York City should create a “bankers’ trade zone” as this would achieve
several goals. It would make New York a more important banking center
than London, and it would “create additional employment” in New York,
as facilities maintenance and records for transactions would be completed
here. Deak also argued that this new zone would “help our balance of
payments” and would also allow the Federal Reserve Bank to supervise
and regulate American banks. As he wrote “it is not dignified for respect-
able American banks to set up quasi-banking operations on small is-
lands,… in order to circumvent the Federal Reserve Q regulations and
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reserve requirements.” This letter was signed by Deak, as an adjunct
professor of international banking at NYU’s Law School. In 1981 the
Federal Reserve approved the creation of International Banking Facilities
(IBF) on American soil, which allowed American banks to offer services
to foreign residents and institutions free of some Federal Reserve require-
ments and some state and local income taxes.
In 1980 Nicholas Deak and Yehudi Menuhin were the George
Washington Awards winners given by the American Hungarian Founda-
tion.51 Forbes magazine started publishing the wealthiest 400 list in 1982.
In 1983 and 1984 Nicholas Deak made this Forbes list, with a personal
wealth of $400 million.52, 53
The scandals that bought down the firm
In August 1975 Time magazine reported that Lockheed Corporation
“admitted under prodding by the Securities and Exchange Commission
that it has slipped at least $22 million under the table to foreign govern-
ment officials and political organizations.” The Deak firm was investigated
for facilitating this bribery, which became known as the Lockheed Bribery
Scandal.54 A detailed investigating report tying Deak to Lockheed was
published by Tad Szulc in the April 10, 1976 issue of the New Republic. In
the Interim Report to the President and the Attorney General, subtitled The
Cash Connection: Organized Crime, Financial Institutions and Money
Laundering (1984) summarized the Lockheed case as follows: Lockheed
was accused of bribing Japanese officials. On page 12 of this Interim
Report the following summary is found: “Lockheed Aircraft’s illegal
payments totaling $25.5 million between 1969 and 1975 were disguised
through false accounting entries and the utilization of cash and “bearer”
drafts payable directly to the foreign officials. Deak-Perera Company in
Los Angeles facilitated the Japanese briberies by wiring $8.3 million to its
Hong Kong office, where the US dollars were changed to Japanese yen
and presented to Deak personnel for delivery in Japan.” In the US press
more salacious details were reported, namely that in “Hong Kong, where a
Spanish-born priest representing Lockheed took the cash and carried it to
Japan in a flight bag or in cardboard boxes labeled “oranges.”55 In Japan,
the scandal resulted in the criminal conviction of a former Prime Minister,
Kakuei Tanaka. Leslie Deak, Nicholas Deak’s son, as the company’s VP,
reacted to the scandal by saying “Lockheed Corporation came in and asked
us to make a payment …We made a payment. The fact that the money was
used later for bribes is Lockheed's shame, not ours.”56 Deak’s firm was not
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fined or punished in this case, as the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act will
only be passed in December, 1977, but the damage to the firm was
devastating.57 “In 1995 Lockheed Corp. agreed to pay a record $24.8
million in penalties and pleaded guilty to violating the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act — a federal law that stemmed from a Lockheed overseas
bribery scandal in the 1970s.” Los Angeles Times, January 28, 1995. In
1976 the IRS began probing the Deak’s San Francisco office for “possibly
illegal currency dealings.…The investigating was begun here when
currency totaling $1,233,988 was found in envelopes labelled ‘docu-
ments’”.58 In 1977 the San Francisco Office manager and the Deak firm
was indicted by the Grand Jury for transferring $10.9 million from the
Philippines to the USA.59 The company was found guilty and was fined a
total of $20,000.60
In a frank interview, following the reports on the IRS investiga-
tion, with the Washington Post, Deak detailed how exchange controls were
broken by his firms (and others). Controls are broken three ways, Deak
was quoted as saying. The three methods were: “the most obvious method
is to try to smuggle cash out of the country either on your person, through
the mail or by courier. Another method would be to locate a broker who
would exchange dollars for local currency and profit either by discounting
the local currency or by marking up the cost of the dollar. The individual
seeking the dollars would be responsible for smuggling the cash out of the
country. The last method is that commonly used by Deak. An individual
would inform Deak, possibly by mail, that he has a certain amount of local
currency that he wants to exchange for dollars and that he also wants Deak
to help him remove the dollars from his country — in violation of controls.
Deak then will quote a rate of exchange and instruct the individual whom
to contact in his country. The contact, or broker — in effect a Deak agent
— makes money by discounting or marking up the rates, and so does
Deak.”61
Luckily for Deak & Co. the 1977 Koreagate faded fast from the
headlines. “In 1977, Mr. Park was charged with 36 counts of conspiracy,
bribery, mail fraud, failure to register as a foreign agent and making illegal
political contributions. A long investigation found that he had concocted a
scheme, with the help of high-ranking Korean Central Intelligence Agency
officials, to collect inflated commissions from sales of American-grown
rice to South Korea, and to use some of the money to buy support for
South Korea in Congress. The charges were later dropped, after Mr. Park
agreed to testify at Congressional hearings and in front of federal grand
juries. His testimony led to ethics proceedings and criminal charges
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against several members of Congress.”62The Nov. 2 1978 issue of the Wall
Street Journal reported that an American company paid $200,000 to a
Korean official through Deak & Co., Hawaii.
The most damaging charges against the firm were the money
laundering accusations. In 1982 nine firms, including Deak-Perera were
accused of laundering more than $100 million in drug sales. The lead
“launderer”, Eduardo Orozco, (and six other Colombians living in NY and
one woman living in Columbia were named in the indictment) was
arrested in November 1982.  Orozco was accused of running two money
laundering schemes, one for Colombian coffee merchants to help them
avoid paying taxes, and one for washing cocaine money. His cover was
that he was a New York commodities trader. He was charged and con-
victed running the largest money laundering operation to that date.63
The Presidential Commission found that “more than two-thirds of
the money moved by Orozco — approximately $97 million — went
through his accounts with Deak-Perera…In fewer than sixteen months, this
account received 232 cash deposits totaling almost $97 million. These
deposits were carried in cardboard boxes to Deak-Perera New York City
branch.” Orozco was sentenced to eight years and was fined $1 million on
June 30, 1983. (President’s Commission, p.36) Although Deak refused to
testify before the Presidential Commission, which had no subpoena power,
on money laundering, as “he had given all the information [the inves-
tigators] had asked for.”64 In 1986 when the company was coming out of
Chapter 11 bankruptcy, Arkadi Kuhlman the president and CEO of the
“new” Deak International, said the money laundering charges “were gross
distortions.”65
When the newspapers began reporting on the findings of the
President’s Commission Deak-Perera was tied to another money launder-
ing case, that of Isaac Kattan. The report said that an IRS audit discovered
several irregularities regarding Kattan’s account, which were held in the
name of Jose Vega. (President’s Commission, 42). Deak’s attitude towards
money laundering was best summarized by him “You don’t refuse a
customer just because his money isn’t clean.”66
On December 7, 1984 Deak & Co, filed for bankruptcy protection
“citing severe liquidity problems.” (The holding company’s assets were
$62.2 million, while its liabilities were $95 million.) The firm’s securities
trading (Deak-Perera Securities Inc.) and futures trading units (Deak-
Perera Futures), and the Deak National Bank were not included in the
bankruptcy filing. The bankruptcy-court petition also didn't include Deak-
Perera U.S., the firm’s non-bank currency and metals trading unit. The
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connections between the parent and the subsidiaries were murky, wrote
BusinessWeek in 1984.67 In a 2012 interview reexamining the Deak
murder, published by Salon.com, on the company organization the then
chairman said “the company was compartmentalized in a way that only the
CEO fully understood.”68 The firm explained the need for bankruptcy
protections: “Mr Deak said many of the clients of the two Deak subsidi-
aries covered in the court filing withdrew their money after a U.S. presi-
dential commission claimed that a subsidiary was used for money launder-
ing by South American drug dealers.” He further charged that “the firm’s
competitors used news articles about the commission report to panic our
clients, causing a run.”69
Even after the firm filed for bankruptcy protection, the firm made
negative news, Deak & Co. Macao Ltd and the company’s Hong Kong
subsidiaries were “under fire” in late 1984.70 The Macao operations were
closed, the Hong Kong government revoked the license of Deak-Perera
Finance and the court ordered the liquidation of Deak-Perera Far East and
the police issued a warrant for Nicholas Deak’s arrest.71
Nicholas Deak did not see his firm re-emergence from bankruptcy.
He was murdered on Monday, 18 November 1985 by a 44 year-old home-
less woman, Lois Lang. The AP wire reported that the murderer was
“claiming some financial injustice was done to her in the past by this
company.''72 The London Times reported that Lois Lang supposedly
“claimed she was a part owner of the company and was owed money.”73
What happened to the best known entities in the Deak empire?
On May 6, 1986 the Deak companies emerged from bankruptcy. The
Washington Post reported that “creditors will receive 48 cents for every
dollar owed to them. Deak-Perera U.S. which was not involved in the
bankruptcy proceedings will be called Deak International and will become
the parent company. The former holding company, Deak & Co., becomes
a subsidiary.… former subsidiaries Deak-Perera Wall Street Inc. and
Deak-Perera International Banking Corp., both of which were part of the
Chapter 11 proceedings, become subsidiaries of Deak International.”74
Deak National Bank changed its name to American National Bank
on June 17, 1985. In spite of the name change, the mostly South American
depositors withdrew their money, the bank failed and closed its doors on
January 24, 1992. Foreign Commerce Bank, Zurich was sold in 1985 to a
Singapore investment group.75 Bankhaus Deak was purchased by Foreign
Commerce Bank in 1983. In 1988 Royal Trust Bank of Canada took over
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the bank and then it was sold to the Anglo Irish Bank in 1995. In 1998 the
bank was again sold to the Austrian subsidiary of Credit Lyonnais Bank.
In September 2008 Valartis Group purchased the bank; the new company
is called Valartis Bank.
110-branch North American Deak foreign exchange, travelers
check and precious metals retail network merged with Thomas Cook
Currency Services, Inc. in 1990,76 and parts of this new firm were taken
over by Travelex Currency Services in 2001.77 This is still an active com-
pany today.
Deak International Inc. started its new life with acquisitions. In
1987 it purchased far-east gold-refining subsidiary and precious metals
operations and the metal dealing operations of Johnson Matthey Com-
modities Inc. in London and New York to be able to produce bullion and
precious metal products under its own hallmark and to have 24-hour
trading capability in the world’s three major metals and currency trading
markets.78 After several bad decisions, the company merged out in 1994.
Barclays Bank PLC acquired the precious-metals and copper trading
operations of Deak International Trading in 1991.79
Conclusions
In the already mentioned 1964 Time article, Deak was compared to James
Bond because of his ties to the secret service. But, maybe, there are other
comparisons that should be made to a James Bond story, esp. to his 1964
nemesis, Goldfinger. In this movie James Bond must outsmart and outgun
the Goldfinger, a bullion dealer and gold smuggler, who plans to raid Fort
Knox and irradiate the American gold supply. Goldfinger was supposedly
named after “the architect Ernő Goldfinger, the husband of a cousin of Ian
Fleming’s golfing partner,”80 a Hungarian; James Bond was assigned to
fight to keep gold pure and the existing trading system safe.
In the movie, Colonel Smithers of the Bank of England explains
the gold market to Bond:
Supposing you have a bar of gold in your pocket about the size of a
couple of packets of Players. Weight about five and a quarter
pounds. Never mind for the moment where you got it from – stole it
or inherited or something. Now, the law says you have to sell that to
the Bank of England at the controlled price of twelve pounds per
ounce. That would make it worth around a thousand pounds. But
you are greedy. You’ve got a friend going to India. Your friend flies
to Bombay and goes to the first bullion dealer in the bazaar. He will
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be given about one thousand seven hundred pounds and you’re a
richer man than you might have been.
A more detailed explanation of the method used is given in the book.81
Goldfinger, in the movie, is more like Deak than Bond, and not
only because they are both eastern Europeans. (In the movie Goldfinger is
Latvian.) Goldfinger arrived in England in 1937; Deak arrived in the USA
in 1939. Goldfinger used the system by getting the necessary licenses to do
his business and by employing middlemen, so did Deak. Deak and Gold-
finger exploit the existing system of currency controls by moving gold and
currencies around the world, and both believed currency control systems
should be abolished.
Had Goldfinger achieved the destruction of Fort Knox, the fixed
exchange rate system would have had to be reevaluated, as the dollar price
of gold would have had to be raised. When the dollar gold fixed exchange
rate was abandoned by Richard Nixon this is exactly what happened.
In the movie, Goldfinger was killed, and so was Deak.
Nicholas Deak was a believer in hard money, money backed by
precious metal. As the banking regulations changed Deak’s business
model also changed; the firm expanded from being a money changer to
owning full-service banks in New York and in Europe. The company can
be credited with several financial innovations, like free travelers checks
and the creation of gold certificates. Deak also minted gold and silver
ingots taking advantage of his “name” was an assurance that these ingots
did not have to be assayed. The complicated web of interconnected compa-
nies was brought down by changing US and foreign laws and Deak’s
arrogance.
__________________________________________
An interesting side-note to the Deak saga
On googling Nicholas Deak on the internet, a gold coin with Deak’s
likeness pops up. What is its history? Deak & Co. did issue gold and silver
ingots; but it did not produce this gold coin, called ‘Deak Fivepiece’. This
coin was issued by the Gold Standard Corporation, which was founded in
1976 by Conrad J. Braun in Kansas City, Missouri. Between 1979 and
1984 the company minted five gold coins, named after famous people/
economists, Harwood, Hayek, Hazlitt, Adam Smith and Deak, all believers
— to a certain degree — in the gold standard. The Deak Fivepiece
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contained 1/20th ounce of gold, and it was the smallest gold coin minted by
the company. It had promotional statements/slogans on each side; around
Deak’s portrait the coin said “The internalization of sound money”, while
on the ‘tail’ — “For integrity there is no substitute.” The coins were
advertised in Barron’s and other papers. If an ounce of gold is valued at
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The Saint Elizabeth of Hungary
Roman Catholic Parish of Toronto:
Nine Decades of Evolution
Nándor Dreisziger
Tibor Horváth S.J. (1927-2008) of Toronto’s Regis College, and later
also of the University of Toronto’s Saint Michael’s College, was a noted
theologian, distinguished teacher, journal editor, and a tireless organizer.
When he started his Hungarian church history project a quarter century
ago, he was thinking very much in terms of an encyclopaedia that included
among other things entries on the individual parishes of Hungarians in the
Magyar homeland and in the Hungarian diaspora. The compilation of such
dictionary of Hungarian church history however would have been an extra-
ordinarily time-consuming task. For this reason the book project I inher-
ited from Father Horváth became a different undertaking: it transmuted
into a synopsis of the literature that has been published on the Christian
churches of the Hungarians. Accordingly our project became not an ency-
clopaedia but a historical synthesis with the title Church and Society in
Hungary and in the Hungarian Diaspora. Nevertheless, in deference to
Father Horváth’s original ideas, we had at first planned to include in this
book a chapter on the history of one Hungarian parish, written not — and
not only — from the existing secondary literature but also from archival
sources. The choice as to which parish to select for such a case study was
easy: there were good reasons for selecting the Saint Elizabeth of Hungary
Parish in Toronto. First of all it was this parish that Father Horváth, during
the decades he spent in Canada, had been associated with most — though
not in an official capacity. More importantly however we thought of this
parish because today it is probably the largest and most active of the Hun-
garian overseas diaspora’s religious institutions. These were our plans,
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until we heard from the editors of our book’s would-be publisher, the
University of Toronto Press, to the effect that they did not want any parish
histories in the volume they would produce for us. So, we included a few
paragraphs about the story of Toronto’s Hungarian Catholics in the chapter
the book has on Canada and we decided to publish the history of the St.
Elizabeth of Hungary Church in Toronto separately, in fact in the present
volume of the Hungarian Studies Review.
The Origins of Toronto’s Hungarian R.C. Community
The Saint Elizabeth of Hungary Parish serves Roman Catholic Hungarians
of the metropolitan area of Greater Toronto in Canada’s economic and
cultural heartland. Today’s Toronto is a bustling city that is home to the
largest urban population in Canada and occupies an enormous area, over
5,600 square kilometres. Toronto also serves as capital city of the Province
of Ontario, Canada’s most populous province.
Relative to the age of capital cities in Europe, or even in some
cases on the North American continent, Toronto is a newcomer. Quebec
City, the capital of the neighbouring province of Quebec, is nearly two
centuries older. Toronto’s roots may not go very far back in time, but they
are interesting. During the French regime, it was a trading post located on
the northern shores of Lake Ontario near the mouth of the Humber River.
The early days of British rule witnessed its birth as a very small settlement,
originally named York, within the fledgling British colony that emerged in
the interior of British North America after the British were ousted from
their traditional colonies in the War of American Independence. The future
Toronto got a big boost when Lieutenant-Governor John Graves Simcoe
made York the capital of Upper Canada — because it was not so close to
the American border as was for example the larger village of Niagara-on-
the-Lake. Some two decades later the town still had a population of only
about 700 people, but the settlement kept growing and still two decades
later, when it was incorporated as the municipality of Toronto, it had 9,000
inhabitants. Toronto’s growth continued, especially as it gradually became
an important industrial and financial centre.
The First World War resulted in the expansion of some of the
city’s existing industries and the birth of new ones. Large-scale meat-pro-
cessing came to Toronto as did the manufacture of munitions. Although
the latter activity declined steeply after the war, meat-processing remained
and manufacturing in general expanded during the prosperous second half
of the 1920s.The Great Depression hit Toronto too, but proportionately
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less severely than it impacted many other Canadian cities. The Second
World War led to a further acceleration of economic activity in the city,
especially in the manufacturing of precision instruments, electronics, and
in particular, military aircraft. In the post-war years Toronto’s economy
continued to expand, bolstered by the post-war baby-boom and the influx
of tens of thousands of immigrants. By 1951 the population of Greater
Toronto had reached over a million. Soon the city would overtake Mont-
real as the premier commercial and manufacturing centre of Canada.
A Hungarian community was slow to emerge in Toronto. At the
turn of the last century Winnipeg acted as a centre of Hungarian cultural
and political activity in the country. Some twenty years later it was Hamil-
ton, Ontario, that was considered the “Hungarian capital” of Canada; but
by the second half of the 1920s, Toronto’s Hungarian community began
growing, mainly as the result to two developments. One of these was the
trans-migration of earlier Hungarian immigrants — or, more likely, their
children — from Canada’s prairie provinces to the manufacturing centres
of Central Canada, and the other was the fact that many of the immigrants
who came to Canada starting with 1924 found only disappointment in the
Canadian West and in a few short years relocated to cities such as Toronto
where economic opportunities were more plentiful. We can suspect that,
for the growth of a Hungarian community in Toronto, this second pheno-
menon was more important than the first. We do not know for sure what
percentage of the post-1924 arrivals ended up in Toronto, but we know
that by 1931 nearly two-thirds of them had migrated from the rural dis-
tricts they had been directed to originally, to live in urban centres.1
The members of the post-1924 immigration wave of Hungarians
were probably not the first Hungarian-speakers to settle in the city.  Before
the war, and even possibly before 1900 a few craftsmen had come, as well
as Jewish shopkeepers and tradesmen. After the introduction in the wake
of the First World War of the American quota laws that kept Hungarians
out of the United States, Toronto might have been a way-station for those
people who wanted to get into the United States one way or another,
legally or illegally. Under these circumstances it is not surprising that or-
ganized life for Hungarians in the city was slow to emerge. After the
middle of the decade, however, it did start to appear. In 1926, for example,
the Presbyterian Church of Canada established a mission for members of
the Hungarian Reformed Church living in the city and its environs. Their
visiting pastor was the Reverend Ferenc Kovács of the already established
Hamilton congregation. The move was followed two years later by the
Lutheran Church of Canada and the United Church. Soon Catholic priests
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from already established Hungarian parishes in the Niagara regions of the
United States and Ontario also began visiting the Roman Catholic families
of Toronto, and occasionally celebrating mass for them in homes or rented
premises. Among these itinerant priests were István Nyíri and Jermos
Hédly, the first and second pastors respectively of the Hungarian R.C.
parish of Welland.2
The Beginnings of a Parish
One Hungarian family that had been living in Toronto for some time was
that of István Leskó Sr. His Canadian-born son István Jr. became a dentist
and established a practice in Toronto. In 1925 he attended a lecture by the
visiting Hungarian elder-statesman Count Albert Apponyi. At the lecture
he met a couple of recent Hungarian newcomers and learned from them
that there were several Hungarian R.C. families living in town. Soon
Leskó Jr. became one of the community leaders of Toronto’s Hungarians.
He approached Archbishop Neil McNeil of the Toronto Archdiocese and
got him interested in the plight of the city’s Hungarians and their hopes for
religious services in their own language.3
These aspirations were not entirely an unrealistic ones as other
ethnic groups in the city, in particular the Italians and the Poles, had
pioneered the creation of ethnic parishes in the Archdiocese of Toronto.
The Our Lady of Saint Carmel parish had been established in 1908 and
was followed by the founding of the parish of Saint Agnes in 1914. Both
were Italian. The city’s Polish immigrants established the Saint Stanislaus
parish in 1911 and the Saint Mary’s parish three years later. Both of these
Polish parishes were served by members of the Oblate Order. In the inter-
war years the creation of ethnic churches in Toronto continued. Among the
groups that were the recipients of this privilege were the Lithuanians in
1932 and the Slovaks two years later.4
In the spring of 1928 Archbishop McNeil wrote to Jusztinián
Cardinal Serédi, the Prince Primate of Hungary, asking him to send a
priest to Toronto to serve as the spiritual leader of Toronto’s R.C. Hun-
garian community. Serédi was unable to find a priest for the task, but he
recommended a seminarian by the name of László Forgács who was close
to completing his preparation for the priesthood. Forgács arrived in Toron-
to late in September of the same year and resumed his studies of the priest-
hood at the city’s Catholic Seminary. At Christmas time Archbishop
McNeil summoned Forgács and told him that he should start serving his
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countrymen in the capacity of a missionary — even though he had not
quite completed his preparations for the priesthood.5
Forgács went to work immediately. As a result of his efforts —
and of others including István Leskó Jr. and a Hungarian priest living in
Toronto, Kelemen Burka — in 1929 Toronto’s Hungarian Catholic Club
was established. By this time Forgács had completed his theological stu-
dies. Not having a church building of their own, for the purpose of church
services the members of Toronto’s Catholic Club had to be satisfied with
renting houses or, whenever possible, the buildings of non-Hungarian
parishes. From 1930 on, the Club operated in a large home on Beverly
Street and began using it for the celebration of masses — as well as for
various social and cultural activities. The place served as a mission to
Toronto’s Roman Catholic Hungarians. It also became an important focal
point for the social and cultural life of the city’s entire Hungarian com-
munity. Later the club’s premises were moved to a house on Grange Road,
still in the heart of Toronto’s immigrant neighbourhood. By this time the
deepening economic recession made life for the fledgling Hungarian Club
difficult. As one contemporary commentator put it, only the dedication and
sacrifice of a few R.C. families managed to save the Club from disintegra-
tion.6
According to official church records, by 1928 a Hungarian parish
had become part of the network of Roman Catholic ethnic parishes in the
Archdiocese of Toronto. The date of its establishment was given in some
documents as 19 March 1928, a time when the community was still being
served by visiting priests from elsewhere. Mass was celebrated in various
R.C. churches, or premises rented by the Hungarian Club, for a long time.
The parish might have been founded in 1928, but it was apparently not
recognized officially until 1933, when Father Forgács (who by then had
Anglicised his name to Forgach) announced its official establishment —
and the recognition of the Hungarian Club as its lay sub-unit.7
In the mid-1930s the Our Lady of Hungary parish in Welland, one
of the oldest and largest Hungarian R.C. parishes in Southern Ontario,
started to experience problems when no Hungarian priest was found to
replace its parish priest, Father Olivér Horváth. To solve the crisis in De-
cember of 1935 Forgach was transferred to Welland and the Toronto
parish was left without a priest. The following year the parishes’ problems
escalated to such extent that at a meeting of the parish council in Septem-
ber the members present offered to resign and dissolve the parish. At the
October meeting, however, the decision was reversed. The council also
decided to appeal to the Archbishop again and to ask him to help them find
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a Hungarian priest. Soon the parish members’ wish came true when a new
priest by the name of Vilmos Szőllőssy was assigned to the parish. A crisis
was avoided and the parish resumed its usual routine: holding Sunday
masses that now became well-attended, as well as organizing picnics in the
summer and dinners and theatrical performances at other times. Unfor-
tunately this renaissance did not last long for in 1938 Szőllőssy decided to
abandon the priesthood. Once again the parish was left without a Hungari-
an pastor. A compromise was found that saw John V. Harris, the Chan-
cellor of the Archdiocese of Toronto, becoming the official pastor, and a
young priest-in-training, József Horváth, visiting regularly from Montreal
and celebrating mass in Hungarian. The arrangement lased till mid-1939
when Horváth was transferred to Welland to replace Forgach who in the
meantime had also abandoned the priesthood. At that time a Canadian
priest, the 25-year-old Leo Austin, was appointed pastor of the Toronto
parish, even though he couldn’t speak Hungarian. In all probability, his
appointment was seen as a stop-gap measure, to last until a Hungarian-
speaking priest could be found, but with the outbreak of the Second World
War bringing a pastor from Hungary became a difficult proposition and
Father Austin’s tenure lasted for an entire decade. With his appointment a
new and eventful chapter started in the parish’s history.8
At this point it might be appropriate to ask the question why
priests such as Szőllőssy and Forgács abandoned the priesthood. The
sources are reticent about this issue. At the time it would have been con-
sidered bad manners for anyone to suggest in public, let alone in writing,
that a young pastor could have fallen in love with a woman. And such a
development may not have been the cause. We really don’t know what the
reason or reasons were for these priests’ abandonment of the priesthood.
But, Forgács’s reminiscences give a hint. While serving in Welland, for
example, he received no salary, not even any money for out-of-pocket
expenses, from either his parish or the mother Church. “Not a cent” — as
he recalled later. He had lodging in the pastor’s residence but had no
money for food. What kept him from starving was the fact that every day
(almost every day?) he was invited to one or another of the families associ-
ated with the parish for a meal.9
By the time Father Austin had assumed the spiritual leadership of
the parish in Toronto, conditions were more auspicious. The economic
depression that did not strike Toronto with the vicious force that it hit
many other Canadian cities, began lifting. The outbreak of the Second
World War had some traumatizing impact on the city’s Hungarian com-
munity, but it also resulted in heightened economic activity — and the
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abatement of the misery that the depression had caused. By 1942 the very
high unemployment of the 1930s had given way to nearly full employment
— as well as higher wages especially for skilled workers. It was under
such conditions that the parish received notice that it had to vacate its
premises on Grange Road. This development precipitated a search for a
real church building for the parish.10
A Church Building for the Parish
After a few months” search the leaders of the parish set their sights on a
church building that went up for sale near the city’s immigrant quarters
and in walking distance of its Hungarian neighbourhood — in fact just a
few blocs west of several of the rented premises the city’s Catholic
Hungarians had used for church services and social activities during the
previous decade. The building in question was Saint Philip’s Anglican
Church, located at the intersection of two major arteries in downtown
Toronto, Spadina Avenue and Dundas Street West.
St. Philip’s Church had a distinguished history. Its historic roots
went back to the times when militia-colonel George T. Denison (1839-
1925) was a key figure in Toronto’s social circles and city politics — he
was, among other things, Toronto’s chief police magistrate.  Denison was
also part of Canada’s political and intellectual establishment. Among his
achievements was a prize he won from the government of Tsar Alexander
II of Russia for a book he wrote on military tactics. Denison and his son
Robert B. Denison were also involved in Toronto’s organized religious
life. They were the founders of Saint Stephen-in-the Fields Anglican
Church on Bellevue Avenue. When the Denisons had a disagreement with
the church’s rector and the city’s Anglican ecclesiastic establishment, they
had Saint Philip’s Church built on the corner of Spadina Avenue and Dun-
das Street. The main part of the church was completed late in 1883 and
services were started in early 1884.11
This part of Toronto already had four Anglican churches and the
addition of a fifth was a risky undertaking. Nevertheless for some time
Saint Philip’s was a success. Being a “low” Anglican parish it catered to a
different clientele than the other Anglican parishes and for a few decades it
prospered. The Toronto of the times was predominantly British and Pro-
testant, and it was famous for its great many churches. The first pastor of
Saint Philip’s, James Fielding Sweeny, was one of the most influential
Anglican priests in the city. He served till 1909 when he became the
Anglican bishop of Toronto. In the second and third decades of the new
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century, things began to change.  Many residential homes especially south
of Saint Philip’s were demolished and were replaced by shops and textile
factories. Immigrants from Eastern Europe began moving in, and the
previously mainly Anglo-Saxon residents moved to newer, quieter and
nicer areas. Their parish followed them. It was resurrected under the new
name Saint Philip the Apostle Church in the city’s northern outskirts, on
Caribou Road near the intersection of Bathurst Street and Lawrence
Avenue.12
Once the Hungarian Catholics of Toronto decided to put in a bid
on Saint Philip’s Church downtown, they launched a major fundraising
campaign. The lion’s share of these efforts can be credited to the newly
arrived (from Stockholm, Saskatchewan) nuns: Sisters Columba and
Sylvia. Sister Mary Schwartz of the Hamilton R.C. parish also assisted.
Father Austin went on a fundraising tour that included stops in some of the
more prosperous American R.C. parishes. The campaign was expected to
yield at least $10,000, an amount that was to be matched by the Arch-
bishop. The building’s purchase price was $23,000 and after the monies
collected were applied to it, the parish was left with a debt of $9,300, owed
to the Bank of Commerce. The figures suggest that neither the parish nor
the Archbishop was able to raise the amount of money originally con-
templated. To make the situation more difficult, soon after the building’s
purchase, it became evident that expensive repairs were needed, the most
serious being the need for a new heating system. The renovations started
not long after the transfer of ownership. To help out, many parish members
donated their time and labour. The spruced-up church was blessed by
Archbishop James C. McGuigan on March 19, 1944. It should be men-
tioned here that the purchase of a church building by Toronto’s Catholic
Hungarians served as inspiration for those of Hamilton. There too efforts
were started to form a separate, Hungarian parish and to purchase a church
building. At first they had to convince the city’s sceptical church hierarchy
that they would be able to achieve their aim. Their quest was successful,
although the Hungarians of Hamilton took a long time to see it through.
The Saint Stephen’s Church of the city became a reality only in 1949.13
The fact that Toronto’s Hungarians established a Catholic Parish
complete with a church building before their brethren in Hamilton were
successful in doing so speaks volumes about the evolving place of these
two cities in the evolution of Canada’s Hungarian community. In the
1930s Hamilton was the city in Canada with the largest and most influ-
ential Hungarian community. Toronto’s Hungarian colony at the time
served as a kind of a satellite of other, older Magyar colonies such as
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Hamilton’s. Pastors came to visit Toronto from places such as Welland
and Waterloo. The Hungarian fraternal sick-benefit associations of Brant-
ford and Hamilton had branch offices in Toronto. All this would change by
the 1950s, and the transition had started in earnest already during the war.
As historians of Toronto point out, during the second half of the World
War II the city experienced a huge expansion in manufacturing that
resulted in thousands of new jobs being created. The new economic
climate brought prosperity to many immigrant Hungarian families and no
doubt resulted in Hungarians flocking to the city in greater numbers.
This growth in economic prosperity also had some detrimental
impact. The upturn in economic activity did not benefit all members of the
Hungarian community equally: some families prospered while others were
bypassed by the new wealth. As a result socio-economic divisions among
Toronto’s Hungarians increased. Furthermore, these developments helped
to destroy the residential concentrations of Hungarians in Toronto, just as
they promoted the disintegration of the neighbourhoods of other immigrant
groups. What happened was that families that prospered tended to leave
the immigrant ghettoes, in particular the one that had existed for many
years just east of the new Saint Elizabeth of Hungary Church. The better-
off families bought homes in the more prestigious Madison Avenue-
Bedford Road-Huron Street area just north of the city’s main east-west
commercial artery, Bloor Street. The area was still in walking distance of
the new church, but not in easy walking distance, especially for the elderly
and families with young kids. In the meantime the poorer members of the
community continued to live in the immigrant ghetto. It is difficult to
estimate to what extent and in what ways this socio-economic and resi-
dential differentiation in the community impacted the organized religious
life of Toronto’s Hungarians.14
While the war had mainly indirect impact on life of Toronto’s
R.C. Hungarian community, the post-war years had greater impact, some
of which was direct and long-lasting. This would be the result of the
coming of two more waves of Hungarian immigrants to Canada. That
process, however, didn’t start till the late 1940s and until then two
memorable events took place in the life of the Saint Elizabeth of Hungary
Parish. One of these was the visit in July of 1947 of the Prince Primate of
Hungary, József Cardinal Mindszenty. He came to Canada for a world
congress of Roman Catholics that was held in Ottawa that year, and he
made a side trip to see the Archbishop of Toronto, as well to visit the city’s
Saint Elizabeth of Hungary Parish. It was on this occasion that he is
alleged to have made an unflattering remark to the parish’s pastor. He told
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Father Austin that he had no business to lead a Hungarian spiritual com-
munity if he didn’t learn Hungarian. The remark, if indeed the leader of
the Hungarian church could utter such statement, suggests that Mindszenty
was ignorant of the situation of Canada’s Hungarian Roman Catholics, in
particular of their inability to attract Hungarian-speaking priests. The Car-
dinal seems also not to have been aware of the fact that most people, even
those with a good education, were unable to learn a language so different
from English as Hungarian. Despite these remarks, if they were indeed
ever made, Austin soldiered on with serving his parish, and probably also
with his in the end unsuccessful efforts to learn the Magyar language. In
December of the same year, a ceremony was held in the church where the
document of the parish’s debt was burned after all debts incurred in the
building’s purchase and renovation had been discharged.15
The Coming of Jesuit Priests
The year 1948 would bring another change in the parish’s history.  Arch-
bishop McGuigan must have been aware of the problem at Saint Eliza-
beth’s and was probably anxious to remedy it. He learned from Sister
Mary that in Boston, MA, in the New England Province of the Jesuit
Order, there were a few Hungarian Jesuits — and he requested a pastor. In
Boston the choice fell on a young visiting priest by the name of István
Békési. He was told to go to Toronto and help the parish priest there.
Békési arrived in November and began celebrating mass, in his native
Hungarian, very soon after. In July of the following year he assumed the
parish’s spiritual leadership.16
These were propitious times for the Saint Elizabeth of Hungary
church. The Second World War, unlike the First, was followed by general
economic prosperity in Canada, especially in Toronto. The unemployment
and misery of the 1930s was long gone and had been replaced by “good
times” for most of Toronto’s Hungarians. Still more important was the fact
that the immigration of Hungarians to Canada resumed in the late 1940s.
The newcomers were the refugees of the war who in 1948 began to be ad-
mitted to Canada from European refugee camps. These were the so-called
“displaced persons” or DPs, and they came by the thousands. During the
1948-49 fiscal year, 1,400 of them came and in the following fiscal years
more and more of them arrived. In 1951-52 some 4,500 of them reached
the country. Unlike the previous wave of immigrants from Hungary most
of whom began their Canadian lives in the Western Provinces, the latest
newcomers ended up in Central Canada, most of them in Ontario’s cities.
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According to the 1951 census, Toronto received by far the largest influx,
some 1,100 people. Hamilton got far smaller contingent, a fact which
sealed the competition between these two cities as to which one would be
the “Hungarian capital” of Ontario. Eventually Toronto would surpass
even Montreal as the home to the largest number of Hungarian Canadi-
ans.17
As has been explained in the previous chapter, as a group the DPs
were different from previous waves of Hungarian immigrants. More of
them were of middle- and in some cases even upper-class origin and
members of the skilled trades and of the professions were more common
among them. Although initial contacts between the new arrivals and the
members of the “old” immigrations were cordial enough, as time passed
relations often became strained. The tables had been turned on Hungarians.
The poor immigrants of earlier ages were now often living comfortable
lives, while the newcomers, former members of Hungary’s upper and
upper-middle classes, were the impecunious new arrivals. The situation
was not conducive to friendly cooperation between the two groups — and,
indeed, relations were not always amicable, especially as far as the new-
comers’ participation in Hungarian immigrant institutions was concerned.
The fact was that the newcomers, rather than joining the organizations of
the old immigrants, tended set up clubs and institutions of their own.
Organized religious life was an exception to this trend.
In one respect the members of the new wave of arrivals were no
different from those who came in the 1920s, or in fact before the First
World War. Most of them were no doubt keen to resume their religious
lives, and even attendance at churches that had been interrupted for them
when they left Hungary. Undoubtedly too, they preferred to do this in their
own Hungarian cultural environment. For the Roman Catholics among the
DPs, this could be done only in the already existing religious organizations
of the “old” Hungarian immigrants, in the case of Toronto, in the Saint
Elizabeth of Hungary church.
What was an even more important development for Hungarian
Canadians in general and for this parish in particular was the fact that
among the thousands of DPs there were several priests. Their arrival
would help to reduce the scarcity of spiritual leaders in Hungarian-
Canadian society. In a short time the situation in this respect got even more
promising for Hungarian R.C. parishes in this country: by the late 1940s
the persecution of the churches in Hungary had gotten progressively
onerous. As a result in the spring of 1949 the Superior General of the
Jesuit Order issued a call to all young members of the order in Hungary to
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leave the country. In the months following dozens of these young men
made their way to Western countries. As a result by the mid- or late 1950s
several of Hungarian Canada’s R.C. parishes would come under the
leadership of recently-arrived Jesuit priests.
In the meantime the active community life in Saint Elizabeth
Parish that members had become accustomed to during the last years of the
war continued. On Saturdays there were Hungarian classes for children, on
Sundays there was mass celebrated in the morning and recreational activi-
ties took place in the afternoon. In the evening there could be a dance
where music was provided by a live band. This was unusual as in Toronto
of the times no public entertainment was allowed on Sundays; however,
churches were permitted to host such events. Completing the community
life around the church were the Catholic Club and a few other lay organ-
izations.18
In 1951 Father Békési took leave to do missionary work overseas
and he was replaced by a more experienced pastor, Father Mihály Szeder.
During his tenure the house next to the Church on Dundas Street was
purchased and became used as a rectory: parish office and quarters for the
pastor and his assistants. The property filled a great need as by this time
the number of priests serving the parish had increased first to two and then
to three. Improvements were made to the church building as well. Some
windows were replaced by stained-glass depicting notable episodes told in
the Bible. The collection a funds was also started for the purchase of a new
organ. Next Békési returned to serve another stint as parish priest. Soon
thereafter another property was purchased, this time on the outskirts of the
city near the village of Streetsville (now in the city of Mississagua). It was
named Mindszenty Park and was used from the spring to the autumn for
picnics, camping trips and other outdoor activities. During the tenure of
the next parish priest, György Simor (pastor from 1953 to 1958), the life of
the park was enriched by the creation of a swimming area in the creek that
ran through the property. Weekend activities in the park were popular with
members of the parish and their children.19
The Arrival of the Refugees
The years 1956 and 1957 brought great changes in the life of the Saint
Elizabeth of Hungary Parish, just as they wrought a huge transformation in
the evolution of most Hungarian-Canadian communities. This was the time
of the arrival of the largest wave of Hungarian immigrants to Canada, the
refugees of the 1956 revolution in Hungary. The coming of the refugees
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resulted in the increase in the size of most Hungarian-Canadian communi-
ties. This was especially true of Canada’s cities where more than 90 per-
cent of the refugees settled. By the time of the next census nearly half of
them were found living in Ontario. Among the Canadian cities that
received the refugees Toronto got the largest contingent, nearly 8,700
individuals. Montreal was second with little over 7,000 newcomers, and
Vancouver was a distant third. This influx of newcomers resulted in the
doubling, tripling and even in some cases the quadrupling of the Hun-
garian communities of these and other Canadian cities.
Almost from the very outbreak of the revolution in Hungary,
Toronto’s Hungarian churches, including the Saint Elizabeth of Hungary
Parish, became beehives of activity. In response to the news from the old
country, Toronto’s Hungarians undertook various ventures, ranging from
organizing protest demonstrations to the collection of funds to be sent to
Hungary in aid of the country’s population. Or, people just congregated to
discuss events and receive news from Hungary. When it became obvious
that the revolution would be crushed by the Soviets, efforts to help the
revolutionaries were transformed into attempts to aid the refugees who
were flooding across the Austro-Hungarian border. The collection of funds
and clothing was continued. Soon the first refugees began arriving in the
city. From this time on the parish became a veritable aid agency. The
refugees were helped to find food and lodging — as well as in filling out
English-language forms needed to start their Canadian lives. It was about
this time that the parish received a fourth priest. The number of church
attendees increased so much that four masses had to be scheduled each
Sunday morning to accommodate everyone.20
Although as time passed Canadian authorities took over much of
the work of helping the refugees, many tasks remained in which the parish
was able to assist the newcomers. The refugees needed loans to pay for the
purchase of large items such as appliances, cars and, eventually, houses.
To help in this the parish was instrumental in establishing a credit union
independent of the parish but still under its umbrella. The institution paid
higher-than-usual interest to depositors and it gave loans and mortgages to
those members of the parish who needed them. The increase in the number
of families with children in the parish required an expansion of school
facilities. For this purpose still another nearby house was purchased, this
time on Spadina Avenue, and was converted into a school complete with
an auditorium.21
In the meantime important events were taking place in the parish’s
leadership. In 1958 Father Simor was transferred to the Jesuit Order’s New
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York head office. He was replaced as parish priest by Lajos Horányi,
under whose guidance the enhancement of the parish’s complex of pro-
perties at the Dundas Street and Spadina Avenue site continued. He in turn
was replaced in 1964 by József Bieleck who remained at the parish’s helm
for seven years. During his time it became necessary to replace the old
rectory on Dundas Street next to the church with a modern building. This
project, along with some of the others before then and later, resulted in an
increasing the parish’s debt burden. The cost of the new rectory alone
amounted to over $120,000.22
Still another event of significance in the early 1960s was the
purchase by the Jesuits of a large recreational property near the village of
Orono. Although nearly an hour’s drive east from Toronto the place was
easily accessible via major highways (nos. 401 and 35). Named Loyola
Park, the property was made available to the parish and its various social
and youth organizations. It also hosted local and international scouting
jamborees. A few of these were attended by scouts and scout leaders from
all over North America and even overseas.23
In 1971 Father Bieleck was followed as parish priest by another
Jesuit, István Király. Improvements to the church, the rectory, and the
adjacent parking lot continued — and the parish’s debt continued to grow
and eventually amounted to nearly quarter million dollars. Király made
efforts to reduce this debt (during his tenure one of the church’s properties
on Spadina Avenue was sold) and, more importantly, he restructured the
parish’s administration and streamlined the role of the various lay organi-
zations played in the parish’s life. By this time the Saint Elizabeth of
Hungary Parish had started functioning according to the guidelines issued
to all R.C. parishes by the Second Vatican Council (1962-1965).24
The Church’s leading administrative organ was the Parish Coun-
cil. It had 24 members and was in charge of planning, directing and super-
vising the parish’s activities. Its members were elected from the parish
community. In the case of the Saint Elizabeth of Hungary Church, the
Council of Catholic Men, the Council of Catholic Women, the Married
Couples Club, the parish school, the scouts and the Youth Club attached to
the church, and the Altar-boys’ Club each had a representative on the
Council. The rest of the members were elected by the membership at large.
The priests assigned to the Church were ex-officio members. There were
provisions for the removal of council members (by a 2/3rds majority), for
example for neglect of duties or inappropriate behaviour — as well as for
appeals against such decisions. The Council’s chief official was its presi-
dent. There was also a vice-president, a secretary, a treasurer and a mar-
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shal — all elected by the Council’s membership. The president presided
over the Council’s meetings and, in consultation with the parish priest,
determined the council meeting’s agenda. The Council had to meet at least
three times a year.
The Parish Council had seven regular committees, each consisting
of three to five council members. One of these was in charge of pastoral
matters, others respectively of finances, property maintenance, recreational
matters, charitable activities, youth activities and communicating with the
membership at large. The pastor also had important functions.  He reported
to the Council, communicated with the Archbishop, and approved — or
did not approve — the Council’s decisions. There was also a nominating
committee that set up a list of members who were eligible to be elected by
the parish’s members, as well as an election committee that oversaw the
election of those members of the Council who were not entitled to be
Council members as representatives of the clubs and other groups associ-
ated with the parish. Elections were held every December. If a parish priest
died or left the parish, the Council was suspended and the newly appointed
pastor could either re-activate it or call for the election of a new Council.25
A New Era in the Life of the Parish
The mid-1970s were times of new developments in the parish’s life. In
1973 Hungarians celebrated the millennium of Hungarian Christianity.
The occasion was the 1000th anniversary of the birth of St. Stephen, the
first Christian king of the Hungarians. The celebrations coincided with
another visit to the parish by Cardinal Mindszenty. This visit happened
two years after Hungary’s Prince Primate had left the American Embassy
in Budapest. The visit was part of an extended pastoral tour by the Prince
Primate that included England and North America. It was intended, ac-
cording to the Cardinal, “to bring comfort and encouragement to Hunga-
rians in foreign lands;”26 and his visit did bring joy and happiness to the
members of Saint Elizabeth of Hungary Parish. A procession was organ-
ized from Toronto’s city hall to the nearby Saint Michael’s Cathedral.
Along the way the masses of Hungarian and other Catholics sang religious
hymns and on arrival in the Cathedral, celebrated high mass. In the
evening a dinner was held that was attended by prominent churchmen and
civic figures.27
In the meantime mundane problems kept intruding into the
parish’s life. During 1973 it became obvious that the 300 chairs the church
had purchased in 1954 were defective and new ones, and a greater number
Nándor Dreisziger74
of them, had to be ordered, at the cost of nearly $4,000. The matter of a
new organ was also still hanging over the Parish’s leadership. The esti-
mated cost of this update was $55,000. The Parish was short on cash for
such a large expenditure and a loan of $30,000, had to be sought — to be
paid back in three years. The loan was approved in the summer of 1977.28
Father Király also saw to it that he Parish’s school building was enlarged.
By this time it was becoming increasingly obvious to some members of the
Parish’s leadership that the present church was too expensive to maintain
and was not large and modern enough for an ever more populous congre-
gation. A debate emerged that saw those who were inclined to look for
another, a larger church building, pitted against those who favoured re-
novating and updating the present one. The debate ended this time in the
victory of the latter group. As a result further funds were expended for the
renovation and re-decoration of the church at Dundas Street and Spadina
Avenue. About this time Father Kiraly helped to organize a pilgrimage to
the Holy Land in which many members took part. This would not be the
last of such pilgrimages sponsored by the Parish. Unfortunately for every-
one, in 1976 Father Király fell ill and died early in the following year.29
Király was followed as parish priest by Balázs M. Jaschkó. He had
come to Toronto in 1970 from the United States where he had been teach-
ing since his arrival there in the mid-1950s. From 1971 he had been associ-
ate parish priest at Saint Elizabeth. One of his priorities as parish priest had
been the enhancement of the school programs associated with the Parish.
An important event, or series of events during the early phase of his tenure
was the celebration of the 50th anniversary of the Parish’ beginnings. The
golden jubilee mass was held on 19 March and was presided over by
Bishop Paul McHugh. A gala dinner was also held. There was so much
interest in this event that it could not be accommodated by the Parish’s
own hall but had to be held on the much larger premises of the new
Hungarian-Canadian Cultural Centre at 840 St. Clair Avenue West. 700
people were in attendance, including Bishop (later Cardinal) Aloysius
Ambrozic who represented Toronto Archbishop Philip F. Pocock (1906-
1984). The celebrations were a gentle reminder that perhaps the Saint Eli-
zabeth Parish had outgrown the facilities at the corner of Spadina Avenue
and Dundas St. West.30
It was at this time that the “old” church at Spadina and Dundas
received its new organ, with 1120 pipes. In the quest to acquire this organ
important role was played by György Zadubán, a highly-trained musician
and conductor who had been the church’s organist almost since his arrival
in Canada in 1957. Zadubán was also responsible for establishing and
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training the parish choir that put on special performances in the church on
high holidays such as Christmas and Easter.31
A New Church for the Parish
It may be recalled that a debate in the mid-1970s about whether the
existing church facilities should be renovated or a search for a new church
building should be started ended in the decision to keep the old church.  In
the years following it was becoming more and more obvious that the
existing building and, especially, the parking facilities around it, were in-
adequate. In the meantime the exodus of Hungarians from Toronto’s
downtown area continued. It must have been also increasingly evident that
the existing premises, being located near the city’s rapidly expanding
Chinatown commercial district, would fetch a handsome price. As a result,
the question of selling the old church and acquiring a larger one elsewhere
re-surfaced during the second half of 1983 — and soon a decision was
made to look for a building site where a new, bigger church could be built.
A committee was struck to take on the task of selecting a site. Beginning
with January, 1984, Father Jaschkó, along with his advisor, the Reverent
Nicola De Angelis the Vice-Chancellor of the Archdiocese, began visiting
various sites around the city that were available for purchase.32
Several sites were considered. Six building lots were available for
sale at the corner of Yonge Street (Toronto’s main north-south thorough-
fare) and Finch Avenue. The site was quickly rejected by the committee as
being too busy and noisy and because there was very little chance of
expanding the property on a future occasion if conditions required such
expansion. Another site was also on Yonge Street, at the intersection of
York Mills Road. Here four building lots were available, and the price was
$1,200,000. This site too, had a number of disadvantages: a part of the lot
was on a hill, there was a creek on the property, the entrance to the lot was
somewhat hidden, and the city’s building codes required a large set-back
from the street. Obviously this site also didn’t recommend itself highly for
the committee. Still another available site was on the corner of Dufferin
Street and Lawrence Avenue. Here 2.75 acres were available at the hefty
price of three-and-a-half million dollars. Aside from the high price there
were two objections to this site. One was that its location was “not central”
to the Hungarian community, and the other was that it was too close to
another Roman Catholic church: Saint Charles.33 In the end the site that
was selected in June of 1984 was a large building lot on Sheppard Avenue
East (nos. 430-432), a block-and-a-half west of Bayview Avenue. It was
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large enough to have a courtyard as well as a fair-sized parking lot, accom-
modating well over hundred cars. Access to this property was convenient
and there was public transportation on both Sheppard Avenue and Bay-
view Avenue. Much later the site would also be served by a subway line
along Sheppard.
Four construction companies submitted bids for the building of the
church, along with parish offices, a hall and other facilities. The lowest
(not by a wide margin) came from Delaney Construction and it was ac-
cepted and work on the site soon started. According to the records, the
architect was Domenic Amato. Before the year was out, “Invoice No. 3”
arrived from the company: it was for $185,386.62 (about a tenth of the
eventual cost). By the end of July of next year, the move from the Spadina/
Dundas premises was completed. At one point in August the “old” church
was no longer available for Sunday services while the new one could also
not be used as there was a delay with the inspection of the church for fire
safety. In early September the fire inspection was completed. The church
was consecrated on October 5. The new Archbishop, Emmett Cardinal
Carter officiated, assisted by Bishop László Irányi representing the Hun-
garian Roman Catholic Diaspora.34
It is not easy for an outsider to get an accurate grip on the financial
aspects of the move of the Saint Elizabeth of Hungary Parish from down-
town to the Sheppard and Bayview site. According to one internal memo-
randum of the Archdiocese the proceeds from the sale of the old church
amounted to $5,800,000.00. Of this sum $4,000,000.00 were applied to the
purchase of the new site and the construction of the new church and
affiliated structures. The transaction left a difference of $1,800,000.00, and
it was felt by the leaders of the Archdiocese that this “profit” should not
entitle the Hungarian community for special consideration. After all, the
Archdiocese had promised only to replace “their facilities” with new ones,
and in fact, the new facilities were a third larger than what the Parish had
before. In other words, 70 percent of the proceeds from the sale of the old
church were applied to the purchase and construction of the new one, and
30 percent were left for covering the Archdiocese’s “other needs”.
Soon after the new church building’s opening it became evident
that the church’s parking lot was inadequate and pastor Jaschkó suggested
that a part of the balance of the proceeds from the sale of the old church be
applied to the acquisition of additional land for the purpose of parking.
The Archdiocese ruled any such deal “absolutely out”. In fact, Father
Jaschkó was advised to remain silent on the matter of the financing of the
transfer of Saint Elizabeth Church to the new site. He was told that over-
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flow parking should be diverted to the parking lot of the “nearby” (not-so-
nearby ?) Saint Gabriel Catholic School. The memorandum on this subject
concluded that the whole deal with the Hungarians had become a “scan-
dal” in the eyes of other communities in the diocese that were obviously
unable to understand why the Hungarians received such a favourable deal,
i.e. why so much money was lavished on them by the mother church.35
The opening of the new church revitalised parish life. According
to one document, attendance at some church functions went up by almost
100 percent — no wonder parking became a problem. Everything was
larger than in the old church. Especially important was the hall in the
church’s basement where now social and cultural functions could accom-
modate several hundred people — far more than in the old church. There
was also the new, large and modern school building. Then there was the
courtyard between the two — where those who had attended mass could
congregate, linger and gossip after church services. In fact the school
facilities soon proved too small and a third floor had to be added to the
structure.36
The 1970s and 1980s were the true “Golden Age” of the Hun-
garian community of Toronto. The masses of Hungarian immigrants who
had arrived in Canada in the 1950s were still young, or at least not too old
to give up active life. Their children were growing up and many of them
remained in contact with immigrant institutions, including the churches.
The city was prosperous, a truly cosmopolitan centre where immigrants
could feel at home. By this time Toronto had definitely become the “Hun-
garian capital” of Canada. It had surpassed Hamilton a long time ago and
Montreal more recently. In fact there was an influx of Hungarians from the
latter city where Hungarians, especially those who had not learned French,
sometimes felt ill-at-ease with rising Quebecois nationalism. There was
also an influx of new Hungarian immigrants from Transylvania where
Hungarians, and just about everyone else, felt being oppressed by the
regime of Nicholas Ceauşescou.
Under these circumstances the people of the Saint Elizabeth of
Hungary Parish could feel confident and comfortable. In 1989 they
received another boost to their pride when Pope John-Paul II selected a
priest from Toronto, Attila Miklosházy, a professor of theology and past
rector of St Michael’s College of the University of Toronto, as Bishop of
Hungarians in the Diaspora. He would be the last of such bishops ap-
pointed by a pope. After his retirement a decade-and-a-half later his “suc-
cessor” would be named by the by then free Catholic Church hierarchy in
Hungary.
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The freeing of the churches from communist domination in Hun-
gary was a mixed blessing for the Saint Elizabeth of Hungary Parish —
and in fact for other Catholic parishes in the Hungarian diaspora. While it
assured freedom of travel and communications between them and the
Church in Hungary, it also resulted in the departure for the mother country
of many individuals who had been serving them, in cases where a greater
need was seen for their services and talents in the new, democratic Hun-
gary.37
The 1990s witnessed several other important events in the Parish’s
life. In October of 1993 the members of the Parish celebrated the golden
jubilee of the acceptance into the order of the Society of the Heart of Jesus
of Sister Columba. She had been serving the Parish’s people since the
1940s and had earned the respect and love of a great many of them. A year
later a different event transpired. It was the publication of a historical
monograph dealing with the Parish. Its author was historian Sándor
Kostya. Although the book’s title talked about the history of the Parish, the
work itself touched on a great many themes including the history of the
Jesuit Order, the story of Hungarian Catholic priests in Canada, and the
activities of Bishop Mikósházy in the years after his appointment by Pope
John-Paul II. In 1997 Csaba Cabafi was ordained as a priest of the Saint
Elizabeth Church. This was only the second time a priest was ordained in
the new building, and the event called for celebrations. In 1997 he became
associate pastor and three years later he assumed the role of the church’s
pastor.38
The new century would see a continuation of the trends of the
1990s. In the life of the Saint Elizabeth of Hungary Parish not much would
change for the time being. Celebrations, anniversaries and special events
would continue. In 2002 the 17th World Youth Congress of the Catholic
Church was held in Toronto. A quarter million participants took part in it,
coming from all parts of the world. Some 180 of these pilgrims came to
from Hungary and the Hungarian-inhabited districts of Romania. The
people of the Parish coordinated the hosting of these participants. A year
later the Parish celebrated the 75th anniversary of its beginnings. Many
events were held and still another parish history was published, this one
full with colour illustrations. In 2006 the then parish priest Cabafi was
transferred to Hungary to assume a high position at the headquarters of the
Jesuit Order in that country. He was replaced by László Marosfalvy. Under
him the Parish celebrated the 800th anniversary of the birth of Saint Eliza-
beth of Hungary. Then Marosfalvy was replaced by Szabolcs Sajgó as
parish priest.
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The Parish’s everyday life continues today. There are Sunday
masses, weekend school program, meeting of the various lay clubs associ-
ated with the Church, weddings, baptisms and funerals — and more
funerals.39 In the meantime, the community the Parish serves continues to
age. The immigrants keep getting older and their children and grand-
children are less and less inclined in participating in the Hungarian com-
munity’s institutional life. Still the Parish remains the most active of the
R.C. parishes in North America — and has been free of the problems that
have plagued some of the much older and more famous Hungarian par-
ishes in the United States.40
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Caught Between Independence and
Irredentism: the “Jewish Question” in the
Foreign Policy of the Kállay Government,
1942-1944
Béla Bodó
The deportation and genocide of the Hungarian Jews in 1944 and early
1945 has been well documented and studied. However, relatively few
scholarly monographs and articles deal with the road to genocide in Hun-
gary, particularly with the events of the preceding three war years. This
earlier period, which is the focus of this article, differs significantly from
the last stage of the Holocaust. The German Wehrmacht conquered
Western Europe with relative ease in 1940 and, until the Battle of Stalin-
grad in late 1942 and early 1943, it seemed to have been winning the war
in the East, as well. Even in the summer of 1943, since a compromise set-
tlement between the Germans and the Russians was still possible, no one
could predict the final outcome of the military conflict with certainty.
Although information about the mass and increasingly mechanized killings
had periodically reached the West since 1941, the leaders of the “free
world” and their political and military advisors were reluctant to accept the
news, not to mention to adjust their war-time strategies to stop the kill-
ings.1 The British and the Americans had long given up on Hungary as a
possible ally or even as a neutral state. Located deep in the German sphere
of influence and behind enemy lines, what transpired in this small nation
state largely escaped the attention of leaders in London and Washington
until the late spring of 1944. The fate of the intensely patriotic Hungarian
Jews, who, for decades, had shunned foreign ties, concerned as well only a
few people in the West. Hungarian Jews fully expected to survive the war,
and were secure in the knowledge that their government and nation at large
would never surrender them to the Nazis. They proved to be wrong.
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The goal of the following investigation is to examine the multiple
functions, and measure the relative importance, of the so-called Jewish
question in Hungary’s relations with Nazi Germany, Romania and Slova-
kia between 1942 and 1944. The first part discusses revisionism, perceived
as the cornerstone of Hungarian foreign policy, and its impact on domestic
policy in the 1930s and during the war. The second part explores the relati-
onship between Hungary and two of its Eastern European neighbours in
the context of their alliance with Nazi Germany and their participation in
Hitler’s wars of aggression. It highlights the propensity of the heads of the
satellite states to resort to anti-Semitic arguments to curry favour with the
Nazi dictator; diminish the reputation of their rivals; improve the position
of their countries in the new Europe and, most importantly, obtain a
favourable settlement of the outstanding territorial disputes. The third,
final part, of the essay, draws attention to the Nazi reaction to Prime
Minister Miklós Kállay’s attempt to find a way out of the war and save the
lives of Hungarian Jews. The article touches on a whole range of relevant
issues, such as the role of humanitarian considerations in foreign policy,
the relationship between small and big states, dependency, imperialism
versus sub-imperialism, and the tendency of small countries to manipulate
the fears and exploit the obsessions of their more powerful allies and
friends. What role revisionism and anti-Semitism played in Hungarian for-
eign policy and how foreign policy events contributed to the genocide of
Hungarian Jews are the subjects of this article.
Hungarian Foreign Policy in the Interwar Period: Caught Between
Revisionism and the Desire for Independence
Based on the values and modus operandi of nineteenth-century Realpolitik,
Hungarian foreign policy in the interwar period pursued limited goals.
Trained in Vienna before the war or in Budapest after 1919 by diplomats
who had started their careers in the capital of the Dual Monarchy, Hun-
garian statesmen continued to see the territorial states, rather than so-called
races or social classes, as the basic units of the international order. They
believed in the primacy of foreign policy: Hungarian statesmen perceived
nation states as independent actors motivated by geopolitical interest,
tradition, national character and Zeitgeist (spirit of the time) rather than
conflicts between social groups. Nation states, unlike modern empires, had
limited interests, which could be defended or advanced by forming tempo-
rary alliances with like-minded actors. Alliances were to be based on
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shared geopolitical concerns rather than ideological affinities or common
values. The domestic order, that is the social and political structure, of
prospective allies remained a secondary issue. The practitioners of Real-
politik regarded war as the last resort, and a means to an end rather than an
end in itself: as a tragedy, rather than a fortune or an opportunity to estab-
lish a new social and political order or create a new man and a superior
race. The goal of Realpolitik was to restore balance in the international
order and preserve peace.
Many, indeed the majority, of European states in the interwar
period continued to conduct their foreign affairs according to the norms of
Realpolitik. What made the Hungarian case different, in some sense
unique, was that the country had been defeated during the war and humili-
ated in its aftermath. Hungarian foreign policy was a product of the
“culture of defeat.”2 In the interwar period, the country was reeling under
three traumas, which coloured the perception of its politicians and limited
the Spielraum of its diplomats. The failed communist experiment of 1919
traumatized the Hungarian middle classes and made cooperation with the
Soviet Union, even on shared concerns, exceedingly difficult. Second, the
Romanian occupation of 1919, perceived as one of the worst humiliations
in their history, combined with the huge territorial losses to Romania, dra-
matically increased hostility between the two countries, precluding normal
contact between their elites.3 Finally, the Treaty of Trianon, which most
people attributed to France and Britain, erected a mental and emotional
barrier between Hungary and the Western democracies. That the Western
counties failed to make amends, and continued to act as the protector of
Hungary’s neighbours and the guarantors of their borders, naturally frus-
trated the political class in Budapest, and make them look elsewhere for
support.
The two guiding principles of Hungarian foreign policy during the
Horthy regime remained independence and irredentism. Both ideas were
the products of the nineteenth-century nationalism and liberalism and the
political conflicts with the Habsburg dynasty and the ethnic minorities.
Compared to the objectives of the major powers, such as imperial ex-
pansion; conquest of Lebensraum (living space); ethnic cleansing; world
revolution and creation of a global dictatorship of the proletariat, these
were conservative and moderate goals. Although not obvious to the con-
temporaries initially, independence and irredentism were difficult to recon-
cile. The truism that the sovereignty of countries, particularly that of small
states, can be only be relative in the modern era rang especially true for
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weak states, such as Hungary, which needed the support of the great
powers to realize their dreams of revenge and territorial (re)conquest. The
support of the great powers, if it had been forthcoming at all, always came
at a heavy price. Hungarian statesmen and diplomats during the Horthy
regime had to navigate between subservience and resistance. They had to
convince the great powers that Hungarian revisionist goals were not only
just but they were also in their interests to support them. They had to be
attractive, without surrendering too much. Hungarian statesmen wanted to
regain their pride without losing self respect; change the country’s borders
but preserve its status as an independent state.
Hungarians, irrespective of their social and political background,
rejected the Treaty of Trianon of 1920, which sanctioned the loss of two-
thirds of country’s territory and placed one-third of the Magyar-speaking
population under foreign rule. As many objective foreign observers also
noted, the Treaty was unfair and vindictive. Yet, had the Western powers
and the neighbouring states been prepared to make amends, apologize for
their misdeeds and perhaps even hold referendums in the ethnically mixed
regions, the government in Budapest, not to mention the more extremist
elements in the Hungarian population, would still have not been satisfied.
The revision of the borders, in other words, was as much a rational
demand as it was a psychological problem; as much a domestic-policy
issue as it was a foreign-policy goal. Irredentism in Europe was an ideol-
ogical issue. With the foundation of the League of Patriots and Boulang-
ism, starting in France in the 1870s and 1880s, the revision of the borders
though force became a standard theme in the propaganda, and an important
weapon in the ideological arsenal, of the European radical and fascist
Right.4 In Hungary, too, the almost universal desire for the restoration of
the old borders benefited mainly the conservative and radical Right. The
leader and the radical and fascist Rights demanded not only the abrogation
of the Treaty of Trianon, they also rejected liberalism, democracy, Marxist
socialism and Western humanitarian traditions. The radical and fascist
Rights did not seek to restore the pre-war conservative liberal regime;
rather they wanted to renew society and build a state on the basis of
martial values; the veneration of strong leaders; the cult of youth, violence
and death; anti-Communism and, perhaps most importantly, anti-
Semitism. After 1921, the right-wing version of revisionism was comple-
mented with, and competed with, a more moderate conservative variety
(popular among professional diplomats), which took political realities
more into consideration. However, the conservative brand of irredentism
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enjoyed, along with the even more moderate, democratic, liberal and
socialist versions of the same idea, only limited support: public opinion in
Hungary, until the end of the Horthy regime, dreamt of full restoration,
and it saw the revision of the Treaty of Trianon on the basis of democratic
principles as, at best, a temporary solution.5
The tension between independence and irredentism, the desire for
full sovereignty in domestic and foreign affairs and the restoration of the
old borders, were already palpable in the 1920s and early 1930s. After
1925, Mussolini and his Foreign Minister, Ciano, tried to spread Italian
influence into the Danubian Basin. Determined to turn Hungary into an
Italian dependency, the fascist leaders made many promises, albeit no
concrete commitment to the revision of the new borders.6 The Nazis were
even more cautious. In June 1933, less than six months after the Nazi
takeover of power, Prime Minister Gyula Gömbös was the first European
head of state to visit Hitler in Berlin.7 He was received with great fanfare;
yet, even in this early stage, the Nazis courteously rejected his idea to
create a German-led block of revisionist states and sign a treaty of eternal
friendship with Hungary. Hitler and his coterie wanted to have nothing to
do with the idea of a multi-ethnic Kingdom of Saint Stephan, which they
saw as an anachronism; in addition, they did not want to alienate the small
states in the region by openly supporting the Hungarian claims.8
Nazi Germany refused to make any commitment to Hungarian
revisionism; Hitler and his colleagues wanted free hand in reshaping the
map of East-Central Europe. On the other hand, they expected that the
small states in the region would do their bidding: Hungarian statesmen
would willingly renounce their independence by adjusting their goals and
behaviour to Nazi plans. Simmering under the surface for years, the con-
flict between the Nazi desire to subjugate Hungary, and Hungarian ambi-
tion to regain the lost territories via German help, became acute during the
Czechoslovak Crisis of 1938. Fearing international isolation and military
defeat, Regent Miklós Horthy and his advisors refused to play the role of
an agent provocateur, even though Hitler promised the entire Slovakia as a
reward. Because of the Hungarian refusal to attack Czechoslovakia, Berlin
had to give up its plan to dismember its hated neighbour in the fall. Still,
the First Vienna Award of November 1938 restored Hungarian sovereignty
over southern Slovakia, which had an overwhelmingly Magyar-speaking
population. Since the new borders more or less followed ethnic lines,
Great Britain also recognized the First Vienna Award as legitimate. Six
months later, in March 1939, the Hungarian army occupied Sub-
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Carpathian Ruthenia to create a common border with Poland, Hungary’s
historical ally. The British government, significantly, did not protest
against the Hungarian occupation of the region. London registered with
satisfaction that Hungary had refused to participate in, or indirectly aid, the
German attack on Poland in the fall; British statesmen were particularly
impressed by the generosity with which the government in Budapest
received the tens of thousands of Polish refugees who fled across the
border in the wake of defeat. Many of these refugees soon left the country
to join Polish units in the British, French and even American armies to
liberate Europe from the Nazi yoke.9
These first successes reinforced the Hungarian political elite’s
conviction that they could manipulate the Nazi threat to their advantage;
remain Germany’s ally without losing their independence; regain terri-
tories without firing a shot, and profit from German expansionism without
losing face with the West. However, the Second Vienna Award of August
1940, which returned one-third of Transylvania and 2.5 million people,
one half of whom were Magyar-speakers, to Hungary, exposed the limits
and contradictions of this “cherry-picking” approach to foreign policy.
Hungary owed its last great foreign-policy success to the Soviet-Romanian
conflict and Fascist Italy rather than to Hitler, and the Nazis, who would
have preferred minor changes along the existing border. The Award pre-
dictably satisfied neither Hungary nor Romania, which remained in a quasi
state of war with each other the next four years. The real winner of the
Second Vienna Award was Nazi Germany. The conflict between Hungary
and Romania over Transylvania facilitated the economic exploitation of
both countries, reinforced their dependence on the Third Reich, in both the
political and military spheres, and made their departure from the Nazi-led
alliance exceedingly difficult.10
The partial restoration of the old border demanded a heavy price:
Hungarian statesmen were rapidly losing control over the country’s
foreign and domestic policy. In November 1938, in the wake of the First
Vienna Award, at Nazi Germany’s insistence, the Hungarian government
sanctioned the setting-up of the first Volksbund groups. Conceived as the
self-governing body of the German minority, the Volksbund looked to
Berlin, rather than Budapest, for guidance, instruction and support. By
1942, it had become a state-within-a-state, one of the most important
engines of right-wing radicalization and an agent of German imperialism.
Under German pressure, Hungary also left the League of Nations and
joined the Anti-Commintern Pact in 1939. By joining the Tripartite Pact in
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November 1940, Hungary officially abandoned its neutrality and became a
military ally of the fascist states and Japan against the West. Deliveries of
food and animal fodder to Germany had increased significantly in the late
1930s and early 1940s, while Hungarian industry became almost com-
pletely dependent on the Third Reich for technology, investment and
markets. In 1940, Budapest allowed the transit of German troops to occupy
the Romanian oil fields. In early April 1941, a week after the German
invasion and in the wake of Croatia’s declaration of independence from
Yugoslavia, Hungarian army units, with German permission, occupied the
northern part of the defunct state. The occupation was done independently
and not on Nazi orders; yet it also suited well the German plans. On her
own, without German request but in the climate of intense anti-Bolshevism
and pro-Nazi sentiment, Hungary declared war on the Soviet Union on
June 27, 1941.11 Great Britain, as the ally of the Soviet Union, returned the
favour on December 7, 1941. Herbert Pell, the American Minister to Hun-
gary, and a friend and admirer of the country, suggested to Prime Minister
László Bárdossy that he should attach a letter to the Hungarian declaration
of war on the United States to explain that the Hungarian government had
acted under duress. However, Bárdossy (who, until his appointment as
Prime Minister had been much more cautious and pro-Western) rejected
Pell’s advice and abruptly responded that the Hungarian government had
acted independently of Berlin. Hungary in due course declared war on the
United States on December 12, 1941.12 However, President Roosevelt did
not consider the declaration from a small East-Central European state
important enough to notify the Senate for several months. The Senate
finally declared war on Hungary in early June 1942.13 Meanwhile, in
January 1942, the Budapest government, hoping that its services would be
rewarded with the restoration of Hungarian sovereignty over Transylvania
in its entirety, dispatched a 200,000-man strong army to the Eastern front.
Simultaneously, it gave Berlin the right to recruit ethnic Germans, many of
whom did not speak their ancestors’ language, into the Waffen SS.14
The gradual loss of sovereignty implied German involvement in
what the Nazis considered the most important issue in the world: finding a
radical solution to the so-called Jewish Question. The link between Hun-
garian foreign policy and the growing influence of the Third Rich on
domestic policy, in general, and on anti-Jewish legislation, in particular,
was first indirect. The victory of Nazism strengthened the radical and
fascist Right in Hungary, and made anti-Semitism more respectable. The
First and the Second Anti-Jewish Laws of 1938 and 1939 had to do with
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domestic rather than foreign policy considerations; these legislations
served to solve deep-seeded social problems at the expense of Jews, and to
take the wind out of the agitation of the national socialists. Yet it is
unlikely that these laws would have been passed, had Great Britain rather
than Germany become Hungary’s new neighbour in 1938. The first two
laws limited the number of Jews in businesses and the liberal professions;
excluded them from the civil service, and deprived the majority of
Hungarian citizens of Jewish background of the right to cast their votes in
local and national elections. Even though there were still loopholes in
these legislations and corruption often saved lives and livelihoods, the
social and psychological impact of these legislations cannot be overstated:
by the end of 1940, more than 200,000 people had lost their jobs and tens
of thousands of families had been reduced to poverty. The relation
between foreign policy and anti-Jewish legislation was more obvious in
the case of the Third Anti-Jewish Law of 1941. The law, which forbade
marriage and sexual relations between Jews and Gentiles, was passed in
the wake of the Nazi attack and Hungarian declaration of war on the
Soviet Union. A result of self-Gleichschaltung rather than direct demand
from Berlin, the Third Anti-Jewish Law reflected the increasing Nazifica-
tion of large segments of the Hungarian political elite. This process was
fuelled by the physical proximity of the Third Reich, German victories in
the first phase of the war, and the success of Hungarian irredentism thanks
to the support of the fascist states.15
From Patriots to Traitors and War Criminals: The Extreme Right
during the War
The greatest threat to the lives of Jews in Hungary came from the leaders
and members of the national socialist parties and their open or clandestine
supporters in the army, the gendarmerie and the civil service. The extreme
Right supported the German alliance for political and cultural reasons.
Racism, anti-Slavic and anti-Russian sentiments pushed many to take the
side of Nazi Germany in its struggle against ‘eastern races.’ Nazi Ger-
many, in this interpretation, represented Western civilization; Hungary, as
an integral part of this civilization, had the duty to support the Germans in
their life-and-death struggle against the ‘subhuman’ Slavs. As one of the
architects of the Hungarian phase of the Holocaust, the Minister of the
Interior, Andor Jaross explained to his judges at his trial in 1946, “in the
Danubian Basin, two currents collide: the Germans and the Slavs. I have
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no doubt that there is only road open to Hungary: it has to support fully its
ally Germany, which represents European culture.”16
The support of the Hungarian extreme right for Nazi Germany was
far from automatic. Many Hungarian national socialists were originally
attracted to Italian Fascism rather than to German Nazism; the majority
found Teutonic racial doctrines too rigid, the Nazis too arrogant and
German imperialism and expansion into East Central Europe too danger-
ous to cast their lot with the Third Reich and embrace the Nazi model.17
Only under the impact of German military victories during the first stage
of the war, and the partial success of Hungarian revisionist goals did they
convert fully to the Nazi cause. As László Baky, Eichmann’s friend, and
one of the three Hungarian architects of the Holocaust put it during his
trial in 1946, “we attributed the return of the territories to the strength of
the German Reich.”18 Hungarian national socialists were grateful to the
Third Reich, and could not imagine that, under any circumstance, they
would betray their benefactor, ally and friend. Some feared Nazi imperial-
ism; yet they still preferred German victory to Western triumph, not to
mention, to Russian conquest. The West, the national socialists contended,
had never supported Hungarian revisionism: were the Anglo-Saxon pow-
ers to win the conflict, they would surely penalize the country for choosing
the Third Reich and Fascist Italy as its allies. A Soviet victory, on the other
hand, would spell the end of the Hungarian nation and state. After Stalin-
grad, the leading national socialists (with the exception of a handful of
fanatics, such as Baky, who believed in German victory until the spring of
1945) recognized that Nazi Germany could not win the war.  However, at
least until the summer of 1944, they thought that a negotiated settlement, a
deal between Hitler and the Allies that would leave Hungary and East
Central Europe in German hands was still possible. In any case, the
majority was prepared to die for the cause in which they believed. They
saw no way out of the ideological and political trap into which they had
fallen, and preferred honourable death, and even national suicide, to the
eternal shame of betrayal. 19
National socialists, as Jaross explained during his trial in 1946, did
not consider Jews Hungarian, but members of a different and hostile race.
Even the most assimilated and patriotic Jews, Jaross argued, preferred the
company of their coreligionists to that of non-Jews; when the interest of
the two groups collided, they never failed to side with their own kind. In
the national socialist interpretation antisemitism, including pogroms and
other forms of violence, was only a natural reaction of the host nations to
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Jewish greed, pretention and arrogance. The national socialists wanted to
find a “civilized solution” to the so-called Jewish Question, which, after
1941, meant deportation to the Third Reich or occupied Poland and
Ukraine and mass murder. It was “civilized” only to the extent that the
killing was done by others, and out of sight of the Hungarian population.
National socialist antisemitism was part and parcel of “palingenetic ultra-
nationalism,” which perceived war as an opportunity to revive the nation
and create a new man.20 In time of war, the national socialist in Hungary
believed, one had to focus on individual and national survival; he or she
could not display empathy for the weak and the unfortunate, not to
mention, for the real or alleged enemies of the race. Western humanism, as
an ideology, was dead, Jaross told his audience in Nagyvárad during the
Holocaust; he then asked his listeners of what they considered more im-
portant: “the fate of 13.5 million Hungarians… of a few hundred thousand
people who have never belonged to the Hungarian community? Our goal
cannot be the protection of… goodness at any price; rather our goal is to
serve life.” 21
The national socialists’ antisemitism was home-grown: their de-
mand to expropriate, segregate and deport Jews was motivated by native
prejudices and interests. The Hungarian national socialists used the war
and their country’s close ties to Nazi Germany to put pressure on the
government to bring about the radical solution of the so-called Jewish
Question. Thus, in the wake of the Hungarian declaration of war on the
Soviet Union in the summer of 1941, parliamentary representatives of the
Arrow Cross Party demanded that every Jew be placed under police sur-
veillance, since “it is well known that they actively participate in the war
and work against both the Third Reich and us.” In December 1941, at least
six months before the German government raised the same issues, they
insisted on the introduction of the yellow star, full segregation, the setting
up of ghettos, forced labour and prohibition of sexual relations between
Jews and non-Jews.22 In March 1943, in a memorandum, the national
socialist deputies asked Regent Horthy to replace the parliamentary system
with a modern, and allegedly efficient, dictatorship.23 In early May 1943,
the same group of parliamentary representatives sent a memorandum to
Regent Horthy demanding that “the Jewry must be isolated from the body
of the nation, and preparation must be made for their final expropriation,
when reparations will be made by the Jews for all the intellectual and
financial damages they have done to Magyardom.”24 In the second half of
1943 and early 1944, radical right-wing politicians, such as Béla Lukács,
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Ferenc Rajnis and ex-Prime Minister, Béla Imrédy gave several rousing
speeches in the parliament, expressing their unwavering support for the
war and the Nazi alliance. In the same breath, they urged the government
to take steps to immediately deport, or at least make preparations for the
deportation of, Hungarian Jews. Jewish black-marketers and speculators
increased misery and destroyed public morality; wealthy Jewish
landowners, bankers and manufacturers stood in the way of serious social,
especially land, reform, and the Jewish community as a whole represented
a grave threat to the country’s security, radical right-wing politicians
argued.25 In March 1944, less than two weeks before the German occupa-
tion of the country, the news agency of the state, the conservative Hun-
garian News Agency (Magyar Távirati Iroda or MTI), passed on to Regent
Horthy and his advisors a secret report. It stated that:
there are then those on the Right, and not a few of them, who are
determined to settle scores (elintéz) with the Jews. It is not only the
extremist members of the Arrow Cross but also, often enough, the
followers of Imrédy who speak openly about the [need for] pog-
roms. They say that we have to exterminate the Jews now, lest they
create chaos and Communism if the situation turns from bad to
worse. In these circles, the hatred of the Jews is stronger and bitterer
than it was when the anti-Jewish laws had been debated.26
Beside the national socialist parties, it was the officer corps of the
Army and the rural police, the gendarmerie, who counted among the most
fanatical supporters of the war and the German alliance in the early 1940s;
the same institutions played an important role in the Jewish genocide.
Born in a civil war after the collapse of the Council Republic in 1919, the
independent Honvéd was never able to shed its counterrevolutionary
origins: its officers remained fiercely nationalistic, anti-communist and,
with a few notable exceptions, anti-Semitic in the interwar period.27 This
was even truer for the gendarmerie, which provided a haven for leaders
and the rank-and-file for the murderous right-wing paramilitary groups
after 1923.28 Impressed with the élan and technological superiority of the
German army and the rapid militarization of German society, the officer
corps became, after 1935, increasingly pro-German and pro-Nazi as well.
Yet, despite their admiration for the Wehrmacht, the Hungarian military
elite, as we have seen, still opposed direct participation in the Czecho-
slovak conflict in 1938, and made their opinion known to the political
leaders.29 The military elite abandoned this cautious approach only under
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the impact of Nazi victories in Poland in 1939 and in the West in 1940.
Under the leadership of Henrik Werth, the Chief of the General Staff and
Károly Bartha, the Minister of Defence, the Army became the main
proponent of the war and of alliance with Nazi Germany. The two men
helped to persuade the Regent to declare war, on false pretences, on the
Soviet Union at the end of June of 1941. Werth’s and Bartha’s enthusiasm
for the German and Nazi cause in 1941 knew no limits; they were even
prepared to transport the entire Hungarian Army to the Russian front, if
requested by Hitler. Their unquestioning support for the Nazi cause was
too much even for Regent Horthy, who had also become more pro-German
in the early stages of the war. In September 1941, the Regent replaced
Werth with the more cautious Ferenc Szombathelyi, who represented the
more pro-Western segment of the military elite.30 Szombathelyi was un-
able to reverse the course set by his predecessor, however; if anything, in
the next sixteen months, the Hungarian army became even more entangled
in the war in the East. In spring of 1942, Horthy and his advisors sent
200,000 soldiers, the entire Second Army, to the Eastern Front, which, like
the German Sixth Army, would be completely destroyed during the Battle
of Voronezh in early 1943.31
Contemporary intelligence reports paint a grim picture of the
political allegiance and activities of the Hungarian military elite during the
war. According to one of these reports, the overwhelming majority of
high-ranking officers was both pro-German and supported the Arrow
Cross or other fascist groups.32 As for their political orientation, pro-
German and pro-Nazi officers in Horthy’s entourage outnumbered their
pro-British and politically less radical counterparts by three to one.33 Anti-
Semitism became all-pervasive, too. Many officers used the new anti-
Semitic laws to get rid of unwanted colleagues and competitors. On the
basis of denunciations, between 1939 and 1942 the Ministry of Defence
dismissed from their jobs hundreds of part-Jewish officers (there were no
fully Jewish officers in the Army) and professional soldiers whose spouses
had descended from Jewish families.34 The participation of the officer
corps in the anti-Jewish campaigns did not end with the expulsion of
Mischlinge from the Army, however. In the spring of 1939, Hungarian
army and paramilitary units committed dozens of atrocities against Jews
and Ukrainians in Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia.35 Typically, the Hungarian
authorities tried to silence the Zionist leader in Ruthenia, Cháim Kugel,
who, during his foreign trips, had allegedly sought to draw the attention of
international organizations to the plight of local Jews and to Hungarian
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policy to rob thousands of Jews of Hungarian citizenship and expel them
from the region.36 With barely disguised joy, Hungarian officials reported
that many Orthodox Jews had been trying to find refuge in Soviet-Siberia.
Others headed for Palestine. According to the report, recent Jewish im-
migrants from Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia deeply resented British support
for the Arabs in Palestine, and did not hide their sympathy for Italy in its
war against the Western allies. 37
The mistreatment of Hungarian and Ukrainian Jews in the recently
occupied Ruthenia did not represent an isolated incident, but only the first
step on the long road to genocide. In the spring of 1941, Hungarian au-
thorities expelled tens of thousands of Serbs, mainly immigrants and the
representatives of the defunct state of Yugoslavia, from the recently
occupied territories. They also killed hundreds of Romanians who resisted
the occupation, and prompted thousands to flee Northern Transylvania
after the summer of 1940. With the declaration of war on the Soviet Union
in June 1941, the Bárdossy government ordered the deportation of foreign
Jews. In the summer, the rural police, the infamous gendarmerie, collected
between 15,000 and 18,000 people, not only “illegals” but many Hun-
garian citizens and lawful immigrants, and transported them, first to the
border-town of Kőrösmező, and then to the southern Ukrainian towns of
Kamenets-Podolsk, Stanislau and Horodenka. On route, the sadistic guards
had robbed, beaten and tortured many of the prisoners; according to the
witnesses’ accounts, mutilation and murder were also common. Upon ar-
rival, the Hungarians handed the deportees over to a German Einsatz-
gruppe to massacre them.38 In January 1942, in the village of Zsablya and
the town of Újvidék (Novi Sad), Hungarian army and gendarmerie units
murdered, as part an anti-insurgency operation, thousands of civilians,
including women and children; many hundreds of their victims were
Jews.39
Under the ministerial decree of 1941, and the Military Service Act
of 1942, Jewish men of military age were excluded from conscription;
instead of regular formations, they were forced to serve in unarmed auxi-
liary labour battalions, which could be employed both at home and at the
front. The officers who commanded the labour battalions were of very low
quality; army leaders often put sadists, violent anti-Semites and Nazis into
positions of power and these used their commission to torture, work or
starve to death or outright murder their subordinates. Between 1941 and
the summer of 1943 more than 42,000 Jewish soldiers died of mis-
treatment, became wounded or fell into Soviet captivity on the Eastern
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front. Thanks to the appointment of General Vilmos Nagy as Minister of
Defence, their situation finally began to improve in late 1942. From then
on, abuses became less common and, and they claimed fewer lives.40 Fif-
teen labour companies were sent to work in Serbian copper mines in the
framework of Organization Todt in the second part of the war. The
majority of the detainees died of mistreatment or were killed, like the
famous poet Miklós Radnóti, who died during the death march of 1944.41
By 1944, ideological penetration had gone so far that the con-
servative political elite could no longer count on the Army to fulfill its
duties. Even though there were plenty of signs of an impending invasion,
military leaders failed to prepare the country for a German attack in March
1944.42 The military leaders considered resistance against German occupa-
tion futile; yet, paradoxically, they were prepared to defend the Carpathian
Mountain Ranges against the much larger and, by 1944, much stronger
Red Army.43 The Hungarian Army, unlike the German Wehrmacht, played
only a limited role in the genocide. On the other hand, the gendarmerie,
which had been army-trained and stood, in part, under the control of the
Ministry of Defence, not only helped to collect Jews, which was their
original order, but it also, ‘proactively,’ participated in the deportation.
The Army failed to defend the country against the invaders and prevent the
deportation of Hungarian citizens. Yet what they did was not only a matter
omission but also that of commission. In the summer and fall of the same
year, the military elite betrayed Horthy and his conservative advisors in
their desperate attempt to find an honourable way out of the war. The
majority of officers refused to abandon their German ally; on October 15,
on the day of an attempted coup, they also violated their oath to Regent
Horthy by siding with the new Arrow Cross government. Many continued
to fight against the Soviet troops, thus prolonging the country’s suffering,
until the spring of 1945.44
Yet it was not only the radical rationalists in the national socialists
parties and the armed forces, who were prepared to sacrifice full sover-
eignty on the altar of revisionism, and accept the country’s status as Nazi
Germany’s satellite.45 Irredentism, the just desire to re-gain at least some
of the lost territories and liberate fellow Hungarian from foreign rule drove
large segments of the population into Hitler’s arms. Until 1942, with a few
notable exceptions, such as Endre Bajcsy Zsilinsky, everyone in Hungary,
from underground Communists to traditional liberal conservatives, sup-
ported the German alliance. The Communists worried only about the
growing political influence of the national socialist and fascist parties at
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home.46 Yet popular support for the Nazis in Hungary also remained
shallow and proved to be transient; like Hitler’s charisma, it depended on
continued German military successes.47 As the war turned sour for the
Nazis after the Battle of Stalingrad in early 1943, the majority of
Hungarians, too, began to have second thoughts about the Nazi alliance
and the war. According to a German embassy report, by 1943, the social
political and cultural elite, including the leaders of the Christian churches,
had become pro-British and anti-German; only the members of extreme
right-wing parties and young military officers in Hungary had still sup-
ported the war.48 The Hungarian public appraised the political situation
more realistically, and did not regard leaving the Axis alliance a moral
issue. That there was still relatively little resistance, in the forms of sabo-
tage, destruction of infrastructure and attacks on German troops, to the
Nazi invasion in the spring and summer of 1944 should not be attributed to
cowardness or widespread sympathy for the Axis cause, not to mention
popular support for the German-led Jewish genocide. The sight of German
soldiers on Hungarian soil was not new: the Wehrmacht had been using
Hungarian railways and roads for years to transport their soldiers to the
front. The Hungarian public had been taught to think that German soldiers
were allies and friends, who came to help to defend the country’s eastern
frontiers against the Bolshevik archenemy. Finally, the conservative politi-
cal elite not only failed to secure the support of the officer corps and
organize the army to defeat the invasion; it also failed to prepare the public
psychologically for the invasion. Fragmented into small groups and pre-
occupied with survival, the Hungarian public watched the unfolding of
events from the sidelines, or were swept away, either as victims or per-
petrators, by them.
The Role of the ‘Jewish Question’ in Hungary’s Relations with Its
Neighbours and with Nazi Germany
Hungary was not the only the county in East-Central Europe that had to
find a balance between independence and irredentism: the desire to
maintain its sovereignty in domestic and foreign policy and draw the
border in a way to incorporate every member of the ethnic community.
Every ethnic group and state was at one point irredentist East-Central
Europe between 1860 and 1945 (and beyond). A product of ninetieth-
century nationalism, irredentism was exacerbated by the First Word War
and the blatantly unfair peace treaties in its aftermath. In the old Austro-
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Hungarian Empire, minorities could look to the royal house and the
cosmopolitan segments of the political and social elite, such as the aris-
tocracy and the Catholic Church, for protection. In the small, more
democratic, nation states in the interwar period, however, the new political
elite, who hailed for the middle and lower middle classes, cared little about
the fate of ethnic and religious minorities. Abandoned and even demonized
by the holders of power, the ethnic minorities in East Central Europe had
only three options in the interwar period: they could leave their ancestral
land; assimilate into the dominant group; seek to revise, with the help their
brethren in the neighbouring states, the borders (betray their new country).
This third option was not available to everyone. Jews who did not have
homeland found themselves in a precarious position after 1919. Since they
had historically identified, and culturally assimilated into, the dominant
ethnic groups, they were even more likely to be accused of disloyalty in
the interwar period. Ethnic Germans faced the same dilemma. Dispersed
all over Eastern Europe, they were perceived (and after 1933 treated), as
the agents of an imperial power, Nazi Germany.49
As an alternative to competition and war (and a means to hinder
the involvement of imperial power in the business of small ethnic groups
and states), Hungary and its neighbours could have forged closer ties with
one another; instead of fortifying or re-drawing the existing borders and
seeking to assimilate or expel unwanted “aliens,” they could have made
the borders permeable. Indeed, after the First World War, the more far-
sighted members of the Hungarian and Romanian elites toyed with the
idea of a personal union between the two countries with the Romanian
ruler as the king. Although it survived well into the Second World War,
the idea of a personal union or federation could not be realized for lack of
support from the major political parties. Cooperation against the common
enemy also remained on the table until the very end of the war. After 1942,
the Hungarian government sought contacts with the regime in Bucharest,
as well as, with its liberal and conservative opposition in order to co-
ordinate their plans to leave the Nazi camp. These top-level discussions
did not go very far, however. The Romanian dictator, General Ion Anton-
escu, preferred “population exchange,” which implied the expulsion of the
Hungarian population from Transylvania, to territorial solutions. His
Deputy Prime Minister, Mihai Antonescu, a distant relative of the dictator,
also demanded the return of Northern Transylvania as a prelude to any
substantive negotiations.50 Negations with the Romanian opposition also
failed to produce any results: no liberal or conservative politician was
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prepared to accept the Second Vienna Award. István Bethlen, Horthy’s
closest advisor, and his fellow Transylvanian aristocrats maintained good
relations with Iulio Maniu, the leader of the Conservative opposition in
Romania. In the summer of 1943, Hungarian diplomats had intense dis-
cussions with Maniu on a whole range of issues from the fate of Transyl-
vania to the possibility of coordinating their policies towards Nazi Ger-
many and the Western Allies. The politically experienced Maniu, who
before 1938 had supported the fascist Legionaries, admitted to his Hun-
garian colleagues that only Nazi Germany had profited from the rivalry
between the two countries, Romania and Hungary, and the Nazi alliance
hurt both lands. Maniu was less paranoid about the Soviet threat than his
Hungarian partners.51 On the issue of Transylvania, the Romanian politici-
an was not prepared to make any concessions, however. Transylvania
belonged to Romania, he argued, and the Second Vienna Award had to be
declared null and void before any serious negotiations could begin.
Predictably, the talks bogged down in mutual accusations of war crimes
and expressions of joy over each other’s distress. The Hungarians were
convinced that the Romanians were internationally isolated; the West, they
believed, would never forget that the Romanian army had turned weapons,
which they had received from France, against their Soviet ally. The
Western powers allegedly recognized that the Treaty of Trianon left Hun-
gary with no other choice but to join the revisionist powers: Hungary was
at least consistently pro-German, while Romania betrayed her friends. The
West was also angrier at Romania, Hungarian politicians argued, because
it had mistreated Jews. Maniu suggested that Romania still had a friend in
the Czech exiled politician, Eduard Beneš, who was highly regarded in
London and Washington. The Hungarian response to this was that Beneš
as a political figure had passed his time: he was too pro-Russian to be
taken seriously either by the British or the Americans. 52
The breakdown of talks between Maniu and the Bethlen circle
reflected the troubled relations between the two countries during the war.
In 1939 and 1940, it was the Romanians who were afraid that the Hun-
garian army, in alliance with the Soviets and the Bulgarians, would attack
them.53 The position of the two countries changed completely after the
Second Vienna Award of 1940. Until then, Hungary was the main revi-
sionist power in the region. After the Second Vienna Award, and parti-
cularly following the Axis attack on the Soviet Union in June 1941,
however, Romania became the chief irredentist force in the region. Pre-
dictably both countries tried to manipulate the Nazis to their own
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advantage. During his first meeting with the German dictator in April
1942, Prime Minister Kállay asked Hitler to prolong the military occupa-
tion of Romania to prevent the invasion of Hungary by the Romanian
army. He also protested against stationing of battle-hardened Romanian
troops in Southern Transylvania, close to the new Hungarian-Romanian
border.54 The Romanian political elite not only wanted to reassert their
sovereignty over all of Transylvania: they also sought to annex additional
territories east of the Tisza River (thus realising the oldest dream of
Romanian irredentism). They sought to achieve this plan by reviving, now
under the patronage of Nazi Germany, the Little Entente, this time as an
alliance of Romania, Slovakia, Croatia and Bulgaria, and launching an
attack by all members against their arch enemy Hungary. Deputy Prime
Minister and Foreign Minister Mihai Antonescu first raised with Hitler the
issue of an alliance among the three Balkan states and Slovakia against
Hungary in November 1941.55 However, the Führer still did not trust the
Romanians, who, until 1940, had been a military ally of Britain, enough to
take the bait. Berlin wanted peace in South-Eastern Europe; a military
conflict between Romania and Hungary would have only disrupted access
to the regions’ economic resources, such as oil and aluminum, and would
have endangered the war effort in Soviet-Russia. German administrators
and diplomats complained bitterly about the attitude of Romanian and
Hungarian leaders, who, obsessed with Transylvania, allegedly ignored the
Bolshevik threat. In a memorandum dated early June 1942, Ernst Woer-
mann, Head of the South-Eastern European Department within the German
Foreign Ministry, argued that Germany’s role in the region was to exert a
moderating influence on both parties.56 A few days later in a letter to the
Foreign Ministry, Dietrich von Jagow, the German ambassador in Buda-
pest, stated that Hitler, too, had guaranteed the Second Vienna Award, and
he would not tolerate military aggression by either party.57
Nazi Germany was not a totalitarian state in the classical sense of
the word: the foreign policy of the German government towards Eastern
and South-Eastern Europe was no more consistent than its approach to
education, culture or economic developments. State and party institutions
with different visions and interests, such as the Foreign Ministry, NSDAP
Office of Foreign Affairs, Göring’s Office of the Four Year Plan, the
Reich Youth Leadership, the Ministry of Propaganda and the SS all tried
to influence, and even sought to set the parameters of, German foreign
policy towards the region. This Social Darwinian struggle between state
and party agencies only highlighted the role of Hitler both as the arbiter of
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conflicts and ultimate decision-maker.58 Hitler held the Hungarians, the
Romanians and the Slovaks in low regard. He also thought that National
Socialism was not for export, and that the fascist parties and movements in
the region did not deserve the full attention and trust of Nazi leaders. As a
result of Nazi racism, the Third Reich provided only limited financial and
political support to fascist parties and movements, such as the Romanian
Legionaries and the Hungarian Arrow Cross in the region.59 Hitler’s goal
was to ensure the economic exploitation of the three countries remain
smooth during the war, and to end discrimination against, and improve the
social and political status of, the German minorities. As we have seen,
Hitler never embraced the Hungarian plan to restore the country’s pre-
1918 borders; yet, he did not side with the Romanian and the Slovak
nationalists either. The Nazi dictator deliberately encouraged competition
between the satellite states by making vague promises and hinting at
compensations at their neighbours’ expense after the war. What the post-
war map of the region would look like, he either did not know or failed to
betray to his allies, however.
Although Hitler and his advisors never renounced the Second
Vienna Award, by the spring of 1943, they had begun to tilt towards
Romania in its conflict with Hungary. As far as Hitler was concerned,
Romania, unlike Hungary, had proven its mettle as a loyal and strategi-
cally important ally of the Third Reich: Bucharest contributed more men to
the Nazi war effort than any other Eastern European country. Romanian
army, gendarmerie and Einsatzgruppen units also played a major role in
the genocide of Jews in Bessarabia, Bukovina Transnistria and Southern
Ukraine in 1941 and 1942.60 Bucharest remained the largest exporter of oil
to Germany, a strategically vital commodity, the value of which only in-
creased with the souring of the war effort in Russia. Finally, Hitler liked
and respected the bright, peevish, arrogant and murderously anti-Semitic
Marshall Ion Antonescu more than any other Eastern European statesman,
Regent Horthy included.61
By the fall of 1943, Hitler not only had become more pro-Romani-
an: he had also warmed up to the idea of the Little Entente under German
sponsorship as well. The original Nazi plan to occupy Hungary in early
1944 thus foresaw the use of Slovak, Croat and Romanian troops; the latter
were supposed to occupy Northern Transylvania and Eastern Hungary up
to the Tisza River, thus bringing one of the oldest dreams of Romanian
nationalism to fruition. Overwhelmed with joy, Marshall Antonescu im-
mediately promised “one million men” to defeat the archenemy. 62 At the
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last minute, however, Hitler, on the advice of Ernst Kaltenbrunner, the
chief of the Gestapo, and two experts of the Reich Security Main Office
(Reichssicherheitshauptamt), changed his mind. Lest the occupation lead
to an armed insurgency in Hungary, the Germans decided to dispense with
Romanian, Slovak and Croat troops.  Even though the decision had already
been made, on March 18, 1944, on the eve of the invasion, Hitler still
talked to Horthy as if involvement of the neighbouring states would still be
an option. His ruse worked: labouring under the memory of the ill-fated
Council Republic and the Romanian invasion of 1919, Horthy ordered the
Hungarian Army not to resist the invading Wehrmacht.63
The Nazis growing dislike of Hungary had to do not only with
geopolitical and military considerations: Hitler and his advisors were also
angered by what they considered the manifest philo-Semitism of Hungari-
an conservatives, and their refusal to participate in the genocide. In early
summer of 1942, Berlin raised, for the first time, the issue of the expulsion
of Hungarian Jews from the Third Reich; it also put pressure on the Hun-
garian government to introduce the yellow star and make preparations for
their eventual expulsion from Hungary, as well. The deportation of the
Jews, Nazi officials argued, “has to be solved in the same manner as it has
happened in the case of Slovakia, Croatia and Romania.”64 In early
October, German bureaucrats told their Hungarian colleagues that the
presence of Hungarian Jews in the Third Reich posed a security threat, and
they were determined to deport these alien Jews to the East, unless the
government in Budapest arranged for their immediate departure. In regards
to domestic policy, Nazi officials advised that Hungary should follow the
example of Romania, Slovakia and Croatia, which had carried out the re-
settlement of the Jews with German help and support.65 A week later
Jagow received a cable from his superiors in Berlin; he was told that it was
“the wish of the Führer to solve completely the Jewish question as soon as
possible.” The high cost incurred and the human sacrifices already made
would all be in vain and the Third Reich would be humiliated, if the Jews
would be allowed to remain in Europe and use their considerable econo-
mic and intellectual resources to defeat Nazi Germany and its allies in the
war. The Ambassador was asked to put more pressure on the Hungarian
government to complete the exclusion of Jews from the economic and cul-
tural life of Hungary and make arrangements for their deportation.66
According to Prime Minister Kállay, in the first half of 1943 the Nazi
government repeated the same request, falling back each time on the same
arguments: Hungary was out of step with its neighbours, and indeed with
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the rest of Europe: that only 10,000 out of the original 95,000 Jews had
remained in Slovakia; Romanians deported tens of thousands of Jews; the
Bulgarian government was planning to introduce the yellow star, and had
asked for German help to make preparation for their eventual transport;
virtually no Jews had remained in Serbia; only technical problems had
prevented the Croats from expelling all their Jews; and the transport of
Jews out of Laval’s France had also proceeded according to plan.67
By the end of 1942, the genocide of the European Jews had
become Hitler’s main goal and the raison d’être of the Nazi regime. Yet,
as we have seen, the Nazis also instrumentalized anti-Semitism in foreign
policy to ensure compliance with their orders, test the loyalty of their allies
and introduce political and social changes in the satellites states. Mani-
pulation and instrumentalization of the so-called Jewish question, how-
ever, was a two-way street: the satellites, Hungary and Romania included,
also tried to exploit Nazi paranoia and genocidal hatred for the Jews to
achieve their geo-political goals. Hungarian leaders thus never tired in
emphasizing their anti-Semitic credentials: namely, that Hungary was the
first state in Europe to pass anti-Jewish legislation after the First World
War. Romanian politicians, on the other hand, rarely missed an oppor-
tunity to contrast their treatment of the Jews with the turpitude and “false
humanism” of the Hungarian government. Thus, during his trip to Berlin
in November 1941, Mihai Antonescu, Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign
Minister of Romania, told Goebbels that the Hungarians were too corrupt
and non-European even to comprehend, not to mention to act upon, the
idea of “pure nationalism free of pro-Semitic tendencies;” he then added
that the political elite in Budapest had secretly supported anti-German
agitation in their country.68
While in Berlin Romanian leaders continued to brag about their
“idealism” for the next two years, at home they secretly worried that they
might have gone too far. By the end of 1942, even Antonescu had realized
that his policy of full compliance did not produce any tangible results:
Romanian sacrifices at the front and Romanian participation in the Holo-
caust did not bring the revision of the Vienna Diktat any closer. Beseeched
by Queen Mother Elena, the Western powers, the Red Cross, the War
Refugee Board, members of the old political elite, such as Maniu and the
Liberals, and the leaders of the Jewish community, and even by his distant
cousin, the equally murderous anti-Semite, Mihai Antonescu, the Condu-
cǎtor decided not to follow through with the deportation order in late
1942.69 In 1941 and 1942, the government in Bucharest had abandoned
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Romanian Jews living in Nazi occupied Western Europe to their fate;
however, in the next two years it sought to repatriate the survivors. Mar-
shall Antonescu also allowed the return of Jews expelled from Bessarabia
and Bukovina. In 1944, the Romanian government even provided a refuge
for Jews, threatened with deportation and certain death, from Northern
Transylvania and Hungary proper. These measures were not motivated by
a change of heart or a sense of guilt or any other humanitarian considera-
tion. Romanian leaders recognized that the Nazis might lose the war, and
they wanted to use the surviving Jewish population as pawns in their
negotiations with the Western allies.70
Competition between Hungary and Slovakia for Hitler’s good will
was equally intense, and it produced similar results. Budapest sought
Hitler’s support to restore Hungarian control over the entire Slovakia; the
Slovaks, on the other hand, sought protection in Berlin against their
southern neighbour. Until 1943, Berlin had no reason to complain, especi-
ally when it came to Slovak compliance with Nazi policy on the so-called
Jewish question. In 1940 and 1941, in a series of legislations, the clerical-
fascist regime in Bratislava created a racial state, destroyed Jewish lively-
hood and even introduced the yellow star. In May 1942, the Slovak
parliament accepted the expulsion of the Jews (the only person who voted
against the measure was the leader of the Hungarian minority party, Count
János Esterházy). As a sign of their total compliance with the Nazis, the
Slovak government even paid the Germans 500 marks for every Slovak
Jew deported.71 During their meeting on April 22, 1943, Prime Minister
Jozef Tiso assured the German dictator that he and the Slovak people
would not rest until the last Jew was deported from their country. Hungary,
on the other hand, Tiso told Hitler, “has become Europe’s ghetto.” Hitler,
in his turn, made fun of Regent Horthy’s apology that Hungarian Jews
might have been treated too harshly in the labour service. 72
By the spring of 1943, Tiso’s boast began to ring hollow.  Chas-
tised by the Vatican and threatened by the Catholic hierarchy at home, the
Slovak government, like its Romanian counterpart, slowed down the
deportation of the Jews in the fall of 1942. The Nazis suspected foul play,
and, to better assess the situation, they dispatched SS Brigadeführer Ed-
mund Veesenmayer to Bratislava in the late spring of 1943. In the Slovak
capital, Veesenmayer raised the issue of deportation to gauge Tiso’s and
his colleagues’ attitude towards Germany: significantly, to Veesenmayer
and the Nazi elite, the willingness to deport Jews remained the surest sign
of loyalty to the Third Reich.73 But the dice had been already cast: soon
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after the visit, on June 6, 1943, the Conference of Slovak Bishops de-
nounced the persecution of the Jews in an open letter. Still, for the next ten
months, Tiso and his colleagues continued to raise the issue of the “Hun-
garian aberration” to curry favour with, and calm the suspicions of, the
Nazi dictator.74
Although the German occupation of Hungary led to a drastic
change in Hungarian foreign policy in March 1944, competition with the
neighbouring states continued until the end of the war and beyond. In June
1944, the Hungarian government reacted nervously to the news that the
Romanians had made a deal with the Roosevelt administration to allow
Hungarian Jews to enter their country and give permission to Romanian
Jews to emigrate to Palestine in large numbers.75 The new Sztójay govern-
ment also took the Slovak racial laws, particularly the anti-Jewish legis-
lation of July 2, 1942, as its model to regulate the emigration and deporta-
tion of Jews. Thus the new Hungarian legislation permitted certain cate-
gories of converts, Jews with “Aryan” spouses, and professionals working
in jobs deemed vital to the war effort to remain in the country.76 Foreign
governments and dignitaries were aware of the competition between Hun-
gary and its neighbours, and tried to exploit it to save lives. One of the
earliest and strongest critics of the deportation, the Papal Nuncio, Mon-
signor Angelo Rotta, appealed to both the vanity of the Hungarian elite
and their paranoia about the neighbouring states. In May 1944, he told
Sztójay that Hungary’s good reputation as a Christian country and the
shield of Western civilization would be permanently damaged, if he per-
sisted with the deportations. The Nuncio also warned the Hungarian
leaders that the “enemies of their country” would not miss the opportunity
exploit the situation, and accuse Hungary, once again, of using Bolshevik
methods.77 Besides the intense pressure from the Anglo-Saxon powers,
Sweden, Switzerland and international organizations, such as the Red
Cross, the fear of being overtaken by Romanians, the Slovaks and the
Bulgarians played an important role in the decision of Horthy and the con-
servative political elite to halt the deportations in early July. Horthy’s
intervention came too late the save the lives of provincial Jews and the
country’s reputation. On August 23, Romania switched sides. In a few
months, King Michael and his advisors were able to accomplish what
Horthy and the Hungarian political elite had tried but could not do for two
years: they forged an alliance among the army, the civil service, the
political opposition and the population to depose the pro-Nazi government
and liberate the capital from German occupation. The successful coup
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decided the outcome of the long competition between Romania and
Hungary. In return for military assistance, the Soviet Union and the West-
ern powers promised to recognize Romanian sovereignty over the whole of
Transylvania — a promise which they kept after the war.
The Road to the German Occupation of the Country
In his memoirs published in American exile in the 1950s, Prime Minister
Miklós Kállay cited five reasons why he and his government wanted to
leave the Axis camp: to save the country from the worst effects of the war;
to forestall a German invasion; to prevent a right-wing coup, which would
have led to the destruction of the Left and the genocide of Jews; to avert a
Russian occupation and to keep the territories obtained with German and
Italian help.78 He and his government, Kállay argued, let more than one
hundred thousand Jewish refugees enter the country; provided legal pro-
tection for Hungarian Jews living in Nazi Germany; refused to introduce
the yellow star, rebuffed German demands to hand over 300,000 Jews as
slave labourers and declined to set up ghettos as the first step towards de-
portation. By surrendering the Jews to their fate, he continued, Hungary
would have sunk to the level of Nazi Germany’s satellites in the region,
such as Slovakia, Romania and Croatia. Full compliance with the German
demands would have not dissuaded the Nazis from invading Hungary; it
would have, however, significantly strengthened the hands of the anti-
Semitic Right, and it would have alienated “every honest person” from the
government. After the Jews, the Nazis would have demanded the surrender
and elimination of “Socialists, left-wingers, pro-Jewish Gentiles, Anglo-
philes and, indeed, the whole Hungarian elite.”79
Historians have been generally sceptical in accepting Kállay’s
self-image as a protector of liberty and civil rights and a defender of Jews.
Lacking a strong power base even in his own party, Prime Minister Kállay,
they have argued, made too many concessions to the anti-Semitic Right.
He was the one who put the Third Anti-Jewish Law into effect and un-
necessarily humiliated Hungarian Jews by downgrading Judaism from a
“received” (established) to a “recognized” faith. The Kállay government
did not allow Jewish men to serve in regular army units but conscripted
them into labour battalions. In November 1943, it nationalized more than
one million holds of Jewish-owned land. Kállay protected parliamentary
institutions and kept the press relatively free; yet he also tolerated anti-
Semitic agitation in the chambers of the parliament, on the streets and in
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the newspapers.80 More recently, Krisztián Ungváry and László Karsai
have questioned, if not Kállay’s courage, at least his argument that he and
his government had taken unprecedented risks by opposing the Nazis in
1942. The Nazi government allegedly paid little attention to Hungary and
Hungarian Jews in 1942. Eager to complete the Polish and Soviet phase of
the Holocaust, the Nazis’ goal in Hungary in the second half of 1942 and
early 1943 was to place more restrictions on Jews and prepare the ground
for their eventual deportation. Hitler and his advisors allegedly began to
put more pressure on Kállay and his government only in the fall; yet as late
as December of 1942, Berlin still did not react strongly to Kállay’s reject-
tions of Nazi demands. At least some of the messages had nothing to do
with the Nazi regime; rather they came from the Hungarian ambassador in
Berlin, Döme Sztójay, who tried to anticipate the wishes of the German
government.81 In any case, Tamás Stark contends, Kállay’s attempt to save
Jewish lives was motivated by political interests, such as the desire to gain
the goodwill of Great Britain and the United States, rather than by the
principled rejection of violent antisemitism.82
The Kállay government’ refusal to hand over Hungarian Jews was
motivated by practical diplomatic rather than ideological or humanitarian
considerations. Yet, Hitler and his advisors perceived non-cooperation on
this vital concern as a heresy. In October 1942, the Hungarian government
rejected the Nazi demand to withdraw Jews of Hungarian citizenship from
the Third Reich, introduce the yellow star, set up ghettos, and hand over
300,000 Jews for labour service in Ukraine. Kállay told the Germans that
the Hungarian state could not force its citizens to “undertake work abroad”
and the country, too, was not in the position to dispense with the skill and
labour of so many people in a time of war.83 In his December response to
the same request, he argued the Hungarian government never doubted the
pan-European nature of the so-called Jewish question. The Hungarians
were pioneers: it was they who passed the first anti-Semitic legislation in
Europe in the early 1920s. The Budapest government was determined to
reduce Jewish influence, but only on the basis of its interests and cultural
and political traditions. The anti-Jewish laws passed since 1938, Kállay
argued, had eliminated Jews from the realm of culture and they had also
seriously curtailed their influence over economic life; further restrictions
in this area, in fact, the Prime Minister contended, would only endanger
industrial production and harm the common war effort. Kállay also
rejected the Nazi demand to introduce the yellow star. Given the high
number of Jews in Budapest and the strong anti-Semitic feeling of certain
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segments of the population, he argued, such measures would lead to anti-
Jewish riots. Finally, Hungary lacked the capacity and the technical
expertise to deport so many people in a relatively short period of time.
Half measures, on the other hand, would lead to chaos and civil war, which
the government could not afford. 84
Both the tone and substance of these letters and cables could not
but anger Hitler and his advisors, who considered the lack of cooperation
in the Jewish genocide as a sure sign of betrayal. As we have seen, both
the Romanian and Slovak governments were opposed to further deporta-
tion in 1943 and 1944; yet the Nazis vented their anger openly only on the
Hungarians. During his meeting with the Regent on April 16 and 17 of
1943, Hitler went out of his way to insult the elderly statesman. He spoke
disparagingly about the performance of Hungarian troops in the winter
campaign and the loyalty of the Kállay government. He told Horthy that
Berlin had learned about the secret contacts between the Kállay govern-
ment and the Western Allies, and that he would never let Kállay and his ilk
backstab Germany by concluding a separate peace with the enemy. In
almost the same breath, he accused Hungary of sabotaging the German
effort to “solve the Jewish question.” With Sweden and Switzerland, Hitler
raved, Hungary remained the only country in Europe that ignored the
Jewish menace; instead of taking energetic actions to neutralize this pan-
European threat, Hungary became a veritable haven for foreign Jews.
Insulted on every level, Horthy responded that he and his government had
done everything humanly possible to address the so-called Jewish ques-
tion; however, he could not simply “club them to death” (agyonütni). To
add insult to injury, the Regent confessed that he felt bad enough to have
sent 36,000 Jewish labourers, the majority of whom had most likely died,
to the Eastern front.85
The meeting marked a turning point in Hungarian-German rela-
tions. In his April report, Edmund Veesenmayer, Nazi expert on Hungary,
argued that a “Jewish-clerical-aristocratic clique” formed around Regent
Horthy opposed the German war effort at every turn.86 After April 1943,
Nazi Germany no longer considered Hungary a friendly state. The coup
against Mussolini at the end of July 1943, and the Italian armistice with the
Allies in September put the behaviour of the Hungarian government an in
even more unfavourable light. The Nazis fully expected that the Kállay
government would use the first opportunity to leave the Axis. The relation-
ship had soured so much that for almost a year the German ambassador, on
the instruction of his superiors in Berlin, refused to have any direct contact
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with the Hungarian Prime Minister or any of his colleagues. Thus, when,
in the summer of 1943, the Nazis demanded the removal of the pro-British
Minister of Defence, General Vilmos Nagy, they submitted their request to
Prime Minister Kállay indirectly through Filippo Anfuso, the Italian
Ambassador in Budapest. By October 1933, the Nazi regime decided to
take action against Kállay. Veesenmayer conducted negotiation with the
various fascist parties, such as Hungarian party of Renewal, László Baky’s
National Socialist Party and Szálasi’s Arrow Cross to remove the Kállay
government in a coup and grab power. However, tensions among the
radical right-wing parties condemned the German attempt to depose the
legitimate government of Hungary with the help of their local allies to
failure.87
Veesenmayer and his superiors in Berlin did not give up, however.
In his next report on December 10, 1943, the Nazi expert delivered a
devastating critique not only of the Kállay government but also of
Hungary and its social and political elite. The letter is of great interest,
because the Nazi expert repeated almost verbatim the prejudices that Hitler
and his closest advisors harboured towards the Hungarians.88 Like Hitler,
Veesenmayer described Hungarians as a “non-Aryan,” lazy, domineering
and culturally sterile race. Everything in Hungary, from bridges, public
buildings in Budapest to classical music and poetry, he argued, were the
work of Slavs and assimilated, mainly German, immigrants. Hungarians
were posers, braggarts, rebels, obstructionists and saboteurs — and com-
pletely useless as soldiers. Because of their eastern origins, the Magyars,
Veesenmayer continued, had always been favourably exposed towards
Jews. The archenemy recognized and took full advantage of their hosts’
instinctive philo-Semitism, and soon enough, Jews had come to control the
economic, cultural and political life of Hungary. There are, the SS
Brigadeführer contended, 1.1 million Jews in Hungary and at least two
million Magyars are economically depended on them. The Jews and their
allies in Hungary maintained an excellent intelligence system, and hin-
dered the war effort at every turn. The Third Reich has tolerated the
existence of this center of sabotage too long. Until appropriate measures
are taken, the German press has to increase the pressure on the Kállay
government by keeping its weak handling of the “Jewish question” in the
limelight; at the same time, the Third Reich government should give “the
national opposition” in Hungary more support. The Regent should be
manipulated through the threat of Habsburg restoration and the peril of
Russian occupation, and by making promises that his “Court Jews”
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(Hofjuden) would not be harmed. In the case of a popular uprising, the
techniques which had been used with great effectiveness in 1919 should be
employed to restore order again. 89
Veesenmayer’s recommendations suggest that the decision to
attack Hungary had not yet been taken in December: the SS Brigadeführer
was only “working towards” Hitler, repeating his prejudices and antici-
pating his moves. Hitler and his military advisors seem to have made the
decision to occupy Hungary on the basis of false intelligence in February
1944: the British and the Americans led the Germans to believe that an
Allied attack through the Ljubljana Gap in the Julian Alps to Vienna and
Budapest was imminent in early spring.90 To preclude any surprises on the
part of Hungary, which could have endangered the link to Romania,
Germany’s most important source of oil, the Nazis decided to act. Hitler
ordered his military men to commence with Operation Margarethe on
March 12, 1944.91 The desire to exploit the country’s economic resources,
including its manpower, cheaply and more efficiently and to introduce
badly needed social reforms may have also contributed the Nazi decision
to invade Hungary.92 Some of Hungary’s military leaders, such as Géza
Lakatos were convinced that Hitler ordered the invasion of the county in
order to gain access to its military resources, which he wanted to use to
close a strategic gap and hinder the advance Red Army.93 The fourth
reason for the occupation was the Nazi obsession with the so-called Jewish
Question. After the battles of Stalingrad, the only conflict that the Nazis
could realistically expect to win was their war on the Jews. Since Opera-
tion Reinhard, the murder of the Polish Jews, had almost been completed
by October 1943, the Third Reich could now turn its attention to Hungary
and the Hungarian Jews. Which of the four reasons was the most important
is difficult to determine: in the Nazi mind, they were inseparable and
reinforced one another. The Crown Council protocol, prepared on the basis
of Horthy’s report on the day of the occupation, cited Kállay government’s
contacts with the Western allies and its allegedly inadequate handling of
“the Jewish question” as the reasons for the German invasion.94
Conclusions
Questioned by the President of the Court at the Sztójay trial on March 13
1946 if “the solution of the Jewish question was an exclusively German
demand, or the demand was raised by the Hungarian government or it was
a shared demand,” the Hungarian expert and Plenipotentiary of the Third
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Reich in Hungary, Edmund Veesenmayer, told the court that “it was first
and foremost a German wish, and I am convinced that had it been left to
the Hungarians, they would have solved it differently. The measures that
they would have adopted, likely, would have been limited to making the
First Jewish Laws more rigorous. No doubt, this form [of the solution of
the so-called Jewish Question, BB] can be lead back to German pres-
sure.”95
As we have seen, Veesenmayer had a very low opinion of
Hungarians: like Hitler, he dismissed them as posers, braggarts, lazy, intel-
lectually sterile, cowardly, domineering and bloodthirsty aliens: as ethnic
outsiders, who had no place in “Aryan” and German-dominated Europe.
Eager to save his own skin, this technocrat and arrogant Nazi, who
resembled in many ways Reinhard Heydrich, Chief of the Nazi Criminal
Police, was always ready to push the responsibility for the Jewish genocide
on others.96 Thanks to his talent as a manipulator, and to the gullibility of
his prosecutors, this mass-murderer was never punished for his crimes.97
His post-war life and career was rather typical: the majority of high-
ranking Nazis who had pillaged Greece and participated in the massacre of
thousands of civilians also escaped justice in West-Germany.98 The
fanatical Nazi never forgot, and continued to resent the fact, that the
Kállay government, and the conservative segment of the political elite in
general, had refused to be drawn into the Jewish genocide. Between 1938
and 1943, the Hungarian political elite sought to adjust their country’s
foreign and domestic policy to the requirements of the Axis alliance. Much
of this adjustment was voluntary and unconscious: the result of self-
‘coordination’ (Gleichschaltung), rather than yielding to direct German
demands. The conservative political elite understood the complex relation-
ship between foreign and domestic policies: they were aware of the con-
nection between the threat posed by the Third Reich from without and the
danger represented by Hungarian national socialists and their fellow
travelers from within. The anti-Jewish laws passed in this period were the
product of self-Gleichschaltung: an attempt to deflate right-wing agitation,
reduce social tensions and curry favours with Berlin.
With the war turning sour for the Third Reich, and with the
mounting Hungarian casualties, the conservative elite also began to have
second thoughts about the Nazi alliance. While not free of antisemitic
prejudices, Hungarian conservatives never shared the Nazis’ biological
racism and their murderous hatred for the Jews. Having learned about the
mass executions in Poland and the Soviet Union, Kállay and his colleagues
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repeatedly rebuffed the Nazis’ attempt to drag the country into the geno-
cide. On the other hand, the conservatives’ sympathy for the Jews was
limited; their contempt for the Nazis was never strong enough to change
their minds about the importance of the German alliance. As students of
the nineteenth-century Realpolitik, Kállay and his colleagues continued to
subordinate human-right issues to winning the war and revising the
borders. It was also not beneath the dignity of Kállay and his colleagues,
or by the same token that of their Slovak and Romanian counterparts, to
use the so-called Jewish Question to manipulate the Western powers. By
providing more protection for labour servicemen and rejecting the German
demand to hand over their Jewish compatriots, the Kállay government
wanted to attract British American attention and support. By treating Jews
more humanly, it sought to establish trust between Budapest and the
Western capitals, as a first way towards leaving the war or changing sides.
Second, Horthy’s conservative advisors hoped that their lenient handling
of the so-called Jewish Question would pay off at the negotiating table
after the war: the survival of Hungarian Jews would lead to a more
equitable peace treaty at the end of the war — a treaty that would leave
parts of Transylvania and Slovakia under Hungarian control.
In 1943 most observers realized that Nazi Germany could not win
the war. However, it was still possible that the Soviets would make a deal
with Hitler, and that the war would end with a negotiated settlement,
which would leave Hungary in the German sphere of influence. Deter-
mined to avoid the fate of Poland and Yugoslavia, the Hungarian political
elite was  prepared to switch sides only after British and American troops
had landed in the Balkans and Allied troops had entered Hungarian
territory or approached the country’s borders. The Allies tried to convince
Hungary to take a more courageous step: to leave the Nazi alliance and
declare war on Germany, even if such a rebellion had little chance of
success. Eager to avoid unnecessary bloodshed, Kállay and his colleagues
predictably refused to lay everything on one card.  In the end, their clumsy
attempt to forge ties with the Allies cost them the trust of Nazi Germany;
their manifest timidity, on the other hand, prevented them for gaining the
friendship and support of the Allies.
Based on the principles and practice of nineteenth-century
Realpolitik, the Kállay government’s foreign policy was too complicated
and too cautious to inspire trust in the European capitals. In the ‘age of
extreme,’ ideological extremism, fanaticism, and devotion to a social and
political system rather than shared geopolitical interests, formed the basis
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of alliances. Their hesitation to embrace fully Nazi anti-Semitism and get
involved in the genocide was bound to anger Hitler and his associates.
Unskilled in the game of ‘gangster politics’ as practiced by Hitler and
Stalin, Kállay and his colleagues piled on mistakes, one after another,
acting as if they had wanted to provoke Berlin. By refusing to recognize
the fascist Salò Republic in the fall of 1943, for example, the Kállay
government not only showed its colors: given Hitler’s well-known attach-
ment to the Duce, such hesitation was rightly perceived in Berlin as an
offense, and it invited retaliation. The Hungarian elites needed the Wehr-
macht to slow down the Russian advance, and defend the country’s eastern
frontiers. Yet they not only refused to make any major contribution to the
German military effort on the Eastern Front after Stalingrad; to add insult
to injury, Horthy also asked for the withdrawal of Hungarian troops from
Soviet soil in early 1944. Against the background of the poorly hidden
negotiations with the Western powers, such a request was bound to in-
crease Hitler’s and his advisors’ suspicion: even less paranoid politicians
than Hitler would have perceived such request as a sure sign of betrayal.
Hitler and his associates always perceived radical antisemitism
and support for the genocide as the litmus test of loyalty to the Third
Reich. Contradicting Hitler on the so-called Jewish Question and criticiz-
ing, not to mention opposing, the Nazi-led genocide was bound to provoke
a strong response from the Dictator. The Kállay government’s policy
towards Jews angered everyone and satisfied no one. The anti-Semitic
laws passed under the Kállay government were meant to undercut support
for the radical parties. However, they only emboldened ideologues, and
wetted the appetite of opportunists eager to line their pockets at the Jews’
expense. Their protestation of loyalty and ideological purity notwith-
standing, Kállay and his colleagues could not dispel Nazi suspicion. The
Nazis predictably perceived the Hungarian plea for independence as a
veiled attempt by a satellite state to distance itself from the Third Reich,
and claim moral superiority vis-a-vis its master. Kállay’s promise to Hitler
in January 1944 to deport foreign Jews failed to postpone the German
invasion; it also showed the moral and intellectual bankruptcy of
conservative foreign policy. The loss of Hitler’s trust explains why the
Nazi leaders pushed for the ‘total’ solution of the so-called Jewish
Question in Hungary rather than in Romania or Slovakia. Both satellites
had a history of collaborating with the Nazis in the Jewish genocide; yet
the Nazis judged the political situation in these countries as relatively
stable, and the influence of the surviving Jewish population on the political
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elite as negligible. It was only in Hungary, where philosemitism and the
opposition to the war, the protection of the Jews and the desire to leave the
Axis, seem to have gone hand-in-hand. To the Nazis at least, the survival
of the Jewish community in Hungary was no longer an ideological issue;
its very existence came to be perceived as a security threat.
The success of Kállay’s foreign policy was dependent, to some
degree, on the state’s protection of Hungarian Jews. The Hungarian con-
servatives were not alone in perceiving such a linkage, however: Hitler and
his advisors, too, were convinced that the survival of Hungarian Jews and
the country’s leaving the Axis camp were intimately connected. Kállay
and his colleagues wanted to use Jews as bargaining chips with the West-
ern powers during and after the war. The Nazis, on the other hand, thought
that it was the Jews who pulled all the strings; who sabotaged war produc-
tion; prevented the full exploitation of the country by the Nazis, and
wanted to take Hungary out of the war. The Kállay government sought to
exploit the survival of the Jewish community to regain its freedom of
manoeuvre in foreign policy. Berlin, on the other hand, had come to view
the continued existence of a one-million strong Jewish community in
Hungary as an imminent security threat. By tying the fate of Jews to the
success of its foreign policy, the Kállay government unwillingly hastened
the demise of the largest surviving Jewish community in East-Central
Europe.
On March 19, 1944, the Wehrmacht occupied Hungary. The popu-
lation and the armed forces of the Hungarian state put up no resistance.
What would have happened if Horthy and his ministers had decided to
resist was hotly debated after the war. Had the Hungarian units or the
people resisted, Sztójay argued during his trial, the German Army, assisted
by the neighbouring states, would have still occupied the land. The
Romanian troops, for the second time, would have ransacked Budapest,
and Hungary would have disappeared from the map. There would have
been still plenty of Hungarians who would have helped the Nazis to deport
the Jews, or shot them on the spot. 99 On the other hand, Holocaust histori-
ans, such as László Karsai, believe that, by not resigning from his post,
Regent Horthy helped to legitimize the Nazi occupation, the puppet
Sztójay government and the anti-Jewish laws that it issued in the spring of
1944. Without a smoothly functioning state and the help and the local
‘know-how’ of tens of thousands of administrators and rural policemen,
the Germans and their Hungarian stooges would not have been able to
carry out the deportation. Active or even passive resistance, combined with
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the rapid disintegration of the state would have seriously hindered the Nazi
effort to complete the genocide. It was not an accident that the majority of
Hungarian Jews were deported and killed in the spring of 1944 under the
Sztójay government (in which conservatives still held the majority of the
posts) rather than in the autumn and winter of 1944, under Ferenc Szálasi’s
dreaded Arrow-Cross regime. The erratic and somewhat unstable Szálasi,
paradoxically, was far less willing to comply with Hitler’s wishes than the
more rational and bureaucratically-minded Sztójay; more importantly,
Karsai argues, political and social chaos, the demoralization of civil ser-
vants and the retreat of the state made the collection and transportation of
Jews out of the country in the final phase of the war much more difficult.
Had the conservatives resisted, chaos and inefficiency, which charac-
terized the Nazi effort in the fall and winter of 1944 would have set in
much earlier; the genocide could not have been prevented, but the number
of victims would have been much lower.100 But not only Hungarian Jews,
but the country as a whole may have suffered less damage, and fewer
deaths. There would have less resistance to the Soviet invasion, and the
battle for Hungary would have been shorter and less devastating. Horthy’
refusal to accept the occupation and early resistance to the Nazi invasion
would have turned the country into a victim of Nazi aggression, and the
country could have been ended up on the winning side of the war.
The Hungarian phase of the Holocaust has been historically
explained either as a result of home-grown antisemitism and social tensi-
ons or as a product of the war and the German occupation. This article has
looked at the origins of genocide from a foreign-policy perspective:
against the background of a struggle between irredentism and independ-
ence. The Hungarian political elite sought out the friendship of the Third
Reich in order to undo the Treaty of Trianon, improve the status of their
state and perhaps recapture some of the glory of the defunct Austro-
Hungarian Empire. The conservative political elite, which controlled for-
eign policy, considered Nazi Germany as Hungary’s natural ally; although
they had misgivings about German domestic policy, their desire to regain
the lost provinces exceeded their distaste for Nazi rule. Until 1942, the
alliance with Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy had paid off: by 1942, the
Budapest government restored, with Hitler’s approval, Hungarian
sovereignty over the southern part of Slovakia, Sub-Carpathian Ukraine,
the northern sections of Yugoslavia and Northern Transylvania. These
successes, however, came with a price; the gradual loss of independence.
Although the country had almost doubled in size between 1938 and 1942,
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its standing in the world declined drastically. In 1938, Trianon Hungary
was still regarded as a sovereign state; by 1942, the world perceived it as a
satellite of the Third Reich. Hungary needed peace more than ever before
to solve pressing social problems; yet by 1942, it had found itself at war
with the largest and most powerful nations in the world. The lesson that
the political elite had drawn from the First World War was that they had to
preserve the integrity of the military forces until the end to prevent the
outbreak of a revolution and forestall foreign occupation. Yet, by February
1943, the Horthy regime had sacrificed an entire army on the altar of
German alliance. The Hungarian political elite hoped that the revision of
the borders would bring stability to the region; yet two Vienna Awards
only increased tensions between Hungary and its neighbours. Isolated
internationally and hated by its neighbours, after 1941 Hungary grew more
dependent on Nazi Germany for protection, especially against the better
equipped and much larger Romanian Army. The desire to keep the re-
gained territories and the fear of Romanian invasion help to explain why
Hungary remained in the Axis camp in 1943 and 1944.
The close alliance with Nazi Germany had serious domestic
implications as well. The shifting of the center of political life to the Right,
a process that had started around 1932, gained momentum after the
outbreak of the war in 1939. Nazi Germany was only indirectly respon-
sible for the anti-Jewish legislation in Hungary between 1938 and 1943.
However, it is highly unlikely that, perhaps with the exception of the first
one, that any these laws would have been passed, had the Third Reich not
become Hungary’s patron and most important ally. The physical ad
political proximity of Nazi Germany emboldened the extreme Right,
which, overrepresented in the parliament, pushed for more stringent
measures to marginalize Jews and prepare the ground for their deportation.
The Kállay government not only enforced earlier laws and created new
ones: it also failed to stop the anti-Semitic agitation in the press, in the
schools and on the streets. By early 1944, the country had become hope-
lessly polarized; the leftist and democratic parties opposed the war and
denounced the persecution of the Jews; yet these parties either lacked mass
support, or had no influence over the conservative elite, the armed forces
and the state bureaucracy. The regime’s right wing opponents were also
divided; yet they were stronger than its supporters, and they had come to
dominate public opinion on the so-called Jewish Question. They were
particularly popular among military officers, rural policemen and pro-
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vincial administrators, all of whom were destined to play an important role
in the Holocaust.
On March 18, 1944, Horthy made a deal with Hitler: he promised
to remain in power in order to avoid chaos and prevent resistance. The
Regent hoped that, by keeping the Army under his control he might be
able to influence political events, and perhaps even switch sides. Hitler
seems to have promised him to end the occupation, withdraw his Gestapo
agents, and stop the arrest of oppositional politicians and public figures
soon after a pro-German government had been formed and the so-called
Jewish Question had been solved to his liking: the dictator promised
independence in exchange for Jewish lives. Horthy honoured his side of
the bargain: the next two three months, he watched the unfolding of the
tragedy of Hungarian Jews from the sidelines, refusing to get involved,
despite the urging of some of his trusted conservative advisors to restrain
his underlings and save lives.101 Post-war trial documents suggest that the
Regent thought that the Nazis and their local allies were determined to
settle the so-called Jewish Question in their own way, and that he was
powerless to prevent it. Clearly, Horthy saw himself and his country as a
victim of Nazi aggression, and hoped that Western governments would
share his view. Instead of ordering state secretary in the Ministry of the
Interior, László Baky, to stop the deportation, he thus pleaded with his
underling, and Nazi informer, to exempt scientists, war heroes, capitalists,
assimilated wealthy Jews and converts from the deportation.102 The Regent
clearly overestimated Hitler’s power in Hungary, and what the Gestapo
and the German army of occupation could accomplish without the support
of Hungarian administrators and policemen. More importantly, however,
he felt bound by the agreement that he had made with the Dictator on the
eve of the invasion. Hitler, predictably, failed to honour his word: the
Gestapo agents not only remained in the country, but also continued to
arrest dissidents and terrorize the population. Incensed by the Nazi
betrayal, Horthy sent a letter to the Führer in early June 1944, reminding
him of his promises.103 Skilled in the game of ‘gangster diplomacy’ as
practised imperial states, Hitler did not even give him an answer. The
Regent thought that, by remaining in office, he, as Hadúr (Commander-in-
Chief) could prevent unnecessary bloodshed and keep the army under his
control. However, in the spring and summer, he was forced to send
hundreds of thousands of poorly armed Hungarian soldiers to the front; the
units dispatched to the frontline fell under German command. By October
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1944, there were an insufficient number of reliable troops under Horthy’s
control to affect a switch of alliance.104
Between 1919 and 1944, Hungarian diplomacy pursed two goals:
the revision of the borders and the preservation of national sovereignty. In
the first stage of the war, irredentism, i.e. the narrow focus on re-gaining
lost territories, led the political elite and the country into a trap from which
Hungary was not able to escape. In March 1944, the same elite walked into
a second trap: the snarl of independence. It was a trap because in the given
circumstances, independence, even if Hitler had fulfilled his promises,
would have been nothing more than a chimera, and a cover for Nazi
hegemony. The foreign policy-mistakes of the Hungarian governments
from Pál Teleki to Döme Sztójay paved the way for the German and
Russian occupations, and the genocide of Hungarian Jews.
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Ágnes Zsolt’s Authorship of her Daughter Éva
Heyman’s Holocaust Diary
Gergely Kunt
This paper, a further elaboration of my earlier work, aims to show that
thirteen-year-old Éva Heyman cannot have been the author of the book
Éva lányom [My daughter Éva], and the actual author was her mother,
Ágnes Zsolt. After its publication in 1947, the diary received little to no
scholarly attention, but in 1972, Zsuzsa Scheer wrote an article on the
book where she referred to the titular Éva Heyman as the ‘magyar Anna
Frank’ [Hungarian Anne Frank].1 Éva Heyman was a thirteen-year-old
Jewish girl murdered in Auschwitz in 1944, and her diary, allegedly
written between February and May 1944, was published by her mother
Ágnes Zsolt in the form of a volume titled Éva lányom. Napló [My
daughter Éva: Diary].2 As a supplement to the diary, Ágnes Zsolt wrote a
preface and also attached two private letters, one written by the family’s
cook and the other by the governess who raised Ágnes as well as Éva.3 To
this day, the widespread consensus among scholars is that the volume
originally published by Ágnes Zsolt contains her daughter’s writing. In
contrast, this paper argues that the book was written by the mother in the
format and style of a young girl’s diary to explore Éva Heyman’s short life
from the child’s perspective and to help Ágnes process her grief over
losing her daughter.
In 2010, after seven years of doing comparative analysis of Jewish
and Christian adolescent diaries, I wrote a Hungarian-language article
where I suggested two possible readings of Éva lányom as either the origi-
nal writing of Éva Heyman or the work of the mother, Ágnes Zsolt.4 How-
ever, in the next four years, I examined several unpublished diary manu-
scripts since my doctoral dissertation focused on the comparative analysis
of adolescent diaries, and based on my experiences of analyzing these
texts, I now firmly believe that judging by its style and format, Éva lányom
could not have been written by a young adolescent.
The first section of this paper presents Ágnes Zsolt’s life and
career, followed by a section where I discuss the role of Ágnes Zsolt’s
guilt and grief over the death of her daughter in writing her memoirs. The
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third section focuses on Éva lányom as Ágnes Zsolt’s work and argues that
by analyzing certain aspects of the text, we can determine authorship even
in the absence of the original manuscript. I also discuss the issue of
authenticity as debated by other scholars, then examine articles and re-
views from 1947, the year Éva lányom was published. I will then examine
the title and structure of the volume as well as the length and style of the
diary entries, highlighting certain historical inconsistencies in the text.
Finally, I shall analyze the two letters attached to the volume that were
allegedly written by the cook and the governess of Ágnes’s family, con-
cluding that the two letters are likely fake and have also been written by
the mother.
The tragic life of Ágnes Zsolt, mother of the ‘Hungarian Anne Frank’
In 1912, the year Ágnes was born in the city of Nagyvárad [today’s Oradea
in Romania], her father, pharmacist Rezső Rosenberg (who later hungari-
anized his surname to Rácz) purchased the Hungarian Crown Pharmacy
and the family hired an Austrian governess called Juszti, who raised not
only Ágnes, but also Éva nineteen years later.5 Ágnes Rácz completed her
studies in Kolozsvár [today’s Cluj-Napoca, Romania] and became a phar-
macist, and we may presume that she was meant to inherit the pharmacy
her father originally bought to provide for his family. (For a portrait of
Agnes Zsolt see appendix I, [page 153])
In 1931, Ágnes Rácz gave birth to Éva Heyman, her only child
from her first marriage to architect Béla Heyman, but their marriage
eventually ended in divorce and Ágnes later married leftist writer and
journalist Béla Zsolt, changing her name to Ágnes Zsolt and following her
husband to Budapest while young Éva stayed behind with her maternal
grandparents in Nagyvárad, where she was practically raised by the Aus-
trian governess. By the time Ágnes married Béla Zsolt, he had become a
nationally renowned and celebrated writer and journalist, who wrote many
extremely successful plays, novels and short stories. However, as a leftist
writer, Zsolt also publicly criticized the interwar Hungarian political
system, which made him infamous in right-wing circles. In 1942, due to
his Jewish origin, Béla Zsolt was sonscripted into labour service on the
Eastern front, where he developed typhoid fever and was only released in
1944 thanks to his wife’s efforts and support. Following Béla Zsolt’s
release from labour service, he and his wife decided to visit Ágnes’s
family. On March 16, 1944, the couple arrived in Nagyvárad and was soon
trapped there due to the German occupation of Hungary on March 19,
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which left Béla Zsolt no choice but to go into hiding due to his reputation
as a notorious left-wing journalist. Following the German occupation,
many antifascist politicians and prominent Jewish persons were arrested
by the German and Hungarian police forces. Nevertheless, the authorities
failed to apprehend Zsolt because he left his residence in Budapest and
moved in with Ágnes’s family in Nagyvárad.
During Béla Zsolt and his wife’s stay in Nagyvárad, the family had
several opportunities to save Éva Heyman from deportation, but Ágnes’s
indecision eventually rendered their options impossible. At the beginning
of May 1944, the family was forced to move into the Nagyvárad ghetto,
where Éva Heyman lived with her grandparents at 20 Szacsvay street
while Béla Zsolt was in hiding at the ghetto hospital as a patient, and
doctors hid Ágnes Zsolt at the maternity ward to prevent Hungarian and
German authorities from finding Béla Zsolt through her, her parents or her
daughter. However, due to these arrangements, Ágnes Zsolt could only
meet with her parents and child in secret.6
At the hospital of the Nagyvárad ghetto, two Jewish doctors,
Sándor Bálint and gynecologist Miksa Kupfer, with the help of a gentile
pathologist called Konrád Beöthy, attempted to save Jewish patients from
deportation by imitating an outbreak of typhoid fever.7 The idea was in-
spired by the fact that it was possible to detect positive signs of typhoid
fever in the blood of patients who had already suffered the disease (as did
Béla Zsolt in 1943 during labor service).8 Kupfer and Bálint took blood
samples from patients and then transferred them to Beöthy’s laboratory,
where he willingly confirmed the samples for typhoid fever whether the
patient in question had the illness or not. The doctors then declared these
patients contagious, isolating them in a special epidemic ward established
in the air defense basement of the building. At the time of deportation, all
non-contagious patients were deported, but thanks to the efforts of the
three doctors, some thirty patients residing at the epidemic ward survived
because Hungarian and German authorities did not want to risk exposing
their personnel to the illness.9
Some of the Jewish patients who were saved by the efforts of
Bálint, Kupfer and Beöthy at the Nagyvárad ghetto hospital, including
Ágnes and Béla Zsolt, eventually managed to escape with forged docu-
ments to Budapest, Romania (due to its proximity to Nagyvárad) or to
neutral Switzerland. At the end of June 1944, thanks to the Zionist Rescue
Committee and journalist, lawyer and Zionist leader Rezső Kasztner, the
organizer of the famous Kasztner train, 1,684 Jews managed to escape
from Hungary by traveling on board the Kasztner train through Bergen-
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Belsen and into Switzerland. Passengers included Kasztner’s relatives and
friends, but the majority were prominent Jews (rabbis, writers, artists and
Zionists) and their relatives, as well as other persons and a group of or-
phans.10 As a fellow journalist, Kasztner was intent on helping Béla Zsolt,
and his efforts allowed Béla and Ágnes Zsolt to reach the Swiss border,
but Éva Heyman and her grandparents could not accompany them. Since
Ágnes’s parents and daughter could not seek refuge in the hospital of the
Nagyvárad ghetto, they were all deported and eventually murdered in
Auschwitz.
In 1945, Béla Zsolt and his wife returned to Hungary from Swit-
zerland, and once they settled down in Budapest, Béla Zsolt began writing
his memoirs while also actively participating in Hungarian politics. Within
two years, he became the co-president of the left-wing Hungarian Radical
Party, the editor of the party’s journal Haladás [Progress], and in 1947, he
also became a member of Parliament.11 By 1946, Zsolt finished his
memoirs titled Kilenc koffer [Nine suitcases], publishing the book in
segments in Haladás. In Kilenc koffer, Béla Zsolt commemorated his labor
service during World War II, his and his wife’s last visit to Nagyvárad, the
German occupation, their stay at the Nagyvárad ghetto and their successful
escape to Switzerland, and though he mentioned his stepdaughter Éva
Heyman in his memoir, it is interesting to note that he did not mention Éva
having ever written a diary. Based on Béla Zsolt’s memoirs, Éva Heyman
either did not have a diary, or if she kept one, her stepfather did not con-
sider the diary significant or important enough to mention it in his own
memoirs, even though Béla Zsolt did mention some of Éva’s possessions,
such as her sports medals or her zoo card.
Although Ágnes Zsolt had originally studied to become a phar-
macist, she decided to follow in Béla Zsolt’s footsteps after World War II
and became a journalist, publishing articles and reports in the journals
Világosság [Light], Világ [World], and Magyar Nemzet [Hungarian
nation], and finally publishing her one and only book, Éva lányom.12
We may assume that as a starting journalist, Ágnes might have
been motivated by her husband’s work and his autobiographical novel
Kilenc koffer to write her own book and commemorate the tragedy of her
daughter Éva. After 1945, Béla Zsolt once again became a celebrated
writer in Hungary, as shown by the fact that he received the Order of Merit
of the Hungarian People’s Republic.13 His prestige definitely played a role
in getting his wife’s book published, since Ágnes’s volume was obviously
meant to be a tribute to the child as evidenced by the title Éva lányom. The
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preface also states that Ágnes Zsolt wrote the book at the Szabadsághegy
Sanatorium, where she allegedly composed the entire text in eight days.14
When she received news of Éva Heyman’s early and tragic death,
Ágnes Zsolt was overpowered by crippling grief and guilt, but her and her
husband’s desperate anger soon turned against their rescuer Miksa Kupfer,
and according to my sources, the Zsolts were not the only patients who
blamed Kupfer and his associates for not saving everyone at the Nagy-
várad ghetto. Reuven Tsur (born Róbert Steiner), who today teaches litera-
ture at Tel Aviv University, was also one of the temporary residents of the
Nagyvárad ghetto and his memoirs provide us with an additional account
of what transpired at the ghetto hospital. Steiner was born in 1932 in
Nagyvárad, where he was acquainted with the Zsolt family and Éva Hey-
man as a child. In 1944, Steiner’s family was forced to move into the
ghetto with other Jewish residents, but unlike Éva Heyman and her grand-
parents, the Steiner family managed to survive by escaping to Romania.
Tsur’s memoirs were originally published in Hebrew, but in 2005, a
Hungarian translation was published under the title Menekülés a gettóból:
egy nagyváradi zsidó család története [Escape from the ghetto: The history
of a Jewish family from Nagyvárad]. Tsur mentions the Zsolts in his mem-
oirs and also states that Miksa Kupfer was sued by several patients who
were allowed stay at the hospital as their family members were deported.
As Tsur writes, “When the Zsolts returned to Budapest after the war, they
decided to persecute Kupfer in any way possible.”15 By blaming their
rescuer, Ágnes and Béla Zsolt tried to alleviate their own guilt and dimin-
ish their personal responsibility in the death of Éva Heyman and Ágnes’s
parents. Their goal was to sue Kupfer and have him indicted by court, and
though their attempts failed, they did manage a small act of revenge by
having Béla Zsolt portray Kupfer in an extremely negative light in his
book Kilenc koffer, calling him a “demonic ponce of a doctor.”16 Miksa
Kupfer was so deeply offended by Béla Zsolt’s unfair portrayal of him that
he almost sued Zsolt for publishing his biased opinion in Haladás,17 and it
is interesting to note that although the full text of Kilenc koffer was meant
to be published as a volume in 1947, it only came out in Hungarian in
1980.18
In 1949, two years after the publication of Éva lányom, Béla Zsolt
died of laryngeal cancer19 and left behind a widow consumed by guilt and
loneliness, since Ágnes’ grief over the murder of Éva Heyman did not
lessen over the years. In August 1951, Ágnes committed suicide, but my
sources disagree on the method she used. According to Tsur, she cut her
wrists, while writer and actress Ilona Harmos wrote that Ágnes poisoned
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herself.20 We only know for certain that her dead body was found in her
house, lying next to the picture of her daughter Éva.21
The psychological background of the birth of Éva lányom: Trauma,
mourning and grief
In November 1947, Zsuzsa Madarassy published a short article about Éva
lányom in the journal Politika [Politics], where she quoted Ágnes Zsolt
with regard to her motivation behind writing her book, which was
apparently a product of the mother’s guilt over losing her daughter: “This
book has made public my private self-accusation of why I stayed alive.”22
Ágnes’s words suggest that she blamed herself for surviving when her
daughter and parents did not, and Béla Zsolt’s memoirs confirm that his
wife was irreversibly traumatized by the fact that she and her husband
managed to escape to Switzerland while Éva Heyman and Éva’s parents
were deported and murdered in Auschwitz. Since Ágnes lost her entire
family in the Holocaust, her mourning and grief work were especially
difficult on account of having no relatives who shared her experiences of
this tragic period and could have helped her cope with her loss.
According to Béla Zsolt’s memoirs, Ágnes made several unsuc-
cessful suicide attempts in May 1944 after the doctors at the hospital of the
Nagyvárad ghetto informed her that her daughter Éva had been deported.
After the death of Éva Heyman, the doctors first withheld the news from
Ágnes and inspired false hopes of the child’s survival, but after three days,
they finally visited her at the epidemic wing to relay the tragic news. In
February 1944, Ágnes developed a tumor and had to undergo extensive
surgery, which already left her in a delicate condition, but her state of
health deteriorated considerably once she became overpowered by crippl-
ing guilt and shock. In her grief over losing her daughter, Ágnes turned to
self-harm and in her first suicide attempt, she managed to tear open her
relatively recent surgical wound. Béla Zsolt was not present during
Ágnes’s suicide attempts, but based on the accounts of the doctors, he
managed to reconstruct Ágnes’s attempts in Kilenc koffer: “On the third
day in the cellar, she discovered that she had been misled and her parents
and her child had been deported. After a hair-raising nervous attack, fol-
lowed by a six-hour faint [sic], she was overcome by a speechless, melan-
choly lethargy and went on hunger strike.”23
To Ágnes Zsolt, the only possible way to cope with the loss of her
daughter was to join Éva Heyman in death by taking her own life in any
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way possible. According to Béla Zsolt, she nearly succeeded in killing
herself at one point:
Then she turned to self-flagellation. For two days she writhed on the
bare stone floor of the cellar: her operation wound opened and the
doctors had to stitch it up again. It was only with great difficulty
that they managed to carry her to one of the empty rooms upstairs.
When they left her alone for a few minutes, she tore her artery open
at the wrist and in a fit of weeping kept biting her fists till they were
bleeding. […] Eventually she recovered somewhat and frantically
demanded to be taken to the gendarmes, put into a wagon and sent
after her family. When the doctors tried to calm her down, she
started to scream: if they didn’t let her go to the gendarmes, she
would reveal the whole deception [sic] and report the doctors and
the patients. If her child had been deported [sic], then everybody
else should be deported too. In the hospital windows there was no
glass, and in the street outside, less than five meters from her room,
every word could be heard by the free Aryans [non-Jewish persons
– G. K.] of Nagyvárad as they were passing by. The horrified
doctors held her down and gave her an injection to make her sleep.24
The tragedy of losing Éva Heyman was exacerbated by the fact
that, just like others who mourned the death of their relatives in Ausch-
witz, Ágnes Zsolt did not know the exact location of her daughter’s body
and was denied an important part of processing her trauma, the means of
giving Éva a proper burial. Funerals have a special function during mourn-
ing since they allow the mourner to conclude their period of shock and say
farewell to the deceased through a series of traditional funeral rites in the
presence of a supportive community. Ágnes was denied the conclusive
farewell of a funeral, and in his 1947 article, Béla Zsolt mentions that the
fact that Éva had no designated grave depressed Ágnes, who often visited
the cemetery after the war: “As a matter of fact, she often goes to the
cemetery to look at the unmarked graves and sometimes manages to
delude herself that the child is there somewhere under one of those
mounds.”25 Ágnes’s coping strategy served to curb her hopeless and self-
destructive grief by finding a place where she could cherish and honor her
daughter’s memory ‘in the presence’ of the departed.
Since Ágnes could not process the loss of her daughter by burying
Éva’s body, we could argue that her memoirs served not only as a tribute
to the child, but also as a means of articulating Ágnes’s most important
memories. By writing her book, Ágnes could recreate her daughter to suit
her own needs of coping with Éva’s murder and loss, leading her to
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construct an idolized image of her child not only in the preface of her book
but through the entire volume, where one recurring theme is Éva’s will to
live despite her terrible circumstances. In the preface, Ágnes talks of her
daughter in the third person, emphasizing Éva’s sensitive nature and will
to survive, which the ‘diary’ proceeds to confirm in the form of diary
entries written in first person. In my interpretation, writing her book as if it
were Éva’s own memoir was part of Ágnes Zsolt’s grief work and gave
her a chance to process the trauma of losing Éva Heyman by presenting
and preserving an idealized image of Éva as a vigorous, smart, sensitive
and open-minded girl with above average intellectual capacities.
Éva lányom and the question of authenticity in scholarly literature
Éva lányom has traditionally been considered a collection of Éva Hey-
man’s own diary entries by scholars such as Judah Marton, who wrote the
preface to the Hebrew translation of the text published by Yad Vashem in
1964.26 Marton also wrote the preface to the first English translation of the
book in 1974, which was based on the Hebrew version. The first sentence
of the preface of the English version reads as follows: “This little volume
contains the diary notes of a thirteen-year-old Jewish girl.”27 Marton sup-
ports his statement by referring to conversations he had with unnamed
close friends of the Zsolt family, who were living in Israel at the time the
Hebrew version was published. Marton also consulted members of the
Rácz-Rosenberg family in Israel, mentioning that “they had no reason to
question the authenticity of any part of the diary.”28 However, it is
important to emphasize that Marton did not claim that any of the family
members had ever seen or read the original manuscript, and he concluded
that in the absence of the original, the authenticity of the text could not be
proven.
In 1981, Dezső Schön and Mose Heller published an edited
volume titled A tegnap városa [The city of yesterday] in memory of the
Jewish inhabitants of Nagyvárad, and their work also considered Éva
lányom an authentic diary, arguing that the text was ‘honest’ in a way the
entries of an adult could never be. At the same time, the editors did assume
that the original material was partially edited by Ágnes Zsolt.29 Mária
Ember, author of one of the first historical studies of Hungarian literature
on the Holocaust, wrote an article on the book where she accepted it as an
authentic diary,30 and her opinion was also shared by Louise O. Vasvári,
who researches the gendered aspects of the Holocaust.31
Recent studies of the book Éva lányom published by Ágnes Zsolt
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began to emphasize the editing role of the mother over the child’s
authorship. For instance, literary historian Sz. Péter Nagy mentions the
book in his short monograph on Béla Zsolt: “He married the daughter of a
pharmacist in Nagyvárad, who later became a journalist under the name
Ágnes Zsolt and also published the potentially fictive diary of her daughter
from her first marriage in 1947 under the title Éva lányom.”32
Alexandra Zapruder comes to a similar conclusion in her book
Salvaged Pages: Young Writers’ Diaries of the Holocaust, which is a com-
pilation of fourteen adolescent diaries, including Heyman’s ‘diary.’33
According to Zapruder, it is probable that Éva kept a diary during the war,
but for its publication, Ágnes Zsolt edited the original diary considerably
by writing supplements and rewriting some of the original manuscript.
Zapruder also assumes that it is no coincidence that the original manu-
script is still missing and Ágnes may have destroyed it so that her changes
could not be traced. However, she concludes that in the absence of the
manuscript, its authenticity cannot be determined, an opinion also shared
by literary historian György Szőke, who considers Ágnes Zsolt to be the
author and attributes the birth of the book to the mother’s feelings of
remorse. In his article about Éva lányom, Szőke also notes that “[o]ne
more legend debunked: the book we are holding in our hands is not the
diary of the Hungarian Anna [sic] Frank.”34 Lastly, Reuven Tsur, who
knew Éva personally from his childhood years, considers the book
as “containing Éva’s diary as well as her mother’s comments.”35
Reviews of Éva lányom upon its publication in 1947
In 1947, several reviews were written about Éva lányom to celebrate its
publication, and when we examine these reviews, we will find that there
was considerable uncertainty at the time regarding the book’s actual
authorship. The short articles I examined were published around October
and November 1947, one of them written by no other than Béla Zsolt,
whose review can be reasonably regarded as the most authentic account of
Éva lányom since Béla Zsolt not only knew both Ágnes and Éva intimately
as Ágnes’s husband and Éva’s stepfather, but was also likely familiar with
the book’s origin. In his review for the journal Haladás, Zsolt introduced
the book as follows: “My wife has recently published her book Éva
lányom, in which she reconstructed from memory the diary of her thirteen-
year-old daughter from her first marriage.”36 In his review, Béla Zsolt
emphasized that the book was not a simple diary due to the fact that the
mother not only used her daughter’s diary as the source material, but also
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supplemented it: “this thirteen-year-old girl revived in my wife’s book
from the fragments of her diary…”37 As we can see, Béla Zsolt’s review
seems to consciously obfuscate the origin of the book by writing that the
child is both ‘reconstructed’ and ‘revived’ in the published volume, which
suggests that there might have been a diary that inspired the mother to
write the book. However, it is important to note that Béla Zsolt never
stated that the published volume was identical to the child’s diary and
continuously emphasized the mother’s role in creating the volume.
In his 1947 review, writer and journalist Andor Kellér also
foregrounded the creative role of Ágnes Zsolt over the authorship of Éva
Heyman: “[S]he wrote the diary of her daughter’s last few months from
memory in one go, one singular trance. At the time, she snuck a peak
inside that private booklet, and the mother’s brain soaked up the voice of
that beloved child like a sponge. She then breathed life into her, she who
was silenced forever.”38
In contrast to Béla Zsolt and Andor Kellér, other reviewers of Éva
lányom accepted the book as containing the original diary. According to
the 1947 article of writer and poet László Hárs, “Ági Zsolt, who appears
on the cover, is not the author but the publisher of the diary of thirteen-
year-old Éva who died in that Nazi hell.”39 Writer and poet Zsuzsa Madar-
assy shared Hárs’s opinion and wrote, “This is Éva’s diary that her mother
sometimes read in secret in Nagyvárad.”40
In conclusion, when we examine the reviews and articles pub-
lished in 1947, the very year of the publication of Éva lányom, we can
clearly see that there was general uncertainty regarding the book’s author-
ship, not in the least due to the fact that Ágnes and Béla Zsolt made no
concrete claims in this regard.
The title Éva lányom
When The diary of Anne Frank was published in 1947, Anne Frank was
designated as the author of the book, whereas the diary of the ‘Hungarian
Anne Frank’ published in the same year was listed under Ágnes Zsolt’s
name instead of Éva Heyman’s. In both cases, the parents had a choice
after the child’s death to decide whose name should be stated on the cover
as the author, and from Ágnes Zsolt’s choice, we may conclude that she
considered the volume to be her own creation rather than Éva’s. In con-
trast, Otto Frank published the original diaries of his daughter, which made
it self-evident that the diaries should bear the name of the daughter rather
than her father’s name.
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The original cover of Éva lányom, shown below, promotes Ágnes
Zsolt as the author of the book instead of Éva Heyman (this cover is
reproduced in appendix II of this article.) Éva’s first name is featured
twice on the cover, but her surname is missing in both instances, which
implies that she is a character rather than the author of the volume. The
cover also features a quote from the preface in capital letters that briefly
summarizes the contents of the book: “Thirteen-year-old Éva fought for
her life against the killers of the Third Reich, but the German beast
defeated Éva.”41 The inner cover contains the title Éva lányom without the
quote, and once again, there is no mention of the book being a diary until
the first sentence of the preface. The cover of the book was obviously
designed according to Ágnes Zsolt’s specifications and shows how the
book is meant to be viewed as her literary work about her daughter. In
contrast, The diary of Anne Frank published in the same year clearly states
on the cover that the book contains Anne Frank’s diary letters.42
In 1964, Éva lányom was translated into Hebrew and published by
Yad Vashem, but the translation made considerable alterations, such as
changing the title of the book to ןאמייה הווא לש הנמוי [Yomanah shel Eṿah
Hayman, Diary of Éva Heyman]43 and replacing Ágnes Zsolt’s name with
Éva Heyman’s. In other words, the Hebrew translation gives the illusion of
the child’s authorship when the original Hungarian text clearly designated
Ágnes Zsolt as the author of the volume. Ten years later in 1974, Éva
lányom was also published in English based on the Hebrew version instead
of the original Hungarian,44 which meant that it also adopted the changes
of the Hebrew translation. Regarding the quality of the English version, I
agree with Tim Cole who notes that “The diary was translated by Moshe
Kohn from Hebrew into English (and hence the translation is far from
ideal)”.45
The preface of Éva lányom written by Ágnes Zsolt had little to say
about the diary it was allegedly based on. In fact, Ágnes Zsolt only men-
tioned the diary twice without any further detail,46 also failing to clarify
how the published diary related to the original manuscript. She noted in
the first sentence of the preface that “I found Éva’s diary in Nagyvárad in
1945,”47 but she did not claim that the published diary was identical to the
diary found in Nagyvárad.
The entries of the book
For my analysis, I compared certain diary entries of Éva lányom with two
authentic adolescent diaries where the original manuscript proves the
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children’s authorship, and then compared these three texts based on the
specificities of the diary genre (frequency, personalness, real time nar-
rative and fragmentation),48 as well as the length of diary entries, style, and
recurring themes characteristic of adolescent diaries.
I compared the text attributed to Éva Heyman with the authentic
diaries of two thirteen-year-old girls, Anne Frank, and Éva Weinmann,
who was born in 1928 in Budapest and kept her diary between October
1944 and January 1945, though the diary was not published until sixty
years later.49 I also compared the Hungarian text of the Heyman ‘diary’
with the original Hungarian manuscript of Éva Weinmann, who started
writing her diary at the age of thirteen, while in the case of Anne Frank, I
only used those entries of the complete English version that she wrote
when she was thirteen years old.50 My analysis was informed by my
experiences with other adolescent diaries in the course of writing my
doctoral dissertation on the comparative analysis of fifteen Christian and
Jewish adolescent diaries.51
When I examined Éva lányom with regard to the specificities of
the genre of the diary, I found that unlike adolescent diaries where the
randomness and spontaneity of daily entries leads to an overall fragmented
text, the entries of Éva lányom are remarkably coherent, which suggests
that they were composed in part by an adult. When I compared the diaries
of Éva Weinmann and Anne Frank to Éva lányom, the other two diaries
showed a number of similarities, the most striking of which was that the
two authentic diaries did not contain long entries like Ágnes Zsolt’s
volume does. Two to three-page entries are relatively rare in the two
adolescent diaries while Zsolt’s text is rife with exceptionally long entries
that would have filled multiple sheets of paper in handwritten form. The
writing style of these long entries is also more detailed and sophisticated
than any entries in Anne Frank’s diary, despite the fact that Anne Frank
revised her diary at a later age.52 Another characteristic of adolescent
diaries is that they are often tied to adolescent roleplay where aspiring
young people, such as Anne Frank who wanted to become a writer, looked
to their diary as their first work of art. According to Ágnes Zsolt, however,
Éva Heyman wanted to become a photo reporter, which means she would
have had no reason or motivation to write exceptionally long diary entries
as a way of testing her abilities. Conversely, there are no short entries in
Éva lányom as opposed to Weinmann and Frank’s diaries, which makes
her ‘adolescent diary’ sound rather artificial.
Aside from lacking the fragmentation characteristic of authentic
adolescent diaries, another aspect that is completely missing from Éva
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lányom is the act of constant self-analysis and self-searching, which is es-
pecially characteristic of and a traditionally recurring theme in adolescent
diaries. In other words, the author of Éva lányom is reporting about her
surroundings rather than sharing information about herself, her feelings,
desires and plans. Parts that pertain to Éva’s desires or plans are so brief
and rare that they do not constitute a recurring theme in the text, which
may be explained by the fact that Ágnes Zsolt did not live with Éva and
therefore found it difficult to grasp her character. On the other hand, Ágnes
was familiar with everyday life in Nagyvárad since she had grown up in
the city, making everyday events, places and people easier to write about.
Ágnes may have also wanted to cater to readers’ needs by describing and
situating places and characters to facilitate navigation in the text.
Another aspect of adolescent diaries missing from Éva lányom is
the focus on the present and on momentary occurrences. For instance, in
the entries before the German occupation in March 1944, the author of the
‘diary’ constantly talks of the past rather than the present, which is un-
common for a diary where instances of reminiscing about the past are
usually rare and accidental. Finally, another aspect where Éva lányom
seems to deviate from authentic adolescent diaries is that the author of the
text does not appear as an agent in the narrative. Unlike other adolescent
authors, ‘Éva’ does not reflect, evaluate or make sense of the events she’s
writing about.
The structure of the ‘diary’
In Éva lányom, the ‘diary’ begins on Éva Heyman’s thirteenth birthday, a
date that seems to have been chosen by Ágnes Zsolt to place the text in a
tragic framework where the narrative begins with the birthday of the
murdered child and lasts until the day of her deportation. It is interesting to
note that Éva’s thirteenth birthday fell on a Friday, which lends an
ominous atmosphere to the first passage that can be connected to Ágnes’s
guilt over having missed her daughter’s final birthday: “I’ve turned
thirteen, I was born on Friday the thirteenth. Ági is terribly superstitious,
though she’s ashamed to admit it. This is the first time Ági didn’t come for
my birthday. […] She didn’t come home for my thirteenth birthday.”53
The first entry of the ‘diary’ serves as an introduction and an
occasion for Ágnes Zsolt to reminisce about the most memorable experi-
ences of her daughter Éva. Ágnes’s description of the most important
events in Éva Heyman’s life begins with the above quoted excerpt and
foreshadows the themes and main elements of subsequent entries. In the
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introductory entry, the author uses the child’s chain of thought to give
short descriptions of Éva’s family members, including the grandparents,
the parents, the servants of the family, immediate relatives and Éva’s best
friends. These descriptions are then juxtaposed by turning points in the
family’s life, such as the divorce of Ágnes from Béla Heyman, the forced
leave of the Austrian governess (due to the Hungarian Jewish Laws of the
era that forbade German citizens to serve Jews), Béla Zsolt’s conscription
into labour service, the expropriation of the pharmacy and the deportation
of Éva’s friend Márta Münczer.
In Éva lányom, diary entries from before the period of the German
occupation pertain to the early years of Éva Heyman’s life, while sub-
sequent entries describe her ‘present’ life. We may assume that early on,
frequent references to the past helped Ágnes Zsolt in constructing the text,
since it was easier to simply select a given event from the past at random
and include it in the diary than reconstruct the ‘present’ life of the child
who lived apart from her mother and stepfather. In this regard, March 19,
1944 was a turning point in the text where the focus finally shifted to the
present, a change of temporal perspective that can be explained by the fact
that Ágnes Zsolt and her husband arrived in Nagyvárad on Tuesday,
March 16, so the mother was by her daughter’s side from that point on-
ward. The German occupation thus became a turning point to Ágnes both
in terms of her constructed narrative and in her family’s situation.
One recurring theme in the book is the foreshadowing of Éva
Heyman’s tragic fate through a series of linked elements such as her friend
Márta Münczer’s red bicycle, which comes to signify the death of Márta
and her family by German troops in Kamianets-Podilskyi54 and serves as a
basis for Éva’s fear that she would share the fate of her friend due to
having matching bicycles. The elements of the symbolic web (bicycle =
Márta = Poland = Germans = death) appear multiple times in repetition,
and to preserve the connection between them, Ágnes even located
Kamianets-Podilskyi in Poland instead of its actual geographical location
in the Ukraine.55 If Ágnes had properly located the city in the Ukraine
instead of Poland, she would have lost one of the pillars of the complex
death symbol, the red bicycle would have also lost its meaning, and the
child’s fear of sharing Márta’s fate would have come across as completely
irrational. However, through the erroneous location or geographical
‘shifting’ of the first great massacre (Auschwitz = Kamianets-Podilskyi),
Éva and Márta’s fates do become the same.56
Ágnes Zsolt’s memoir is structured within a framework where the
first diary entry was condensed in order to provide a full overview of the
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child protagonist and her surroundings to the reader, while the last entry
serves as the conclusion where Éva Heyman finally parts with her diary:
“Now I see that friendly gendarme has let Mariska come in. I can’t write
anymore, dear diary, the tears run from my eyes, I’m hurrying over to
Mariska…”57 The character of the friendly gendarme also appears in the
memoir of Béla Zsolt and might have been adapted by Ágnes Zsolt, but it
is more probable that the identical description stems from their shared
experiences.
When was Éva Heyman deported? The final entries of the ‘diary’
Judging from certain contradictions in Éva Heyman’s ‘diary’ and based on
accounts of the deportation of Jews from the Nagyvárad ghetto, I
concluded that the last two entries in Éva lányom are fictitious. The pen-
ultimate entry was allegedly written on May 29, 1944 and informs us
about the first deportation from the ghetto, followed by the final entry
dated May 30, 1944, in which Éva parts with her diary. Ágnes Zsolt states
in her preface that Éva was put into the cattle train on June 3, 1944 and
arrived in Auschwitz three days later. However, there are several contra-
dictions in the account, not only within the ‘diary’ and the preface but also
compared to the accounts of former residents of the Nagyvárad ghetto.
The Hungarian gendarmes divided the Nagyvárad ghetto into
seven deportation districts, and each district was closed before deportation
to prevent people from escaping into other districts.58 Based on these
divisions, Éva Heyman and her grandparents residing at 20 Szacsvay street
were part of the third district, a fact that Béla Zsolt confirms in Kilenc
koffer.59 The announcements of the Chevra Kadisa published in 1949 list
the number of deportation transports per day as well as parts of the ghetto
from whence people were taken to the trains and the date of their arrival to
Auschwitz. The list places the first deportation on May 25, 1944, when the
residents of Rimler Károly street and people forced into the Nagyvárad
ghetto from other parts of the country were deported, arriving in Ausch-
witz on May 29, 1944.60 The second deportation took place on May 27,
when the residents of the odd numbers of Kapucinus street and Szacsvay
street were deported and arrived in Auschwitz on May 30, 1944. The even
numbers of Szacsvay street, including number 20, were deported on May
28, 1944 and arrived in Auschwitz on May 31, 1944, which means that
Éva could not have written her last two entries on May 29 and 30, 1944.
The diary of Sándor Leitner, the last president of the Orthodox Jewish
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congregation in Nagyvárad more or less confirms these events.61 Ac-
cording to his diary, the third wave of deportations occurred on May 29.
Ágnes Zsolt claims in the preface of Éva lányom that her daughter
was deported on June 3, 1944 and arrived in Auschwitz on June 6, 1944,
but several facts contradict her statement. The preface hints at the fact that
in the last three days before the deportation (June 1 to 3), Éva could not
have written anything if she had previously given her diary to the cook on
May 30 for safekeeping. However, if we accept the mother’s preface as
factual, then her daughter could not have lived at 20 Szacsvay street based
on other available sources and somehow had to either avoid or miss her
deportation. However, this does not seem to be a viable alternative ac-
cording to other related sources, including Béla Zsolt’s memoir, which
states that Éva was deported from Szacsvay street in district three.
According to Béla Zsolt, Ágnes Zsolt’s efforts to transfer her daughter into
another district failed, and every available information supports the idea
that Éva and her grandparents were deported either on May 28 or May 29
from district three.
The child Ágnes had (not) left
As I have previously mentioned, Ágnes Zsolt and her husband managed to
find refuge inside the ghetto hospital at Nagyvárad before deportation
began at the ghetto. Béla Zsolt was admitted to the hospital as a patient
and Ágnes was hiding in the maternity ward under an alias, which meant
that she could only meet her daughter and parents rarely and in secret.62
However, we only know of their location from Béla Zsolt’s memoirs since
Ágnes Zsolt’s book does not mention that she was hiding there while the
child was left with her grandparents. Instead, the text of the ‘diary’ con-
stantly stresses the opposite, that Ágnes did not abandon her child and they
were preparing for the deportation together. For instance, the entry on May
14 reads as follows: “Grandpa is in charge of the pharmacy, and now he
put Ági on the list of workers so that she would be able to visit Uncle Béla
every day.”63 It is clear from the entry that Béla Zsolt was no longer
staying with the family at 20 Szacsvay street, a fact that is confirmed by
other accounts, but these same accounts also confirm that Ágnes Zsolt was
not a visitor or hospital staff but a patient at the hospital. One of these
accounts is the memoir of Reuven Tsur I have mentioned before, who was
acquainted with the family and his mother was an old friend of Ágnes
Zsolt. In his memoirs, Tsur mentions a conversation between his mother
and Ágnes at the ghetto hospital, which likely took place in May or June
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1944, and the fact that the conversation took place at the hospital proves
that Ágnes Zsolt was not with her daughter and parents at 20 Szacsvay
street. According to Tsur’s memoirs,
My mother asked her old friend where Éva was. Ági replied that she
was with her grandparents. “She had always been with them. We
thought it would be best if she stayed with them.” To which my
mother said, “At times like these, a child’s place is by their parents’
side. Ági, I’m afraid your maternal instincts have failed you this
time.”64
By careful shifting of certain facts regarding her stay at the Nagy-
várad ghetto, Ágnes Zsolt managed to create a narrative that may not have
reflected reality but helped alleviate Ágnes’s remorse as a mother over
abandoning her daughter Éva. To maintain the illusion of staying by her
daughter’s side, Ágnes and even Béla Zsolt appeared in the ‘child’s’ final
entry, where Éva allegedly witnessed a conversation between her mother
and stepfather. Their implied presence served to ease Ágnes’s guilty con-
science by indicating that her daughter stayed with her mother until the
end and the whole family was preparing for the deportation together. There
are also other details that suggest to the reader that Ágnes remained with
her daughter and parents, such as parts of the text where the ‘child’ writes
about her conversations with her mother or Béla Zsolt, or describes their
everyday activities. From the mother’s perspective, these entries served
two important purposes: in the self-constructed past of the diary, her
daughter knew her mother wanted to save her, which alleviated Ágnes’
guilt, and such passages were also an indication to the reader that the child
was included in her parents’ escape plan: “Ági and Uncle Béla are whis-
pering something to each other about our staying here in some kind of
typhoid hospital, because they plan to say that Uncle Béla has typhoid
fever.” 65
Ágnes Zsolt deliberately left out the details of her own escape to
Switzerland from the preface of Éva lányom because her narrative
attempted to convince the reader that Éva Heyman and her mother were
preparing for their deportation together. In the preface, Ágnes Zsolt only
mentioned very briefly and vaguely that she managed to escape to
Switzerland while her only child died in Auschwitz. However, this means
that it remains unclear to the readers how Ágnes actually managed to
escape when according to the final entries of the diary, she was still by her
daughter’s side at 20 Szacsvay street. The preface raises questions that
Ágnes Zsolt’s book does not want to answer, probably because she knew
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that the answers were all in her husband’s memoir Kilenc koffer. While the
abandonment of the child filled Ágnes with so much grief and guilt that
she could not bear to write about it, Béla Zsolt gave a detailed account in
his own memoirs of how they failed to rescue Éva. In his book, Béla Zsolt
not only pushed responsibility onto his wife and her family, who did not
recognize the severity of the child’s situation like he did, but also blamed
the doctors who failed in their attempts to transfer the child into another
deportation district.
The letters and self-accusations of a negligent parent
When Ágnes Zsolt published her book in 1947, she attached two letters
that were often completely ignored by scholars. Both letters were written
after the war in 1945 and addressed to Ágnes, one by the Christian cook of
the Rácz family, Mariska Szabó, and the other by Juszti, the Austrian gov-
erness who had raised not only Ágnes but also her daughter Éva. Both
letters were replies to Ágnes Zsolt’s letters, which suggests that her first
letters were written to inform them of Éva’s death at age thirteen. In light
of my discussion of the text as the mother’s work rather than her
daughter’s writing, one may ask why Ágnes Zsolt considered it important
to publish these letters along with what she claimed was the child’s diary.
If we consider the book to be Ágnes Zsolt’s work, then it is of
course possible that the letters attached to the diary were also written by
her. Viewed in this light, the first letter allegedly written by the cook
would thus serve to further reinforce the authenticity of the child’s diary.
Similarly, writing the letter on behalf of Juszti gave Ágnes an opportunity
to openly articulate her self-accusation through the character of the
governess, pointing out where she made wrong decisions as a parent that
she would later regret.
In my opinion, the primary function of the cook’s letter was to
prove the existence of Éva Heyman’s diary to the reader since the letter
does not pertain to the book in any other way. Similarly, the purpose of the
final sentences of the last entry is to establish a connection between the
‘diary’ and the attached letter, in which the family’s cook informs Ágnes
Zsolt about the diary in her possession: “Madame knows that on the last
day, when I got inside the Ghetto, Évike gave me her diary.” 66
In her letter to the Austrian governess, Ágnes Zsolt must have
written of her immense guilt over surviving while Éva was murdered in
Auschwitz, which firsts elicites the governess’s sympathy in her reply to
Ágnes, but Juszti then goes on to accuse Ágnes of neglecting Éva well
Who is the Author of Éva Heyman’s Holocaust Diary? 145
before the time of their transportation to the ghetto in a straightforward and
harsh criticism of the mother:
If there is one thing for which I must blame you, it isn’t for having
stayed alive while the girl is dead, for the very opposite could have
happened too, but for having lulled yourself with excuses that
looked real — things I have already referred to — and for not
having fought to have Éva with you, even in more modest circum-
stances. You, who fought so hard for your man when everybody
said it was hopeless; you, who in the end succeeded in rescuing him
from that horror in which you found yourselves in Várad; and in the
end you, who understand people so well, for you have an instinct
about this sort of thing, you, my Ágika, in this matter you failed! 67
If we read Ágnes Zsolt’s published volume as the mother’s
memoirs, then certain recurring themes in Éva lányom, such as Ágnes’s
divorce from Béla Heyman, can be traced back to the image of the
negligent mother projected by the governess’ letter to Ágnes Zsolt. Ágnes
likely realized in retrospect that not only was her divorce a difficult period
for Éva, but that her relation with Éva was also different from more
conventional mother and daughter relationships, as evidenced by her
calling herself Ági throughout the book rather than ‘mother’ to illuminate
their peculiar relationship. Therefore, in an attempt to view herself from
the child’s point of view, Ágnes wrote about the negative impact of the
divorce and often described herself in the book as someone who was un-
suitable for the maternal role, with several episodes included to reinforce
her incompetence while there are hardly any instances that counterbalance
it. The reason behind such passages would be Ágnes’s self-accusations
fueled by her reflection on her daughter’s life and realizing she did not do
her best as a mother to give Éva a short but happy life until the day of her
deportation.
To counterbalance somewhat the negative image Ágnes projected
of herself as Éva’s mother and to compensate for her neglect of her
daughter, Ágnes Zsolt made a point to mention her desires that pertained
to the postwar reunion of mother and child. While divorce as a recurring
theme could be attributed to the author’s guilt, her guilt would then be
alleviated by repeatedly projecting a happy future in Pest. At the same
time, by constructing the text in this particular way, Ágnes Zsolt also
attempted to validate herself by claiming that she only left her child due to
forced circumstances and trusted her to the care of her grandparents in
Nagyvárad. There are several episodes in the book that contrast the child’s
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negative present with a happy future in which the ‘family’ is together
again:
…I go to them, and when there won’t be any more Jewish Laws for
journalists. I’ll live with Uncle Béla in Budapest. That is why Ági
says that my staying with grandpa and grandma is only a transition
[sic] period, and that my true, final home will be with them in Pest,
as I’ve already written in you, dear diary. 68
Conclusion
In this paper, I focused on the book Éva Lányom published in 1947 in
Budapest by journalist Ágnes Zsolt, and offered an alternative inter-
pretation of the volume that has traditionally been presumed by scholars to
contain the diary entries of Ágnes’s daughter Éva Heyman, murdered in
1944 in Auschwitz at the age of thirteen. Due to Ágnes Zsolt’s circum-
stances and her difficulties in coping with the murder of her child, this
paper posits a possible alternative according to which the book was written
by Ágnes Zsolt as a tribute to her daughter. The memoir of Ágnes Zsolt’s
husband Béla Zsolt suggests that his wife was irreversibly traumatized by
the fact that her connections helped her and her husband escape to Switzer-
land during the deportation of Hungarian Jews while Ágnes’s daughter and
parents died in Auschwitz. Therefore I deemed the book to have been the
work of the mother, whose grief and remorse over losing her daughter Éva
compelled her to write her memoirs in the form of a child’s diary. In my
interpretation, the book was conceived from the mother’s inconsolable
grief, and as such not only commemorates the child but also served as an
attempt to articulate Ágnes’s most important memories. Ágnes Zsolt’s
mourning period was especially difficult due to losing her closest relatives
who shared her experiences and could have reminisced with her about her
daughter and the Holocaust. In the absence of her family, Ágnes’s grief
over the murder of Éva Heyman did not lessen over the years, nor did she
ever forgive herself for managing to survive, leading to her suicide in
August 1951 at the age of thirty-nine.
I argued for Ágnes Zsolt’s authorship by presenting evidence from
authentic accounts of the Nagyvárad ghetto and examining the text with
regard to the specificities of the genre of the diary, and based on my
research, I concluded that Éva lányom is not Éva’s diary, but Ágnes
Zsolt’s book written in the style of an adolescent diary. If Éva did write a
diary during World War II, her manuscript was likely negligible and only
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served as an inspiration for the mother to write her own book, just like the
letters of the cook and the governess.
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Identity Shift in the Literature of Vojvodina’s
Hungarian Community, 1992-20101
Oszkár Roginer
This paper deals with evolving forms of identity as represented in the
Hungarian literature from the Vojvodina, and analyzed through local, re-
gional and national aspects of space. From the end of the Second World
War and until the dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugo-
slavia (SFRJ), there has been a relatively self-sufficient Hungarian com-
munity in Vojvodina, with its own collective identity quite distinguishable
the from collective identities of communities surrounding it. Hungarians in
Vojvodina produced literature following the traditions determined by this
autonomous community and its spatial experience. This paper concentrates
on the period between 1992 (when SFRJ disintegrated) to 2010 (when dual
citizenship for diaspora Hungarians was made possible), with the aim to
outline modifications of collectively inhabited space based on narrative
representations of certain elements of the topography (i.e. cities, rivers and
landscapes) in Vojvodina Hungarian literature.
Following a brief introduction to the history of Vojvodina Hun-
garian literature, this research focuses on the 1990’s and 2000’s, i.e. on the
period after the breakup of Yugoslavia. I am interested in how, during this
period, the identity of the Hungarian minority shifted its base of identi-
fication. I will try to outline how a Yugoslav based, thus essentially geo-
cultural identity shifted to a Hungarian based, thus ethno-cultural one, re-
lying on the representation of inhabited space in literature. Parallel to these
shifts, the topographical image, the collectively imagined map of the Hun-
garian and Yugoslav/post-Yugoslav collective identities also changed.
This eventually led to modifications in the self-image and the perception
of a homeland for the Hungarians in Vojvodina as well. I will base my
analysis on the works by Hungarian authors from Vojvodina. Other texts
containing important spatial references from Yugoslavia and Vojvodina
are cited in the annex “Further reading”. The theoretical framework and
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the used concepts are mainly by Marc Augé, Benedict Anderson, Gaston
Bachelard and Michel Foucault, cited in the bibliography.
Introduction
With the dethronement of the Karađorđević-dinasty, and abolition of the
Kingdom of Yugoslavia, the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (KPJ) headed
by Josip Broz Tito, backed up both by the western allies and the Soviet
Union, started a state building project already during the Second World
War, effectively reorganising the country territorially, ideologically, demo-
graphically, economically and administratively. This led to the creation of
the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia in 1946, while the Socialist
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) came later, in 1963. Up until its
disintegration in the 1990’s, this state in the Western Balkans was, on the
one hand, one of the major powers in the Non-Aligned Movement, as well
as the least authoritarian country in the Eastern-bloc. On the other hand, it
was a state union displaying more and more apparent economic and
demographic divisions, differences in industrialisation and modernisation
processes, level of poverty and contribution to GDP — problems which
were increasingly hard to master after Tito’s death in 1980, and which
eventually led to war and constitutional dissolution.
With six republics, and the now-independent Republic of Kosovo,
Vojvodina was an autonomous province of Yugoslavia, located on the ter-
ritory of the Republic of Serbia. Its population — dependent on the period
— varied around 1.5 million, and Hungarians made up a quarter of the
population.2 Vojvodina’s capital, Novi Sad (Hungarian: Újvidék), was the
province’s cultural, political, administrative and industrial centre. More-
over, from the early 1950’s onward, the Hungarian community developed
a centralized organisational structure based in the city. Firstly, this meant
that the community had one centre, and everything else was more or less
culturally marginalized, frowned upon as provincial, and — following this
pattern — state funding was relatively disproportionate as well. Secondly,
the centre was fully institutionalized with infrastructure necessary for cul-
tural production, such as the editorial for a daily newspaper (Magyar Szó)
and several journals (e.g. Híd, Új Symposion), a publishing house (Forum),
a facility for higher education at the university of Novi Sad (Magyar Nyelv
és Irodalom Tanszék), an institute for research of Hungarian culture, litera-
ture, and ethnology in Yugoslavia (Hungarológiai Intézet) which was later
merged with the Department of Hungarian Language and Literature, and a
theatre with a regular Hungarian repertoire (Újvidéki Színház). This centre
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was so influential that even the former smaller Hungarian gravitational
points within Vojvodina (Subotica-Szabadka, Senta-Zenta, Sombor-
Zombor, Zrenjanin-Nagybecskerek etc.) or outside of it (e.g. Zagreb-
Zágráb, Osijek-Eszék, Lendava-Lendva) in existence prior to Novi Sad
(Újvidék) as a centre of Hungarian language and culture, gradually de-
clined and gave place to the well organised governmental structures of the
federal system.
By the end of the 1950’s, for the vast majority of the country’s
population, the attribute “Yugoslav“ meant less and less what it etymol-
ogically denoted (South-Slavic). The discourse “Brotherhood and Unity”3
vouched for a different definition. With the isolation of its ethnic elements
(though promoted in terms of language and culture), the term “Yugoslav”
systematically transformed from an exclusive into an inclusive idea of fed-
eral strength through heterogeneity. It affirmed a then quite widespread
model of nationhood, connected not to ethnicity, but to citizenship. Diffe-
rences in language, regional characteristics, folklore, or even the latently
present religious practices in public were perceived as a positive and not as
a negative statement — and this was particularly significant for the numer-
ous minorities (Albanians, Bosnians, Hungarians, Italians, Roma, Rumani-
ans, Ruthenians, Slovaks, etc.), many of whom inhabited Vojvodina. In
comparison to the term “narodi”, which denoted ethnic groups of south
Slavic origin in Yugoslavia, the communities cited above were coded
“narodnosti” and not “manjine”, which would have meant minorities. Ac-
cording to the Constitution of Yugoslavia from 1974, the minorities of
Yugoslavia effectively seized to be minorities.4 Stated in the article 245:
“All nations and nationalities of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugo-
slavia are equal.” Hungarians in Yugoslavia were thus relatively free to
exercise their rights concerning language, to promote and cultivate other
aspects of culture through institutions, press or electronic media. By the
1960’s, for the Hungarian community (although assimilation was an ongo-
ing but latent process), this resulted in a substantial improvement of their
situation in comparison to other Hungarian minorities in the Carpathian
basin. The improvement was evident mainly in the fields of cultural poli-
tics, ethnic self-determination and language rights. Furthermore, if we look
at the cultural policies, publishing houses, theatre practises or even the dis-
tance between freedom of speech and official censorship,5 the Hungarian
minority was in some respects better off even than the Hungarians in Hun-
gary.
Substantial structural reforms put through under Josip Broz Tito’s
governance had led to this constellation, and was one of several outcomes
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of the widely accepted and politically cultivated discourse of “Brotherhood
and Unity” (Bratstvo-Jedinstvo) in Titoist Yugoslavia. It promoted an um-
brella-like, supranational Yugoslav geo-cultural identity, connected pri-
marily to the homeland, the secular state, Tito’s cult of personality, social-
ist egalitarianism and — in order to root out internal nationalisms that con-
tinued to carry the historical memory and linger on between different eth-
nic groups such as Croats, Serbs and Bosnians — the liquidation of ethnic
and religious belief systems. Thus, during the 1960’s and 1970’s, the Hun-
garian community differed only in language from other citizens of the
Yugoslav terrain, sharing an ideology, a popular culture and the landscapes
comprising this literature, which was in this sense Yugoslav in its manifes-
tations, but Hungarian in its language and literary heritage. This pattern
did not change until the mid 1980’s.
Literary landscapes of the Vojvodina Hungarians
The Hungarian minority in Yugoslavia thus had its own cultural, govern-
mental and political centre which was fully independent of Budapest and
governed by the choices and verdicts made by the federal officials mostly
in Novi Sad, and partly in Belgrade. This way the collective identity
evolved fairly detached from other Hungarian collective identities, and as
early as the late 1940’s, developed its own collective name (jugoszláviai
magyarság, vajdasági magyarok). The collective name, although originat-
ing from the interwar era, did not exist in the 1920’s, and was not so wide-
spread in the 1930’s either. On the one hand, the Hungarian minority of
the interwar years more or less still considered Budapest as its cultural
Mecca. On the other hand, since their rights as citizens were few, their
language rights practically unacknowledged, cultural and political organi-
sations sporadic, and the imagination of a community only present in a
rather rudimental form in the 1930’s, the collective self was not a sub-
system of the land of citizenship as it was the case after 1945, but more a
part of a greater, though mosaic-like Hungarian collective identity stretch-
ing throughout the Carpathian Basin.
Moreover, this collective identity was firmly linked to an estab-
lished, autonomous and flourishing literature (jugoszláviai magyar iro-
dalom — Yugoslav Hungarian literature). It is important to note the dif-
ference in this respect to Hungarian minorities in Romania or Czecho-
slovakia. The Hungarians in Yugoslavia rarely used regional toponyms
inherited from earlier history when distinguishing their cultural produc-
tion. In contrast to the terms “erdélyi magyar irodalom” (Transilvanian
Identity Shift in Vojvodina’s Hungarian Literature 159
Hungarian Literature) or “felvidéki magyar irodalom” (Upper Hungarian
Literature), there has not been a “délvidéki magyar irodalom” (Southern
Hungarian literature), for even in its early years — in the late 1920’s —
scholars, authors, poets and writers were referring to it as “vajdasági” or
“jugoszláviai magyar irodalom”. This identity can best be described in the
following terms: the community had its own Hungarian ethnic roots, with
its own linguistic identity and cultural heritage; after World War II, they
merged into an amalgam with a Yugoslav collective identity hallmarked
with contemporary culture and the openness to Western values. An over-
arching geo-cultural identity, which was to be distinguished from an all-
Hungarian national identity, or as Danyi Magdolna, the editor-in-chief of
the literary magazine Új Symposion put it in 1975: “Our cultural existence
has a triple bond. Besides the autonomous vojvodiniannes and the tradi-
tions of the mother tongue, we put a large emphasis on the influence of the
Yugoslav mentality which forms our consciousness.”6
What I am arguing is that the cities, rivers, islands, the seashore
and other landscapes represented in this literature are showing a Yugoslav
based cultural identity, with a perspective on the Western Balkans. The
texts presented in this paper are therefore as much a part of Yugoslav lit-
erature written in Hungarian, as they are a part of Hungarian literary his-
tory. The topographical representational space of this literature includes
places like Novi Sad, Belgrade and the Danube, stretching all the way to
Zagreb, Rijeka (Fiume), the Velebit mountains and the Adriatic Sea as
well as the Neretva River, Mostar and Sarajevo. This literature thus oper-
ates along the same Yugoslav identity as other Yugoslav authors of the
time who were writing in Serbo-Croatian, Slovene or Macedonian. Topo-
nyms from Hungary such as Budapest, Szeged, Lake Balaton, are all dis-
tant places which have no or very little inner significance for the reality
experienced in Yugoslavia. Therefore, they are not represented as parts of
the space inhabited by the imagined community of Hungarians in Yugo-
slavia. In the period between the Second World War and the Balkan Wars
of the 1990’s, spaces of Hungary differ little from the spaces of other
countries beyond the border. There is no substantial difference for in-
stance, between Prague, Vienna or Budapest. These cities are always fitted
to a tourist gaze, and a relationship which has little in common with the
self-image, the collective identity or the coherent spatial cosmos of the
collective subject writing about it. Nevertheless, sites from Hungary are
also present in the Hungarian literature of Yugoslavia, but they are very
sporadic and rare, and if we look at them closely, there is a certain other-
ness attached to them. As Ottó Tolnai, one of the most important authors
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of Yugoslav-Hungarian literature, puts it in his poem Balaton (Lake Bala-
ton): “despite everything, the vacation of the Hungarian worker is more
organised/ because they have workers/ and we have workers as well.”7
Disintegration
For Hungarians, the shift began between the so-called “anti-bureaucratic
revolution” of Slobodan Milošević in the late 1980’s, and the dissolution
of Yugoslavia in the early 1990’s, when this Yugoslav geo-cultural iden-
tity became rapidly devalued. The formerly nominal minorities became
real ones yet again, and — through segregation — they were deprived of
their extensive educational, cultural and linguistic rights. In parallel —
since the SFRJ as a state vanished within a few years — it suddenly be-
came anachronistic for the Hungarian minority to declare itself “Yugo-
slav” or to use “Yugoslav” as a distinctive quality when referring to itself.
Therefore, the Vojvodina Hungarians began to look for a collective iden-
tity elsewhere.8
Yugoslav Hungarians were Hungarians by ethnicity and language,
and Yugoslavs by socialisation and geo-cultural bonds, which meant that
with the shift in question, they became a minority as much as in Slobodan
Milošević’s Serbian-dominated Yugoslavia, as in post-Soviet Hungary.
The Vojvodina Hungarians, thus, effectively became a minority without a
country. In the first half of the 1990’s, they had lost the legal and political
discourse which granted them the rights and privileges previously men-
tioned, as well as the spatial dimensions of their collective identity: Sara-
jevo, the home of the 1984 Winter Olympics, became a worldwide media
sensation due to sniper attacks on civilians and shelling; Dubrovnik, the
pearl of the Adriatic Sea was under siege; the Adriatic coastline, where all
Yugoslavs enjoyed spending their family holidays, was cut off, while
Ljubljana became the capital of independent Slovenia and thus un-
reachable for Serbian citizens in the 1990’s. Most importantly, every sin-
gle one of these places pinpoints a disintegrating collective identity, gradu-
ally denoting more and more distant spaces somewhere abroad. Through
time, the identificational linkage became looser and looser, and these land-
scapes evolved from denoting spaces inhabited by citizens of the same
country to spaces reachable only as a tourist (with a passport) — and lit-
erature followed this process step by step.
Through the spaces represented in Yugoslav-Hungarian literature,
one can see the blueprints of this collective identity. In addition, compared
to its situation in the previous, Yugoslav periods, the shift from a geo-
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cultural perspective to an ethno-cultural perspective is also noticeable. The
biggest change, however, became the imagination of a collective self not
as a sub-system of an ethnically heterogeneous entity in the Western Bal-
kans, but of an ethnically homogeneous entity in the Carpathian Basin. For
authors of the younger generations socialised through post-Yugoslav pop-
culture and collective discourses, also in line with cultural and educational
policies of the late 1990’s and beyond, the perception of their own inhab-
ited space is to a much greater degree connected to Hungary or Budapest
than to the Adriatic coastline or the Balkans, thus differing vastly from
generations of the SFRJ period between 1945-1992.
The landscapes that fell out of the previous collective identity
transformed from previously heterogeneous spaces into more homogenous
ones. The terrain is no longer cracked with experience or intimacy, as Gas-
ton Bachelard would explain it, it is not bended with memories, and there
are no narratives linked to it. The post-Yugoslav space of the Western
Balkans is homogenous in the sense that it is flat, hollow and empty — a
blank spot of a collectively indifferent terrain on the map. Without these
augmented memories and elements which could carry the possibility to
distinguish one segment of this space from another, a community cannot
develop a meaning for it, and it cannot embed it in its collective self based
on — amongst other things — its spatial experience. For familiar places
contain memories; spaces which are known to us were at some point
scenes of events — if not to us, then to someone with whom we share a
collective identity. “In its countless alveoli space contains compressed
time. That is what space is for.”9 The landscapes which were gradually
fenced off for post-Yugoslav generations of Hungarians in Vojvodina, do
not have these compressed memories, which were handed down by narra-
tives or accumulated through the experience of annual summer vacations,
various cultural manifestations, inland travels or means of education.
These landscapes are flat, in a timeless and empty plane from where the
collective self has retreated, and which cannot be narrated collectively any
longer. Parts of the old geo-cultural identity mean nowadays (especially
for younger generations socialised during the 1990’s and after) as little as
Rome, the Black Sea, Munich or Vienna. As parts of a former identity, the
toponyms on the chart shaped a cosmos of familiar spaces, while in con-
temporary literature these toponyms are as chaotic and foreign as they
would be in a tourist guide. Mircea Eliade begins his book The Sacred and
the Profane with the sentence “For religious man, space is not homoge-
nous; he experiences interruptions, breaks in it; some parts of space are
qualitatively different from others.”10 Much like the religious man, the
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man of the age of nationalism also interprets space by building a hierarchy
within it, and by doing so he shapes an individual, eventually a collective
cosmos, too, with borders, centres, and routes of transit. However, when
these interpretations are questioned or replaced, space becomes a chaotic
mass, similarly unshaped as it was before, not differing from other un-
known spaces. This is the interpretational shift in question, which occurred
during the 1990’s, transforming the collective imagination of inhabited
space for Hungarians in Vojvodina to this day.
Dilemmas
The first signs of this shift appeared as early as 1992. István Németh, one
of the most prolific short story writers of the period, uses the term “Dél-
vidék”, for the first time, on the pages of the daily newspaper Magyar Szó.
The sheer act strikes him as a problem: “I write Délvidék for the first time,
since the word Vojvodina is starting to lose its meaning.”11 The term “Dé-
lvidék” means “lands of the south”; it is a traditional Hungarian geo-
graphic term denoting what Southern Hungary had been prior to the Treaty
of Trianon, i.e. roughly the territory of Vojvodina. It was in use prior to the
First World War, and again during the Hungarian takeover of Vojvodina in
the Second World War. During the communist period, the term was
banned from public discourse. In the same year that Németh picked up the
term “Délvidék”, Ottó Tolnai writes: “If I would have to say why this ab-
straction of the Adriatic concerns me a lot (allegedly one could travel to
Croatia with a Catholic baptism certificate), then aside from the abandoned
marble quarries of Vrnik, I would most probably mention the geranium
trees from Žuljana.”12 This text was published in the first issue of the jour-
nal EX Symposion based in Veszprém, Hungary, although the manuscripts
were most probably intended for the journal Új Symposion based in Novi
Sad (Újvidék), which ceased publication after its authors had fled abroad.
The concept of the two journals is practically identical, both relying tradi-
tionally on Hungarian authors from Vojvodina and Hungary, and some
Serbo-Croatian authors from other parts of Yugoslavia, with a strong focus
on post- and neo-avant-garde practices, and a comprehensive approach
from social sciences.13
And thus the shifting began. If we look at it as a hobsbawmian
question of invented traditions,14 we can observe a very indicative model
of identity shifting from one tradition to another, and the utilisation of
toponyms as part of one tradition towards a different one. Communities
choose their traditions, and if the usage of toponyms requires a linguistic
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practice, then this practice means that at an identificational crossroad, the
practice shows which collective identity prevails. The (re)labelling of
landscapes and their representation in literature contributes to, and is a fine
indicator of these practices. Tradition in this case functions as part of a
discourse, and it formalises the way of representing objective reality. Rep-
resentation of space in this discourse is just one of the symptoms, and lit-
erary examples can show that, when it comes to space, traditions are the
instances within which rules are invented. It is therefore crucial, whether a
spatial identificational element is represented as alien or not, whether it is
perceived as one abroad or not, or inhabited by one’s own community or
the “Others”. The two quotes above show how this barely tangible but
penetrating flow had begun. Németh ponders whether another discourse
should or should not be accepted, and, if so, which would be the proper
way of (re)introducing it. While the Tolnai text deals with the reconstruc-
tion of spaces, emigration, borders. He writes about war with countries that
were recently homelands, but which are becoming foreign and potentially
alien to future readers, who will be unable to identify with them.
Interludes
The shift from one collective identity to the other was (and never is) by no
means a smooth, uneventful and easy process; nonetheless, it resulted in a
lot of sidetracks — fortunately, a lot of them were highly creative. On the
one hand, due to the fragmentation of public space, the collective self-
image had connected to smaller, locally defined spaces, while on the other
hand, spaces of transit became a frequent scenery of literary narratives.
Along with spaces disappearing and emerging, one of the most peculiar
symptoms of the forthcoming age was the reappearance of sacral spaces —
in literature as much as in other art forms as well.
Local discourse of the mid 1990’s
By the mid 1990’s, authors started to describe places which were quite
marginal in quantity and sporadic in their appearance prior to the shift, or
didn’t even exist — neither in landscapes of the collective self, nor in liter-
ary discourse. These spaces were rarely known beyond the local commu-
nity. Poems, prose and even drama started to use these spaces, which were
up until that point fairly unknown to the wider public, and familiar only to
the local observer. The plot unfolded at previously unknown sites, in a mi-
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lieu scarcely represented before, and in spaces belonging to a necessarily
smaller scale. In contrast to previous patterns where novels, poems and
short stories could take place on streets and boulevards of such Yugoslav
cities as Sarajevo, Belgrade, Zagreb, Priština, sometimes in a specific vil-
lage on the seaside or even on islands in the Adriatic, the mid-1990’s were
rather hallmarked by a number of micro-spaces. Literary texts abandoned
the above mentioned larger landscapes, and pulled out their subjects from
its contexts. Instead of the vast settings of poems or prose, one could en-
counter spaces at the micro-level: bridges, streams, wells, field paths,
streets, squares, marketplaces — without any intention or hint from the
author to reveal the town’s name, a town almost without exception located
somewhere in the Vojvodina countryside, away from urban areas. The au-
thors often used smaller geographical elements, village alleys instead of
city squares or even streams instead of rivers. Novi Sad and Subotica
rarely provided a scenery at this point. The great waterways of the Danube,
or the once relevant Sava, Drina, and Drava, vanished from the collective
imagination, hence the significance shifted to a much smaller radius. The
subject becomes more focused on its proximal environment, dealing with
issues concerning only the immediate visibilities, thus mythologizing and
closing them into a much smaller textual world than it was usual during
the 1950’s, 1960’s, 1970’s and 1980’s.
Here, at the barely inhaling
living Aranka
leafs
started to fall swiftly
through them like knots
nests lump out
and within them already
the autumn is nesting
With us, at the barely inhaling
living Aranka
the silence of the
fallows had grown and





a whole heaven of birds
and on the fading trees
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cold nests
whether next year
will there be hatching here
the same ones who put
who placed them here this year?!15
The reader often requires the gaze and knowledge of the local, na-
tive observer in order to decipher the whereabouts of the specific locality.
One could say that the authors retreated from the more and more uncertain
and indeterminate spaces to the only space that they were certain would
not fall into pieces — the space of the local community. On the one hand,
this cosmos remains a small one, but on the other, it is rich with anecdotes,
village fools, local heroes and buildings, toponyms, wells and roads which
could only be fully interpreted through the eye of the local bystander. As
Bachelard writes: “Inhabited space transcends geometrical space.”16 Read-
ing these poems and stories of the mid 1990’s, one can experience a small
world enlarged by literary fantasy, enhanced in scope to much greater ur-
ban and social construction, represented as a gargantuan maze, sometimes
with a centre, but certainly never with a way out — a Hungarian Macon-
do17 in a disintegrating Yugoslavia.
In a 1994 conference analysis from Hamburg, Zygmunt Bauman
argues that postmodern communities dream of a local discourse which will
grant them certainties and truths that nation-states cannot grant them any
longer. They dream more of a unity of thought, feeling, will and action on
a local scale. Bauman calls them “neotribal communities”, and refers to
them as ones that cannot live differently, but only through the faith in the
norms stated above.18 If we look at the products of the Hungarian literature
in Vojvodina, it is quite easy to notice that a similar process took place and
peaked in literature by the mid 1990’s. The only certain way of building a
collective identity — or at least trying to build one during the dissolution
of the country, which resulted in the devaluation of every identificational
pattern of a larger scale — was through the certainty provided by the local
identificational web. This, actually, was the most radically minimalistic
approach a public discourse could provide; after that, there is nothing but
the individual.
To define it briefly, the local discourse is a way of thinking, writ-
ing and identifying oneself according to the norms, structures and hierar-
chies of the local community. The subject retreats from the imagined
communities of national or even regional strata, and finds its way back to
the primary face-to-face community of the local milieu. In contrast to
Benedict Anderson’s imagined communities,19 a local community is not
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necessarily imagined. Hence, a lot of knowledge is implicitly present and
there is no need for a “footnote” or a reflection, since there are very few of
those who would seek additional explanation. These narratives are closed
by not mentioning the city name, and they are focusing on the inner struc-
tures, with the obvious assumption that the reader shares the writer's local
knowledge. This community is small, compact and often provincial. Texts
are recurrently written in dialect. The step-by-step withdrawal is demon-
strated very precisely in a poem by Károly Jung, entitled Limányi anziksz
(Postcards from Liman), written originally as a street graffiti in Novi Sad,
showing instability even in its linguistic manifestation (written in Serbian
and Hungarian, but struck out in both). The author names every level of





This is a building!
This is crap!20
Another aspect of the local discourse is that the narration depends
very much on the topography, which is mostly codified in names tangible
only to the ones who share the knowledge with the locally defined collec-
tive identity. This, naturally, does not mean that a reader with an entirely
different cultural background will be completely unable to understand
what is written, but his experience will be undeniably different. The author
aims at a locally socialized reader, one who is familiar with the current
situation and understands his problems and needs — for these are the prob-
lems and needs of “the” community. This narrative practice gives the
poem certain mysticism, and even though, on the surface, it is readable by
everyone, the author’s only true accomplice is someone who can decode
the topographical matrix and break through this locally encrypted fence.
Éva Harkai Vass, in a poem from 1993, wrote:
I see you standing on the Butter Hill,
and on the freshly painted Calvary
only an alto prayer was heard
and the stacios as lung wings
successively open their gates21
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The Butter Hill (Vajhegy) and the Calvary on its top is located in
Bačka Topola (Topolya), a town 74 km north of Novi Sad. It is impossible
to locate these places on a map, for they are not normative, codified names
— only the local subject can pin it on his/her spatial chart. Another exam-
ple from an essay, published in the same year demonstrates how the hydro-
graphy shows signs of this local discourse as well: “Undergarments, I saw
a lot, but not just in the summer, when on the Little-Danube the bathing
women take off their clothes.”22 The Little-Danube (Kis-Duna) being a
backwater of the Danube near Novi Sad, which is also not a codified
name, and is used only by Hungarians in Novi Sad, Serbs calling it “Duna-
vac”. The authors in these years rarely define which specific village or
town they are referring to, their only aim most certainly being tucking
away the subject geographically to the safest, most secluded spot of the
“couleur locale”.
Non-places
In the mid 1990’s, another by then rather unusual experience of space
emerged. It manifested itself through waiting rooms, refugee camps, bor-
der checkpoints, railway compartments, train- and bus stations. The opuses
got overloaded with places which Marc Augé calls non-places, and refers
to them as follows: “If a place can be defined as relational, historical and
concerned with identity, then a space which cannot be defined as rela-
tional, historical and concerned with identity will be a non-place.”23 This
movement, along with a migrational unpleasantness with its borders, trans-
fers, delays and waiting, can be felt in a poem written in 1996 by György
Szakmány:
I got down at Kiskunhalas
at quarter past one
I’ll be at Kelebia by three
I’m from Vojvodina
I study in Buda.24
Due to the Yugoslav war, a large number of Hungarian and other
students, intellectuals, artists and other mainly educated and young people,
fled abroad in search of a peaceful life, with no notions of war, conflict
and ethnic divisions. For decades, the centre of gravity for Vojvodina
Hungarian intellectuals has been Novi Sad (Újvidék). However, when the
war broke out and the university campus mutated into a hunting ground for
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young men who were to be recruited into the army, more and more people
decided to leave. Authors such as dr. Máriás and Bada Dada who left Novi
Sad wrote poems about these experiences of migration, László Végel
wrote novels and essays about the ever migranting “Gastarbeiter”, while
Csaba Szögi, who was a soldier, wrote a novel which takes place in a mili-
tary base, and continues the tradition of the non-place. The novel is called
Drót (Wire), and even its title functions as a synecdoche, denoting the
fence enclosing the narrator, and pointing out the hollowness of the iden-
tificational space inside the barracks. Árpád Nagy Abonyi, Aaron Bloom
and Ottó Tolnai wrote a series of texts about the same empty spaces which
have to be passed to get to the destination point. It is symptomatic that —
due to the generic situation of war — the last issue of the literary magazine
Új Symposion was published by an editorial made up entirely of women
(Ildikó Lovas, Csilla Utasi, Tímea Bordás and Zsuzsanna Papp), the editor
in chief being Papp P. Tibor, who left the country soon after as well. In
one of his short stories, György Szerbhorváth writes about a police station
in Budapest: “Entering the police station on I. street I was only occupied
with one thought, how long must I stand about this time around to get my
residence permit.”25
Poems, plays, novels from migrants and commuters got filled with
these liminal, transitional spaces of travel, temporary residence, and other
provisional landscapes of need set in an intermediate place without time,
relations or any possibility of building an image of the self connected to
them. The majority of Vojvodina Hungarians experienced different parts
of the world, which carried the probability of a new home, but had been
divided with these necessary spaces of transit. The fact that these spaces
appear in a wide variety of genres shows the relevance of these repre-
sentations of space amongst other landscapes of the collective self.
ERNŐ You think I went mad don’t you? Man, I
didn’t even see that country!
TIBOR Where were you?
ERNŐ They’d escorted me, with my wife and child to
a refugee camp near Malmö, and had let me go to the
city only twice during the one and a half years stay. I
didn’t get a permanent residence permit nor a work
permit, and now – as the war apparently ended – they
transported us home via an airplane nicely, culturally
and with a Swedish politeness.26
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The shift thus produced a unique sidetrack of Hungarian migrant
literature. Places which were tourist attractions at most, became necessities
for an escape, be it temporary or permanent. Short stories and essays about
immigrant offices, train stations, passport controls abound. Empty spaces
became places of contact, but even through these augéian empty spaces the
subject could not build a temporary collective identity — it is trapped be-
tween its old geo-cultural self and a desire to form a new community. This
wave in Vojvodina Hungarian literature reached its peak in the last third of
the 1990’s, with the decline of the Milošević-era, but — due to the politi-
cal, economic instability in Serbia, and the fact that more and more young
people decide to study in Hungary — it has remained common since. On a
number of occasions, the immigrant offices, university waiting lines and
other places of transit were/are often located in Budapest, Szeged or at an-
other ”home to be” in Hungary; and the foundations of the new identity
have evolved somewhere near this sidetrack.
Sacral space
The end of the sacral space’s stigmatization in pseudo-secular Central-
Eastern Europe went parallel with the ideological shifts of the post-Soviet
era. Churches, calvaries, roadside crosses or figures of saints became a
familiar topos in the arts and even popular culture by the end of the
1990’s. The church, as one of the most emblematic structures of every lo-
cal identity, had become a taboo after the Second World War and it was
not advisable to use it for artistic purposes. However, in post-socialist
Europe, churches were among the first previously suppressed emblems to
appear as foucauldian heterotopias, marking the town centre, a traditional
gathering place for the community, a space of interaction, history, relation-
ships, durability and ritual communication. These objects are marked with
their exception from regular communal time, and the sheer entering ex-
tracts the subject from temporal continuity. They often represent complex
sites, comprising a wide array of meaning, thus becoming a guarded sym-
bol of the community. Once again, a church became a site which is defined
by the renewed relations established between the space it occupies, the
institution it represents and the community, which on the one hand inter-
prets itself through it, and on the other modifies it according to its commu-
nal needs. The sacral objects, as heterotopias of an imagined communal
assembly, hence became sites bearing relations to the past as a vertical,
and the present as a horizontal tie to a certain group, to ethnic origins and






from your ruinous walls




Aside from the above mentioned traditional aspects of a sacral ob-
ject as a heterotopia, a new quality of the late 20th century became appar-
ent. One of the most interesting phenomena is that, with reclaiming its
communal position, the sacral space had undergone a curious trans-
formation. Vojvodina churches and monastery ruins, while re-entering the
Hungarian collective self’s as an ethno-cultural blueprint, somewhat di-
luted their divine tone and painted it with an ethnical one. Medieval ruins
of churches, monasteries and fortifications became a symbol of continuity,
thus strengthening notions of the upcoming discourse, serving not only as
links to a pre-socialist Christian (mostly Catholic or Calvinist) identity,
and as a millennium-old tie to Western Europe, but also as a spatial me-
mento of Hungarian presence, and as knots in a network culturally and
historically interconnected with other places of the Carpathian Basin. In
contrast to the previous discourse, where one of the key characteristics of
the collective self-image was the perception of itself as a socialist identity
rooted in the present and in a struggle for the future, the new one gave pri-
ority to the past, to the continuity in opposition to the previous mythology
of discontinuity, and to the cultural memory embedded in architecture.
During the 1990’s, the cultural journal Üzenet presented more essays on
the buildings of this type in Subotica (Szabadka). To celebrate the new
millennium, a series of historical essays were published in the 2000 issues
of the journal Híd in order to commemorate these places.28 The keywords
were precisely the ones mentioned above: Carpathian Basin, Pannonia,
Hungarian presence, middle ages, Christianity, Western Europe.
The Post-Yugoslav collective self of Hungarians
As stated before, the emblematic year of the shift is 1992. In this particular
case, this was not just the end of the SFRJ; there is an additional, more
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cultural background to it as well. As mentioned above, in the same year,
the most important literary and art journal of the Vojvodina Hungarian
post-avant-garde — the Új Symposion — seized to exist. This coincidence
of political and cultural overlapping marks the beginning of a major identi-
fication shift, and clears the terrain for a process which resulted in a dis-
course, a collective self and a mental landscape different from the one be-
fore 1992. Although just a symptom, after the end of Új Symposion, one
could not write about, publish about, or even imagine space as up to that
year.
1992
The August issue of Új Symposion came out with no signs of future inter-
ruption, yet after that, no further issues appeared.  However, a new journal
of a very similar profile and featuring the similar authors soon came to life
in Veszprém, Hungary, significantly named EX Symposion.29 Yugoslavia
was falling into pieces, and the authors who fled from the military draft —
or due to other existential reasons — saw themselves forced to establish a
new forum. This journal is still in existence today. During the same period,
a younger generation came to age in Vojvodina, and established at home, a
Novi Sad-based sequel to the journal simply naming it Symposion, which
— albeit in a somewhat altered form — also still exists today. It gathered
authors and artists from the region, but due to the financial difficulties,
issues came out quite irregularly. The journals Híd and Üzenet were fairly
unaffected by the course of events of the 1990’s. Híd has been undergoing
radical transformations since the mid 2000’s, giving place to authors from
a younger generation, and traditionally publishing literary utterances from
the post-Yugoslav area, but also paying attention to contemporary litera-
tures of neighbouring Hungarian canons. Üzenet seized to exist in 2006.
The daily and weekly newspapers have gone through considerable altera-
tions as well, each of them developing a profile more and more affected by
the shift. The Forum publishing house in Novi Sad (Újvidék) and the thea-
tres in Novi Sad (Újvidék) and Subotica (Szabadka) Újvidéki Színház and
Szabadkai Népszínház — although new publishers and new theatres were
founded — remained most likely the least affected institutions in this pe-
riod (aside from organisational and financial problems). They will most
likely have to deal with the shift in the second half of the 2010’s, for the
geo-cultural and ethno-cultural discourses are competing in these institu-
tions since the 1990’s as well. What remained, and has prevailed for the
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last two decades is the idea of a Hungarian community in the Vojvodina,
which identifies itself with canons channelled through both discourses.
There is, however, a strong tendency of development — which can be ob-
served since the mid-1980’s — parallel with ethno-centric nationalisms in
Central-Eastern Europe. References to space remain more and more in the
ethno-cultural framework of southern Vojvodina. Furthermore, cultural
and political connections to the Western-Balkans — although still existing
— weakened, and the Hungarian community became increasingly inte-
grated with other Hungarian communities in the Carpathian Basin.
In the meantime, the Hungarian community in Yugoslavia de-
creased from almost half a million, as it was in the 1960’s, to somewhat
more than 300,000 in the 1990’s, and a bit over 250,000, according to the
2011 census. This was partly due to a combination of a low birth rate and
assimilation, and partly to emigration. The entire state became smaller and
smaller, and its name also changed several times, from SFRJ to the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia, then to Serbia and Montenegro (when the name
Yugoslavia disappeared altogether), and eventually to Serbia alone. One
can see that, from the second half of the 1990’s, a new identificational ba-
sis was not so much an option, but more a necessity. Since it was an
anachronism for the Yugoslav Hungarians to identify with a country which
existed only as a cultural memory, the community had to turn elsewhere
for an identificational basis. The 1990’s are in this sense the watershed
between a firmly established geo-cultural identity, and the fracturing rest
of something believed to be an everlasting cornerstone of the collective
identity, evolving to something new.
The ethno-cultural discourse
Due to the increased mobility in the past couple of decades, and to the fact
that a holiday, a longer trip or even a resettlement to Hungary became
more usual than in case of any other post-Yugoslav state, experiences of
these spaces have also changed. Since encounters with Hungary became
more frequent than with landscapes of the Western Balkans, literary texts
represented a collective identity quite different from the previous one.
Hungarian spaces, thus, became a recurring setting in poems, short stories
and novels. Streets, squares of Szeged, boulevards and subway stations of
Budapest, the beaches of Balaton became more and more represented.
Therefore, mental distances between a city in Hungary and a town in Voj-
vodina were reduced. One could say that post-Yugoslav landscapes were
abandoned during the 1990’s only to be reintroduced as snapshots on tour-
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ist routes of Slovenia, Bosnia or Croatia in the 2000’s. The narratives con-
nected to the old discourse could not be utilized, spaces belonging to a
former collective self were incapable to address the reader, and while land-
scapes of the new discourse with further details became more and more
integrated and remodelled into a spatial element of the new collective
identity, spaces of the old one became merely a distant, isolated, and
sometimes unreachable point on the map with a touch of nostalgia. Soli-
darity between Hungarians and non-Hungarians, interethnic ties within one
model of identity got more and more abandoned, and constructions of a
more monoethnic, monolingual identity seemed to be the trend. A few
decades ago, it was completely normal for a Hungarian student from Voj-
vodina to attend the University of Belgrade or Zagreb, and it was relatively
rare to see Vojvodina Hungarians as students at the University of Szeged
or Budapest — but after the shift, the opposite became true. This does not
mean that the old spaces vanished completely, they only became rarer.
There are authors, such as the young poet Anna Terék, who try to combine
both discourses. Terék has a poem entitled Szarajevó (Sarajevo), but also
another one entitled Temetés (Funeral), with a much differing approach:
“we have departed into the summer night
of urine stinking Pest
[...]
after
my first girl died of cancer
I drank brandy on the Wesselényi-road
[...]
the morning of Buda came through the window
the suffocating Sun glittered.” 30
The shift resulted not only in spaces on a macro level, but — as
we can see in the excerpt above — on the micro level as well. Unlike the
Hungarian literature of Yugoslavia, especially in the 1960’s, 1970’s and
1980’s — where Budapest may be briefly mentioned as a city abroad —
the Hungarian capital is no longer a distant, foreign city today. References
to its streets, squares, parks, shops broke down the alienated topographical
element to a more pedestrian scale. Authors today integrate and perceive
these spaces as the ones belonging to a shared knowledge, generational
memory, mythology and pop culture. In literature, narratives connected to
these spaces have been presented as the subject’s generic narratives em-
bedded into a wider social context, thus merging them into a metanarrative
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of an “imagined community,” (Anderson) centralised by Budapest. These
narratives, representing parts of a map, channelled an integrated imagina-
tion of a sovereign collective self, overarching state borders. Furthermore,
they delimited landscapes, and separated them from other spaces not in-
habited by the community in question. The line separating one imagined
community from another was radically redefined.
The Hungarian capital is, naturally, not the only mentioned city.
Hungary’s map became bit by bit more detailed, and over the decades —
through personal links — the communal network of landscapes evolved
into a densely woven structure. We can read about the same link in the
poem entitled A veszprémi emigráns költők (Emigrant poets of Veszprém)
by Krisztián Tóbiás:
‘cos
an emigrant poet in Veszprém
stays the same
an emigrant. 31
Prior to the shift, one of the most characteristic identificational
points was the Adriatic Sea. As Yugoslavs, the Hungarians of Yugoslavia
considered this part of the Mediterranean as an all-encompassing land-
scape, while adjacent to the shift it turned either into a nostalgic common-
place of cultural memory (and along with other spaces, it was referred to in
Past Tense) or into a tourist attraction not differing from other destinations
abroad. While István Domonkos, Ottó Tolnai or Ottó Fenyvesi wrote doz-
ens and dozens of poems about the shore, the islands, the waves, their col-
our, smell and shape, the representation of the spaces in contemporary lit-
erature is rare and quite different — even within one oeuvre. Tolnai writes
about being cut off from the sea in 2001:
Now, when I’ve been cut off the Adriatic sea
for over
a decade […]
I hear very often
the bell of Tijesno.32
The importance of the loss of the Adriatic is quite vividly depicted
in Tolnai’s book Világítótorony eladó (Lighthouse for sale), published in
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2010. The novel is mainly about people who were connected to the “Yugo-
slav Riviera”, who travelled there for decades, lost it during the war and in
some cases reclaimed it again afterwards, only this time as foreign tourists.
This short novel is precisely about the value of the Adriatic, what it stands
for and what it meant, when this heterothopia faded and was made indif-
ferent. It is perhaps the perfect example of how the landscapes forming a
collective identity and the spatial matrix of minority literature could
change due to a shift in only two decades. In the early 1950’s, the Adriatic
transformed from the Italian and Croatian seaside, and from the holiday
resort of the upper middle class to ‘the’ Yugoslav shore for all of its citi-
zens — which was not the case in previous times, nor in the interwar
years, and not even before that, during the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. It
was not a landscape of the working class, but of the chosen few who could
afford it. Yet, in the Yugoslav era, it became the foucauldian heterothopia
of vacation, remodelling time, space, collective perception and communi-
cation within its range. For a few months, the whole country migrated to
the shore. During the 1990’s, however, this drastically changed. While
Yugoslavia was vanishing from the map, Hungarian literature was gradu-
ally losing a complex site which was extensively present from the early
1950’s to the early 1990’s, leading to a vast number of iconic works by
István Domonkos, Ottó Tolnai, Katalin Ladik. The Adriatic reappeared in
the mid-2000’s merely as a space of nostalgia, differing from its previous
image not only in sentiment, but — for the younger generations — as a
site abroad, not a part of their own inhabited space.
Conclusion
While reading poems, novels or plays, one can see that spaces which were
once crucial to the community of the Vojvodina Hungarians became mar-
ginal, while new, Hungarian-defined spaces became more important. On
the one hand, there are hardly any texts today about the Croatian seaside,
the Bosnian mountains or the Neretva river; on the other hand, many are
now about streets and squares of various cities within ethno-cultural
boundaries. The collective self is a construct perceived — metaphorically
speaking — from a Budapest perspective, and not from a Belgrade one any
longer; the community imagines itself as a subdivision of an all-Hungarian
homogenous ethnic community, and not as one of the many communities
in ethnically and culturally heterogeneous Yugoslavia. The framework of
today is stretched on the Carpathian Basin, and not on the Western Bal-
kans, as it used to be.
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The shift in question has been a long-term process, thus its stages
exist in a more or less syncretic form, harmonising and levelling out one
another between generations. Despite the fact that one can find both ex-
tremes of the shift within one opus and/or representation of a collective
identity, it does not necessarily end in a paradox or a contradiction. On the
one hand, one can find texts with yugonostalgic or balkanesque overtones,
and on the other, ones which belong more in a Mitteleuropean or Hun-
garian cultural context. Essays by László Végel or novels by Ottó Tolnai
— authors of an older generation — often speak nostalgically about Vo-
jvodina landscapes with an Austria-Hungarian touch, the Vojvodina inter-
war years, but also about Yugoslav spaces of their youth. There are also
authors who do not step out of a sharply defined local discourse; Aaron
Blumm, for instance, never leaves his native Kishegyes (Mali Iđoš), and
stories of Kálmán Jódal or Attila Balázs mainly stay in Újvidék (Novi
Sad). Novels by writers in their twenties or thirties, such as Károly Barlog,
Tamás Kiss and Csaba Szögi, or short stories and essays by György
Szerbhorváth are mostly about liminal experiences of space, non-spaces
and transitional spaces. Most importantly, poems, novels, plays, short sto-
ries adjacent to the spatial shift, are written almost by every generation,
from Ottó Tolnai and Attila Balázs, through Árpád Nagy Abonyi and Fer-
enc Kontra to Károly Barlog, Tamás Kiss, Anna Terék and Orsolya Benc-
sik. Their subjects move through a wide variety of spaces, strengthening
the characteristics of the paradigm after the shift.
Yugoslavia had vanished, and it is not very likely that con-
temporary authors of the post-Yugoslav space will ever develop a similar,
interdependent geo-cultural identity in the Western Balkans as it was the
case in the SFRJ. The dominant myths have been deconstructed, made ei-
ther nostalgic or stigmatised, a uniform and interconnected spatial perspec-
tive has become fragmented, and another perspective (institutionalized
mainly in Budapest) has already developed. The collective self imagines
the inhabited landscapes as a web within the Carpathian Basin, a Deleuze-
Guattari-type rhizome growing and developing in consonance with the
Hungarian language, culture, history, and nonetheless with the common
knowledge and mythology shared with its contemporaries. Hence, after the
shift in question, it is impossible to talk about Hungarian authors from Vo-
jvodina as it was possible before. The borders became more liquid than it
was ever the case in the 20th century; legitimization and censorship are no
longer a regional issue to the extent that it was before. Furthermore, with
the integration of the nation-state into supranational governmental forma-
tions, and the transformation of the concept of nation itself, which can —
Identity Shift in Vojvodina’s Hungarian Literature 177
as Habermas proposes it33 — even be called post-national, reconstruction
of an independent and autonomous Hungarian regional canon in today’s
Vojvodina — as in the 1950’s, 1960’s, 1970’s, 1980’s and even in the
1990’s — has become impossible.
During this shift, the space inhabited stayed put, and the identi-
fication changed only through spatial reinterpretations. The community
inhabiting this space tried to build a new collective identity based on the
“corner of the world” given, and although their own space remained more
or less what it was, the points of reference moved towards other criteria of
identification. If we perceive the shift during the past two decades as a
continuum with many sidetracks, dead ends and failed identificational at-
tempts, we can detect a firmly established collective identity on both ends,
and an identificational vacuum which lasted for about ten years, roughly
from the mid 1990’s to the mid 2000’s. Landscapes, which were parts of
the Yugoslav geo-cultural identity, have given their place to spaces which
now form a still developing, amorphous Hungarian ethno-cultural identity,
with notions of regional and local spatial elements. The regional literature
in question is now an established sub-system of Hungarian literature, and
the community a dispersed southern part of an ethno-culturally defined
Central European state.
Where all this leads, and when the next shift will occur, we can
only guess; but even now we can already see signs of further fragmenta-
tion, together with the development of a multicentric and multicanonic
discourse of a networked-like Hungarian literature amidst the regrouping
communities of Europe. Despite the legitimizing impact of institutions and
manifestations in Budapest, cultural production will most probably articu-
late itself through a wide array of regional canons instead of an in-
stitutionalised single one, dictated from one centre. We can observe these
regional canons in their initial forms in Újvidék (Novi Sad), Szeged, Deb-
recen, Pécs, Kolozsvár (Cluj), Marosvásárhely (Târgu Mures), Pozsony
(Bratislava)... These urban centres usually provide a necessary critical
mass for artistic utterances. They are university centres, with a theatre and
at least one journal dealing with literature and criticism, gathering authors
who came to these cities mostly due to educational purposes. These centres
are already interconnected, providing a platform for cultural production,
which would not have been possible before the 1990’s, but which will
most probably be the case in the near future.
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NOTES
1 The research for this paper was funded by the Balassi Istitute in the
period 2010-2013.
2 Current census: Vojvodina has 1.92 million inhabitants, and a Hun-
garian minority numbering 251.000 (13% of the total).
3 In Serbo-Croatian: Bratstvo-Jedinstvo.
4 “U Socijalističkoj Federativnoj Republici Jugoslaviji narodi i narod-
nosti su ravnopravni.”, in Ustav 1974, član 245.
5 “Zajemčuje se svakoj narodnosti da, radi ostvarivanja prava na iz-
ražavanje svoje narodnosti i kulture, slobodno upotrebljava svoj jezik i pismo,
razvija svoju kulturu i da radi toga osniva organizacije i uživa druga ustavom ut-
vrđena prava.,” in Ustav 1974, član 247.
6 “Kulturális létünk háromszoros kötöttségű. Az autonóm vajdasági-
asságon és az anyanyelvi hagyományokon kívül kihangsúlyozott jelentőséget tula-
jdonítunk a jugoszláv szellemiség tudatunkat alakító befolyásának. A tizenegyedik
munkaév felé,” Magyar Szó – Kilátó. 1975.02.15/11.
7 “mindennek ellenére a magyar munkás nyaralása jóval szervezettebb/
mert hát nekik is vannak munkásaik/ és nekünk is vannak munkásaink” (Domon-
kos-Tolnai 1968: 22.)
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8 Igor Štiks accurately describes this devaluation of the geo-cultural iden-
tity, through the loss of citizenship using the case of independent Slovenia. (Štiks
2010)
9 Gaston Bachelard, The Poetics of Space (Boston: Beacon, 1964), 8.
10 Mircea Eliade, The Saint and the Profane (Harvest Book, Harcourt,
Brace & World, 1987), 20.
11 “Először írom le, hogy Délvidék, miután a Vajdaság szó kezdi elve-
szíteni tartalmát.” István Németh, “Velünk mi lesz?” Magyar Szó – Kilátó. 1992.
06.20./ 12.
12 “Ha hirtelen meg kellene mondani, miért is érint olyan nagyon az
Adriának ez a hirtelen, minden előkészület nélküli megvonása (állítólag katolikus
keresztlevéllel már lehet utazni Horvátországba), akkor az elhagyott vrniki
márványbányák (lásd Böcklin) mellett minden bizonnyal a žuljanai muskátlifákat
is megemlíteném.” Ottó Tolnai, “Feljegyzések a vég tónusához,” in. EX Sympo-
sion, Benyúlás 1992/1-2.
13 See archive on: www.exsymposion.hu
14 Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, eds., The Invention of Tradition
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).
15 “Itt a már alig lélegző/ létező Arankánál/ gyorsan hullani kezdtek/ a
levelek/ közülük mind jobban/ kicsomósodnak/ a fészkek/ és bennük már/ az ősz
fészkel/ Nálunk a már alig lélegző/ létező Arankánál/ nagyra nőtt/ a parlagok/
csöndje és csődje/ már-már az álarcként/ feszülő égig ér.../ lomha madarak/ re-
dőzik, csőrözik/ az enyészetet/ égaljnyi madár/ s a kivesző fákon/ kihűlt fészkek/
vajon jövore is/ azok költenek itt/ akik az idén/ ide rakták,/ sikerítették őket?!”
16 Bachelard 1964: 47.
17 Macondo – an imaginary town in Gabriel García Márquez’s novel 100
Years of Solitude.
18 “Das postmoderne Denken is voller Träume von gemeinschaflichen,
lokalen Wahrheiten und Gewißheiten, von denen man hofft, daß sie jene Aufgabe
der Zivilisierung übernehmen, die die umfassenden, universalistischen Wahrheiten
und Gewißheiten der Nationalstaaten nicht erfüllen konnten; man hofft, daß sie
eine Einheit von Denken, Fühlen, Wollen und Handeln stiften und damit Gewalt
nur als unberechtigt denkbar erscheinen lassen. Die neotribalistischen postulierten
Gemeinschaften können jedoch gar nicht anders, als an diese Hoffnungen zu glau-
ben.” (Miller-Soeffner 1996:59.)
19 See Anderson: 1991: p. 6.
20 Ovo je Jugoslavija!/ Ovo je Srbija!/ Ovo je Vojvodina!/ Ovo je Li-
man!/ Ovo je zgrada!/ Ovo je kerov kurac!
Ez (itt) Jugoszlávia!/ Ez (itt) Szerbia!/ Ez (itt) Vajdaság!/ Ez (itt a)
Limány!/ Ez (itt egy) épület!/ Ez (itt) a kutyék fasza! Jung Károly: Változatok
Pilinszky négysorosára – Limányi anzix. In: Jung. 2002. 51.o.
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21 látlak a Vajhegyen állni/ a frissen meszelt Kálvárián/ alt ima zsong/ s a
stációk mint tüdőszárnyak/ sorra megnyitják kapuik. Harkai Vass: “Triptichon,”
in. Híd. 1993./3. 124.
22 “láttam én más sokféle alsóneműt, és nemcsak nyáron, mikor a Kis-
Dunán vetkőznek a fürdőző asszonyok” Gyula Gobby Fehér: “Sáfrány virágai –
Illatos plánták,” in. Híd, 1993/5-6. 359.
23 Marc Augé, Non-places. Introduction to an Anthropology of Super-
modernity (London-New York: Verso, 1995), 77.
24“leszálltam Kiskunhalason/ negyed kettőkor/ Kelebiára megyek három-
kor/ vajdasági vagyok/ Budán tanulok.” Szakmány György: “Mélázás,” in Sympo-
sion, 1996/007.
25 “Amikor beléptem az I. utcai rendőrkapitányság épületébe, még csak
az foglalkoztatott, vajon mennyit kell megint ácsorognom azért, hogy megkaphas-
sam tartózkodási engedélyemet.” György Szerbhorváth: “Véraláfutás,” in Sympo-
sion, 1995/4, p. 24.
26 “ERNŐ Most azt hiszed, hogy hülye vagyok, mi? Apukám, én azt az
országot nem is láttam! TIBOR Hol voltál? ERNŐ Mint menekülteket asszonyos-
tul, gyerekestül egy Malmö melleti menekülttáborba helyeztek el, de onnan két-
szer engedtek be a városba a másfél év alatt. Se letelepedési engedélyt, se munka-
vállalási engedélyt nem kaptam, és most, hogy állítólag véget ért a háború, szépen,
kulturáltan, svéd udvariassággal repülőgépen szállítottak haza bennünket.” Gyula
Gobby Fehér: “Ezüstlepkék a piacon,” in Híd, 1996/nov., 883.
27 “Aracs/ romos falaidról/ nyúzott bőrként/ hámlanak/ az évszázadok/
Elsüllyedt szentélyed/ fölé koszorút/ burjánzó gyomokból/ az enyészet fon,” Ist-
ván Cs. Simon: “Borong,” in Orbis, 1997/3. 8.
28 Essays about Aracs church ruins, or the medieval Cistercian monastery
located where today the Pétervárad (Petrovaradin) fortress stands, the ruins of
Bács-fortress – from where the name Bácska (Bačka) originates, the small 12th
century church at Marót (Morović)....
29 It is interesting that the first issue bare the subtitle: “Benyúlás” (Reach-
ing into), and the third: “Talajvesztés” (Losing ground).
30 “nekiindultunk a nyári/ húgyszagú pesti estének/ [...]/ miután/ meghalt
az első rákos lánykám/ én pálinkát ittam a Wesselényi úton/ [...]/ a budai reggel
bejött az ablakon/ megcsillant a fulladozó nap.” Anna Terék: “Temetés,” in Híd,
2010.okt. 15.
31 Mer’/ a veszprémi emigráns költő/ az marad ami/ emigráns. Tóbiás
Krisztián: “A veszprémi emigráns költők.” In.: zEtna,
http://www.zetna.org/zek/folyoiratok/62/tobias6.html
32 most hogy immár egy évtizede/ el vagyok vágva/ az adriától/ […]/
gyakran vélem hallani/ azt a tijesnói harangot (Tolnai 2011: 12) (it is also symp-
tomatic that the book was published in Pécs, Hungary)
33 Habermas: 2001.
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Marius Turda, Eugenics and Nation in Early 20th Century Hungary. Ba-
singstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014. 343 pages. ISBN. 9781137293534.
Investigating the history of eugenics in early twentieth-century Hungary
bears great significance for multiple disciplines. Scholars seeking to under-
stand the intellectual history of Hungary in the early decades of the 1900s,
the significance and contribution of Hungarian thinkers to scientific, so-
cial, and political discourses in an international context can find a wealth
of previously unexamined material when they explore the debates on
eugenics in early twentieth century Hungary. Perhaps more significantly,
addressing the issues of the variations of the eugenic discourse that were
prevalent a hundred years ago can help us to arrive at a more nuanced un-
derstanding of the highly complex, contested, and ideologically charged
notions of nation, race, and health — concepts that still are the focal points
of heated socio-political debates in twenty-first century Hungary. Anyone
wishing to examine the intellectual-political dynamics with respect to
health, race and nation should turn to Marius Turda’s monograph, Eugen-
ics and Nation in Early 20th Century Hungary, since it is a thoroughly re-
searched, thought-provoking and highly illuminating study.
Although Turda’s book is a significant addition to the social, po-
litical, and intellectual history of Hungary, those who are more specifically
interested in the (international) history of eugenics will find Eugenics and
Nation a crucial contribution, as well. The international development and
various national adaptations of eugenics have mostly been studied in
Western countries, such as Britain, Germany or the United States. How-
ever, in a community where a struggle for national sovereignty and politi-
cal independence from colonial powers has been a dominant cultural narra-
tive, the significance and stakes of defining “race,” “nation” and “national
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progress” are quite different than in those countries that have been the
dominant forces in world politics and history.
The aim of Turda’s book is to explore how the “vision of social
and biological improvement associated with eugenics became central to
various programs of social reform and national progress” (1) in early twen-
tieth-century Hungary, and to examine how Hungarian intellectuals debat-
ing eugenics interacted with the international scholarly community in this
period. As a result, Turda’s methodology draws on “comparative and intel-
lectual history as well as [on] the history of science and the social history
of medicine” (6). Turda traces the development of a Hungarian approach
and later on a specific national adaptation of eugenic thought from the be-
ginning of the twentieth century to the aftermath of the First World War.
The various chapters helpfully contextualize the specific issues on a na-
tional and international level. On the one hand, this helps the readers to see
the importance of Hungarian eugenics in an international ideological land-
scape. By locating debates on eugenics in a specific cultural and historical
framework, Turda shows in what ways eugenics was important in further-
ing an agenda of the political and social improvement of the nation. Turda
analyses numerous articles published in journals such as Huszadik Század,
Athenaeum, Egészség, Fajegészségügy, A Társadalmi Muzeum Értesítője
and Magyar Társadalomtudományi Szemle and public debates and lectures
delivered at conferences in great detail, and shows the diverse nature of
eugenic thought in Hungary.
Apart from unearthing a facet of Hungarian intellectual and politi-
cal history “which historians have repeatedly edited out of Hungary’s na-
tional past” (6), Turda’s book also makes many relevant and significant
theoretical points. One of the most crucial contributions of the monograph
is that it shows the process and repercussions of equating the notions of
“race” and “nation,” of intermingling biology and science with politics and
nationalism. Turda shows how eugenics facilitated a process whereby “in-
tellectual and political change was […] recast by means of social and bio-
logical diagnosis” (18) and that “as a result, the nation’s body politic was
eugenically choreographed, thereby prompting another phenomenon: the
biologization of national belonging” (8). The legacy of such discourses is
prevalent in contemporary political discourse on a Hungarian and interna-
tional level as well, thus Turda’s study provides an important historical
context to the understanding of current bio-political projects as well.
Since Turda’s book maps out the history of Hungarian debates on
eugenics in the early decades of the 1900s in a nuanced and extremely de-
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tailed manner, it not only serves as a thorough study and introduction to a
specific facet of Hungarian intellectual, scientific, and political history, but
it is a highly useful resource for initiating further research on pertaining
topics. There are many exciting issues and questions, such as the interac-
tion of eugenic discourses and women’s movements, which could not be
elaborated on due to the scope of the study, even if they deserve further
investigation. Although many tenets of eugenics seem incompatible with
feminist ideas, such as emphasizing women’s reproductive duties, in actu-
ality eugenics offered a potential space of social and political participation
for women, in addition to assigning a new ground for citizenship by em-
phasizing women’s responsibilities as “the mothers of the nation.” As
Turda’s book highlights, eugenics indeed intersected with the preliminary
phases of feminism in Hungary. Turda details eugenic ideas by thinkers of
the women’s movement, foregrounding that in the context of birth-control
activism, which was an important facet of eugenic practice, “feminists like
Rosika Schwimmer or Vilma Glücklich connected education and limita-
tion of fertility with women’s social and economic emancipation” (100).
Contextualizing eugenics within the framework of Neo-Malthusian ideas,
Turda also points out that Hungarian feminists who engaged with the ideas
of eugenics were revered internationally. Thus, addressing the intersection
of women’s movements and eugenics within a Hungarian or Central Euro-
pean context would be a valuable contribution to the history of not only
eugenics, but feminism as well.
Moreover, it would be worth examining how the discourse of eu-
genics constructs the notion of disability as a hindrance to the progress of
the whole race. Turda quotes the following passage on African child-
rearing practices by Emil Torday, a Hungarian ethnologist and collector
for the British Museum:
When the infant is born, it is examined carefully; if it is weak or deformed,
then in one way or another, it is no longer allowed to burden its own life
nor handicap its race in the struggle for survival. This is the reason why
one sees no cripples or other kind of defective persons in Central or West
Africa; this is the reason why man there is a man, virile in habit, strong and
lithe in body. (qtd. in Turda 98; first emphasis mine)
This brief excerpt highlights the importance of the interaction between the
individual body and the body politic, and explicitly construes embodied
difference as a liability for the whole nation. The construction of anom-
alous embodiment and monstrosity as an obstacle to national progress has
a long history, and the examination of such discourses in a Central Euro-
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pean context with a view on eugenics would definitely be an exciting area
of research.
Another possible topic offered by Turda’s work is the investigation
of how ideas of eugenics were interpreted and put into practice on reli-
gious grounds, and how eugenics was aligned with metaphysical dis-
courses and logic in general. Revealingly, the “founding father” of eugen-
ics, Francis Galton proposed that after eugenics is explored as an academic
question and accepted as a viable practice, “it must be introduced into the
national conscience, like a new religion” (qtd. in Turda 6). Not only was
eugenics overtly positioned as a “new religion” from the outset, eugenic
ideas seemed to resonate with religious practitioners. For instance, the
Bishop of Székesfehérvár, Ottokár Prohászka “located the regenerative
potential of eugenics within Christian morality and used it to reinforce the
importance of instruction and schooling in the formation of a strong na-
tional community” (90). Although there is no space in Turda’s monograph
to devote chapter-length analyses of religious discourses, addressing the
relationship of eugenics and religious morality could lead to illuminating
insights in future research — especially in Hungary, which has been con-
structed as a country dedicated to the Virgin Mary by the dominant nation-
al narratives. Another prevalent Hungarian cultural narrative is the vision
of “the death of the nation” (nemzethalál-vízió) — it would be exciting to
explore how this dominant cultural anxiety interacted with a founding fear
of eugenics (regardless of nationality), the anxiety about biological and
national degeneration.
As such, apart from being a comprehensively researched and highly
insightful study of the development of eugenics in Hungary, the wealth of
material also makes Turda’s monograph an extremely useful and thought-
provoking ground for future investigations. Turda draws on a great number
of resources, and the book’s useful and instructive index serves as a great
help in trying to locate the many contributors to the debates on eugenics in
the various parts of the study. The monograph’s accessible language
makes sure that Eugenics and Nation is enjoyable not only for scholars but
also for those who are not engaged in academic study but would like to
know more about the history of eugenics or the intellectual landscape of




H. David Baer. The Struggle of Hungarian Lutherans under Communism.
College Station, Texas: A&M University Press, paperback edition, 2013.
164 pages. ISBN 13 978-1-60344-990-8.
I write this review on the basis of better late than never. Baer’s monograph
seems to have had little exposure in Hungarian scholarly circles — which
is unfortunate. Hopefully this book-review will help to ameliorate some-
what that situation. The book at hand deals with an important subject: the
reaction of one of Hungary’s churches to the attempt by the Communists
who ruled the country from 1948 to 1989 to eliminate them or to make
them instruments of the totalitarian state for the control of Hungarian soci-
ety.
Hungary’s churches had a taste as to what can happen when Com-
munists take power: during the commune in Hungary in the summer of
1919 the ruling Communists unleashed a reign of terror on the churches
and religious life and would have no doubt caused them irreparable dam-
age had their experiment with leftist politics not come to an end after a few
months. After this episode of torment for the country’s faithful, organized
religious life rebounded and the following two decades saw a golden age
for Hungary’s churches.
Highly supportive of the churches in these decades was the regime
of Admiral Miklós Horthy. His rule has often been portrayed as “fascist”
by polemicists and even some historians. Baer considers this depiction of
the Horthy regime “inaccurate”, he admits however that it could be called
“oddly authoritarian” (p. 10). Under Horthy, the churches “flourished”. In
the “political and civil spheres” they had more influence than they had be-
fore 1914. The “accepted” churches, including the Lutheran Church, re-
ceived state subsidies. Together with the Roman Catholics and the Cal-
vinists they operated about two-thirds of the country’s elementary schools
and three-quarters of its teacher-training institutions. The Lutherans had
four dioceses headed by bishops — two of whom, Zoltán Túróczy and La-
jos Ordass, would play large roles in the story Baer tells.
Although Hungary was occupied by the Red Army in 1945, it
wasn’t till 1948 that the country’s churches were subjected to the full force
of communist repression. The greatest crisis was caused by the govern-
ment’s decision to nationalize parochial schools. Bishop Túróczy came to
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the conclusion that the Church had to yield to the state’s wishes in this
matter, while Ordass refused to consent to the idea. Despite fierce resis-
tance to the plan, mainly by the Roman Catholic Church, the law to na-
tionalize the country’s parochial schools was passed by Hungary’s com-
munist-dominated Parliament. Unlike Cardinal Mindszenty of the R.C.
Church, Bishop Ordass organised no resistance to the process of school
nationalization. Still, the authorities decided to remove him from office
and, after a while, succeeded in arresting him and convicting him on
charges that he violated some obscure rules for the handling of diocesan
finances. Compromising with the regime in the manner of Bishop Túróczy,
and resisting its anti-church measures in the fashion of Bishop Ordass,
would remain the two often contradictory approaches Hungary’s Lutheran
Church would use in the following four decades of communist rule. The
advocates of both lines used theological as well as historical arguments to
support their position, arguments that Baer outlines and analyzes in great
detail. Both strategies were designed to ensure the Church’s long-term sur-
vival. Later, other approaches surfaced, including the idea that in its strug-
gle against the atheist assault, the Church might have to undergo martyr-
dom.
In the Rákosi era of Hungarian history (1948-56) not only the per-
sonnel of the Church’s elite changed but the role of the leading clergy was
transformed also. Church leaders were no longer accountable to their flock
but to the authorities who put them into their positions. Often they func-
tioned as propagandists for the Communists and they also developed what
Baer calls “a new theology of socialism” (p. 45). In the process theological
arguments were invented for the justification of totalitarian socialism. This
process took Túróczy and his colleagues’ non-resistance to communist
anti-church measures, to their successors’ complete cooperation with the
regime. This was collaborationism at its worse.
Opposition to this state of affairs within the Church was slow to
gather momentum but by the early fall of 1956 it had become substantial.
Almost as an unrelated development, Bishop Ordass was rehabilitated of
his “crimes” and was to start teaching at Hungary’s Lutheran seminary on
the 24th of October, but by then events in the country had overtaken these
developments. A revolution broke out in Budapest on the 23rd. As a conse-
quence and a result of the resignation of two other bishops, Ordass became
the senior bishop of his Church. Interestingly, the restoration to power by
the Communists did not lead to Ordass’s immediate removal from office.
By year’s end, however, relations between Ordass and his political superi-
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ors deteriorated and, after a long process of recriminations, he was si-
lenced again.
Ordass’s successor became Zoltán Káldy. Baer describes him as
“an ambiguous, partly tragic figure.” Some people saw in him a col-
laborator, others a “pragmatic defender of the church.” In Baer’s view, he
was responsible for inflicting “countless and unnecessary psychic wounds”
on members of his flock, both pastors and parishioners (p. 93). In the mid-
1960s he advanced his theology of diaconia, the church in the service of
the socialist society, which became the Church’s official theology espe-
cially after 1967 when Káldy assumed the position of his country’s senior
Lutheran bishop (p. 97). In the following decade, Káldy became the pre-
eminent figure of Hungarian Lutheranism. An acknowledgement of his
stature was his election in 1984 as president of the Lutheran World Federa-
tion. Rather than using his new-found international prestige to enhance the
position of his Church, Baer tells us that Káldy spent his time trying to
settle scores with priests who had crossed him in the past. By this time
Káldy “was a lost man, preoccupied only with his own prestige…” (p.
109). Late in 1985 he suffered a stroke and died two years later. Baer’s
overall assessment of Káldy and his theology of diaconia is unflattering.
The theology, in Baer’s words, was “originally only a theological excuse
for compromising with the regime,” but it later “became… one more way
of… legitimating socialism,” and Káldy, despite his good intentions, “be-
came a mere player in the communist game…” (p. 122).
After the 1989 events that saw the transition in Hungary from to-
talitarian rule to multi-party democracy, the leadership of the Lutheran
Church granted “moral satisfaction” to all those in the Church who “suf-
fered unjustly” because of wrongs committed against them by the Church.
Many members argued that such a facile apology “did not confront the
past but glassed it over” (p. 124). In the meantime other developments re-
sulted in the return of the Church to its pre-1948 position in Hungarian
society. Important among these processes was the re-opening of some of
the schools that had been nationalised by the Communists. A group within
the Church called for new elections for all church offices but action on this
demand was stalled — and acrimony regarding the Church’s transition
continued. The path to a free church in a free society was burdened by the
legacy of four decades of oppression. This era of repression has been com-
pared to the “Babylonian captivity” of the Jews in Biblical times. Baer
points out that when that captivity ended, the Jews could march back to
Jerusalem — but when the Lutherans of Hungary became free of com-
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munist rule, they had no Jerusalem to return to but had to embark on a
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